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Abstract
With the aggressive scaling of device geometries, the yield of complex Multi Core Single Chip
(MCSC) systems with many cores will decrease due to the higher probability of manufac-
turing defects especially, in dies with a large area. Disintegration of large System-on-Chips
(SoCs) into smaller chips called chiplets has shown to improve the yield and cost of com-
plex systems. Therefore, platform-based computing modules such as embedded systems
and micro-servers have already adopted Multi Core Multi Chip (MCMC) architectures over
MCSC architectures. Due to the scaling of memory intensive parallel applications in such
systems, data is more likely to be shared among various cores residing in different chips
resulting in significant increase in chip-to-chip traffic, especially one-to-many traffic. This
one-to-many traffic is originated mainly to maintain cache-coherence between many cores
residing in multiple chips. Besides, one-to-many traffics are also exploited by many parallel
programming models, system level synchronization mechanisms, and control signals. How-
ever, state-of-the-art Network-on-Chip (NoC)-based wired interconnection architectures do
not provide enough support as they handle such one-to-many traffic as multiple unicast traffic
using a multi-hop MCMC communication fabric. As a result, even a small portion of such
one-to-many traffic can significantly reduce system performance as traditional NoC-based
interconnect cannot mask the high latency and energy consumption caused by chip-to-chip
wired I/Os. Moreover, with the increase in memory intensive applications and scaling of
MCMC systems, traditional NoC-based wired interconnects fail to provide a scalable inter-
connection solution required to support the increased cache-coherence and synchronization
generated one-to-many traffic in future MCMC-based High-Performance Computing (HPC)
iv
nodes. Therefore, these computation and memory intensive MCMC systems need an energy
efficient, low latency, and scalable one-to-many (broadcast/multicast) traffic-aware intercon-
nection infrastructure to ensure high-performance.
Research in recent years has shown that Wireless Network-in-Package (WiNiP) archi-
tectures with CMOS compatible Millimeter-Wave (mm-wave) transceivers can provide a
scalable, low latency, and energy-efficient interconnect solution for on and off-chip communi-
cation. In this dissertation, a one-to-many traffic-aware WiNiP interconnection architecture
with a starvation-free hybrid Medium Access Control (MAC), an asymmetric topology, and a
novel flow control has been proposed. The different components of the proposed architecture
are individually one-to-many traffic-aware and as a system, they collaborate with each other
to provide required support for one-to-many traffic communication in a MCMC environment.
It has been shown that such interconnection architecture can reduce energy consumption and
average packet latency by 46.96% and 47.08% respectively for MCMC systems.
Despite providing performance enhancements, wireless channel, being an unguided medium,
is vulnerable to various security attacks such as jamming induced Denial-of-Service (DoS),
eavesdropping, and spoofing. Further, to minimize the time-to-market and design costs,
modern SoCs often use Third Party IPs (3PIPs) from untrusted organizations. An adver-
sary either at the foundry or at the 3PIP design house can introduce a malicious circuitry,
to jeopardize a SoC. Such malicious circuitry is known as a Hardware Trojan (HT). An HT
planted in the WiNiP from a vulnerable design or manufacturing process can compromise a
Wireless Interface (WI) to enable illegitimate transmission through the infected WI resulting
in a potential DoS attack for other WIs in the MCMC system. Moreover, HTs can be used
for various other malicious purposes, including battery exhaustion, functionality subversion,
and information leakage. This information when leaked to a malicious external attacker
can reveal important information regarding the application suites running on the system,
thereby compromising the user profile. To address persistent jamming-based DoS attack in
WiNiP, in this dissertation, a secure WiNiP interconnection architecture for MCMC systems
has been proposed that re-uses the one-to-many traffic-aware MAC and existing Design for
Testability (DFT) hardware along with Machine Learning (ML) approach. Furthermore, a
novel Simulated Annealing (SA)-based routing obfuscation mechanism was also proposed to
protect against an HT-assisted novel traffic analysis attack. Simulation results show that,
the ML classifiers can achieve an accuracy of 99.87% for DoS attack detection while SA-based
routing obfuscation could reduce application detection accuracy to only 15% for HT-assisted
traffic analysis attack and hence, secure the WiNiP fabric from age-old and emerging attacks.
v
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Extensive computation requirements for various applications and their ever-increasing de-
mand have driven chip designers towards massive integration arena for Complementary
Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) devices. For decades, the silicon industry has exploited
Moore’s law to satisfy the exponential growth in the functionality required for application
domains like weather forecasting, astrophysics, bioinformatics, computer graphics, and many
others. To provide the required performance for such computation expensive applications,
computing platforms have undergone a paradigm shift form Single Core Single Chip (SCSC)
architecture to Multi Core Single Chip (MCSC) architecture due to the increased parallelism
and low-power consumption offered by MCSC paradigm. As the design and integration com-
plexity continue to increase in MCSC systems, recently, High Performance Computing (HPC)
systems such as server blades and embedded systems have adopted Multi Core Multichip
(MCMC) architecture over MCSC to ensure higher reliability, yield, and hence, lower cost.
Such MCMC architectures accompanied by the increase in memory intensive applications
and device scaling have significant impact on design requirements for various components
of the system. Therefore, to achieve the desired performance and meet the system require-
ments, memory subsystem, interconnect, integration, even the core micro architecture need
to be redesigned accordingly. Moreover, due to the increase of Third Party IPs (3PIPs)
for low cost and faster time to market, security has become a major concern in current
MCMC systems. The research presented in this dissertation considers one-to-many traffic
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requirements, issues and challenges in a MCMC system and proposes a novel interconnection
architecture to overcome them while ensuring a secure communication from various threats
and vulnerabilities associated with the proposed interconnect.
In this chapter, some essential background starting from the SCSC system, interconnect
evolution, MCMC systems have been discussed in Section 1.1, which justifies the need for
MCMC system for future computing platforms. The issues in MCMC systems including one-
to-many traffic requirement have been discussed in Section 1.3. These issues in MCMC have
motivated this research to adopt wireless interconnect as a solution and discussed in Section
1.4. The challenges of the wireless interconnect especially the communication security have
been presented in Section 1.4.2. The chapter concludes by describing the research objectives
and contributions in Section 1.5 and Section 1.6 respectively.
1.1 Background
With technology scaling and increased operating frequency for higher performance, both
static and dynamic power increase significantly for SCSC systems in advanced technology
nodes. This upsurge in power consumption not only increases chip temperature but also
decreases chip reliability and performance. On the other hand, increase in device density
due to scaling has not only resulted in increased power consumption density, but also in
the dramatic increase of global wires in a single chip. Unlike local wires and gate delays,
Figure 1.1: Interconnect (a) Delay and (b) Power consumption trend.
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the global interconnect delay does not scale with the technology due to Resistive-Capacitive
(RC) and inductive coupling [9] which also limits the maximum clock frequency of the
system. Figure 1.1 shows the RC delay and power density trend according to International
Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS), 2013 [10] and also have been discussed
in [11]. In a nutshell, the SCSC design lacks the speed and energy efficiency required by
the future computation expensive system. Therefore, we need a power efficient interconnect
solution that can satisfy the requirements of the future computation intensive HPC nodes.
The MCSC system has appeared as a feasible solution to address the power and fre-
quency limitations of the uniprocessor system [12]. Multicore systems according to Flynn’s
taxonomy can be thought as an example of Multiple Instruction Multiple Data (MIMD)
computing organization, where different cores execute different threads (Multiple Instruc-
tions), working on different parts of memory (Multiple Data) concurrently [13]. Therefore,
a multicore system can exploit the parallelism by running more tasks in different cores in
parallel. Because of the parallelism, cores can run at a lower frequency along with reduced
operating voltage and still can produce significant speedup. Therefore, MCSC systems can
reduce both dynamic and static power consumption while meeting the required performance
for computation intensive systems. Intel’s 80 core Polaris [14] and 48 core Single-chip Cloud
Computer (SCC) [15], Tilera’s 64 core Tile 64 [16] are some examples of MCSC systems.
However, as we integrate more numbers of cores in a system, due to the significant increase
in Communication-to-Computation ratio (C2C), the communication architecture plays a vi-
tal role to determine the system performance. Traditional bus-based interconnection fabrics
for System-on-Chip (SoC) like the ARM AMBA [17] and the IBM Core Connect [18] are
based on a shared wired bus and therefore, cannot support multiple communication and
require significant arbitration overhead. Moreover, with the increase in the number of con-
nected cores to the bus, the parasitic capacitance of the interconnect increases significantly
making the shared bus-based approach a non-scalable solution for future multicore SoC. Even
after repeater insertion interconnect delay might exceed a single clock cycle. Bus splitting
[19], various coding techniques [20] have been introduced to reduce power consumption and
delay of the system. However, with an increase in the number of cores in the design, the in-
creased complexity in implementing those methodologies fails to provide any viable solution.
Given the limitations of traditional bus-based interconnect and importance of interconnects
on overall system performance, the research focus in multicore systems have been shifted
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from computation to scalable communication architecture required for future HPC systems.
The Network-On-Chip (NoC) paradigm has emerged as an interconnection infrastructure
enabling the integration of hundreds of cores on the same die [21]. The NoC separates the
computational cores from the interconnection, hence, communication needs and provides a
scalable plug-and-play network for data communication. In NoC interconnection architec-
ture, cores within each chip communicate with each other through on-chip switches [22].
These switches are connected by a regular topology which makes the interconnect determin-
istic and scalable. The inter-switch distances are maintained carefully so that data can reach
to the next core within a single cycle. Moreover, the switches usually follow a pipelined ar-
chitecture to increase the system throughput even more. Unlike traditional circuit-switched
wire-based system, NoC implements packet switched network where each packet is composed
of many flow control units, flits. The NoC architecture can also be configured to provide
a hybrid of packet switching and circuit switching methodology to achieve the desired per-
formance. In short, various routing and switching protocol can be adopted to improve the
system performance further. In NoC interconnection architecture, as more number of cores
can communicate simultaneously, it significantly increases the throughput and reduces com-
munication latency. Figure 1.2 shows a NoC interconnection architecture arranged in a
regular mesh. Intel’s 80 core Polaris [14] and 48 core SCC [15], Tilera’s 64 core Tile 64 [16]
multicore systems implement NoC as the communication fabric.
Figure 1.2: Regular mesh NoC topology with switch.
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Table 1.1: Yield improvement with chip size reduction
Dies/package Cores/die Die dimension (X × Y mm2) Good die/wafer Yield (%)
1 64 20 × 20 86 60.8
2 32 20 × 10 232 77.5
4 16 10 × 10 545 87.9
8 8 10 × 5 1186 93.7
16 4 5 × 5 2471 96.8
1.2 Multichip Multicore Systems: Motivations
As the demand for performance continues to grow up to 300×, according to ITRS [23],
100x cores need to be integrated to meet such performance. Though NoC can provide a
scalable interconnection solution to integrate a large number of cores, integration of such a
large number of cores in a single chip is faced with another massive challenge. In advanced
process nodes, different factors such as sub-wavelength lithography, line edge roughness, and
random dopant fluctuation can cause a wide process variation, which can result in higher fault
density [24] and hence, lower yield. Figure 1.3 shows this phenomenon where we considered
two wafers with two different size dies. The wafer with a smaller die size has a higher yield.
Therefore, the disintegration of large multicore processors into smaller chips called, chiplets







This is because the disintegration will decrease the area of individual chips and therefore,
improve the yield of the individual chips. Table 1.1 shows the increase in yield for implement-
ing a system with an increasing number of chips ranging from a single monolithic chip to 16
chips manufactured in a 300 mm round wafer. We consider a total of 64 cores in the system
and a moderate fault density of 0.13/cm2 as reported by ITRS for current process nodes.
The yield has been calculated using the Murphy model [26] as shown in equation 1.1. Where
Y is the yield, A is the die area, D is the defect density. Disintegrating a large chip with 64
cores into smaller chips or chiplets will result in steadily increasing yield. These smaller chips
or chiplets are integrated into a platform-based system and enable the integration of chiplets
from heterogeneous process technologies or functionalities. This, in turn, offers both process
and functional flexibility in the design while eliminating the design and manufacturing com-
plexity of large SoCs. MCMC computing modules with multiple processors or chiplets can
be found in a wide range of platform-based designs from servers to embedded systems. An
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example of such a MCMC module is the AMD EPYC series released in 2017 [27], which is
a processor system designed for sophisticated servers. The EPYC Threadripper processor
node is available as a 4-chip System-in-Package (SiP) with 8 cores in each chip, fabricated
in 14 nm lithography technology. However, these new approaches require multiple chips to
be interconnected efficiently to ensure desired performance with low cost. Moreover, the
existing multichip systems can have processing chips such as multicore chips, CPUs, GPUs
or a heterogeneous mix of such chips [28] (e.g., AMD’s Fusion Accelerated Processor Units
(APUs)) depending upon desired functionality. Moreover, disintegration enables a chip to
be reused efficiently in different systems to provide the required functionality.
1.3 Challenges of Multichip Multicore Systems
Though disintegrating a large die into smaller chiplets improves yield and reduces cost per die,
it also provides less functionality as it has now a fewer number of cores integrated into a small
area. Aggregating more number of small chiplets in a single package can provide the similar
functionality of a large chip having thousands of cores. The increased coordination among
several chiplets results in a significant increase in chip-to-chip communication. Moreover,
often these data packets need to encounter protocol conversion overhead while traveling chip-
to-chip paths. Depending on interconnect, integration methodology used, and the nature
of the traffics that exist in such MCMC environment, the design of the MCMC system
Figure 1.3: Fault for different die size (a) Large die (b) Small die.
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can be faced with different challenges. However, it is obvious that, along with intra-chip
communication, inter-chip communication needs to evolve at a rapid pace in a seamless
manner to avoid being the performance bottleneck of the next generation HPC nodes.
1.3.1 Integration Issues with Wired Interconnect
Several metal-based integration and interconnection methodologies have been used to design
the communication fabric in a MCMC environment. In traditional Two Dimensional (2D)
multichip platforms, inter-chip communication happens through C4 bumps coupled with
flip-chip packaging [29] or through Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) or PCI express
(PCIe) which is a common local I/O bus standard. Recent trends according to the ITRS [23]
predicts that the pitch of the wired I/O interconnects, solder bumps or pads in Integrated
Circuits (ICs) is not scaling as fast as the gate lengths or pitch of on-chip interconnects
as shown in Figure 1.4. This implies a gap in density and performance of traditional I/O
systems relative to on-chip interconnections. The wiring complexity of both on-chip and
off-chip interconnects exacerbates the problem by posing design challenges, crosstalk, and
signal integrity issues [30]. All these factors along with protocol conversion overheads cause
additional delay and reduce the energy efficiency for 2D multichip platforms.
On the other hand, in Three Dimensional (3D) integration technology, multiple chips can
Figure 1.4: Scaling of I/O pitch and minimum global interconnect pitch.
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be stacked on top of each other in different layers and hence can exploit the spatial proximity
of the chips to provide low latency multichip communication [31]. Moreover, 3D integration
can integrate CMOS with other disparate non-silicon technologies stacked in different layers
to establish interconnection between them. However, complex thermal management tech-
niques are required to address the higher power dissipation densities in 3D ICs due to smaller
footprints. These thermal management techniques vary from dynamic power management
methods such as Dynamic Voltage Frequency Scaling (DVFS), temperature-aware task mi-
gration [32] or microfluidic cooling channels for better heat circulation [33]. Moreover, die
thinning for the fabrication of Through-Silicon-Vias (TSVs) to connect multiple layers results
in lower yields.
In 2.5D integration technique, multiple chip modules are placed side by side on another
die called interposer that contains several metal layers in it through which the multiple chips
are connected to each other [34]. These metal layers are fabricated using the same Back-
End-of-Line (BEOL) processes as the traditional metal interconnect inside dies. An array of
µ-bumps are then used to provide an electrical connection between the dies and the top metal
layers of the interposer using Redistribution Layers (RDL). Either TSVs or RDL can be used
for the interposer to package interconnection to route signal, power, and ground to package
C4 bumps. In 2.5D integration, the disintegration of processor chips will lower the total
manufacturing cost considering the fact that smaller die size will result in higher yield and
better packing of the rectangular die on a round wafer [35]. Moreover, in 2.5D integration,
the processor chips do not need to undergo die thinning process alleviating the manufacturing
woes of monolithic 3D IC. However, interposer metal layer usage has been limited by the edge-
to-edge connection among neighboring chips making the available resources underutilized.
Moreover, the number of chips that can be integrated using interposer is limited by the
silicon die size used as an interposer.
1.3.2 Integration Issues with Alternative Interconnects
As conventional wire-based interconnection architectures limit the performance of future
MCMC systems, an alternative emerging interconnect technology along with NoC framework
have the potential to provide the required performance for future MCMC systems. Integrated
inter and intra-chip photonic interconnections [36][2] is a promising solution to the off-chip
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interconnection challenges as it provides ultrahigh bandwidth, low power consumption, high
noise immunity [37]. Moreover, the enormous bandwidth provided by optical interconnect
can be leveraged through Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) to increase the capacity
and performance of the system. However, optical interconnect poses many new challenges
such as huge static power consumption [38]. The laser source used for an optical signal
generation has very low efficiency. The micro resonator used in the optical interconnect
architectures needs thermal tuning as its wavelength selectivity varies with temperature.
The photonic signal cannot be buffered directly and therefore requires electrical conversion
and hence introduce additional delay. Most importantly, most of the nanophotonic devices
lack compatibility with standard CMOS process.
The Zenneck Surface Wave Interconnect (SWI) is an emerging interconnect which is es-
sentially an in homogeneous 2D electromagnetic wave (EM) supported by a surface. The
surface is a designed waveguide that traps the EM in two-dimensional media [39]. As a result,
the electrical-field decay rate in the SWI from the source horizontally along the boundary is
around 1√
d
, where d is the distance from the source [41]. This low power dissipation allows
the SWI to offer relatively linear Joules per bit scaling compared to the higher order scaling
of regular global buffered wire interconnects. However, though the surface wave interconnect
provides energy efficient multicast/broadcast message transmission the surface itself needs
to be designed carefully to match the desired impedance. Therefore, designing such a sur-
face with precise dimension and material is very challenging. Moreover, making the surface
wave incident at the required Brewster angle for maximum transmission efficiency requires
an additional transducer and hence increases the design complexity.
1.3.3 Challenges of One-to-many Traffic
Although different kinds of traffic exist in a MCMC environment, in this thesis, the impor-
tance of one-to-many traffic has been highlighted as a small portion of such traffic can degrade
system performance significantly. State-of-the-art interconnects do not provide enough sup-
port for such traffic and hence, it is very challenging to come up with a one-to-many traffic-
aware architecture. To overcome this challenge, it is critical to understand their sources and
impact on MCMC systems as described in the following sections.
9
One-to-many Traffic Sources and Trend
Due to the scaling of parallel applications, the computation is likely to be distributed among
various cores residing in different chips increasing the communication-to-computation ratio
in MCMC systems. Also, due to application scaling, several applications can be mapped to
different subsets of cores located in different chips. Moreover, as modern applications are
memory intensive, such a SiP with in-package memory modules is very common. Therefore,
traffic pattern in those compute nodes not only consists of the core to core unicast messages
but also a memory to core multicast/broadcast messages. Since, multiple copies of the same
data is shared among several caches across multiple chips, these one-to-many traffic patterns
(multicast/broadcast) mainly originates from cache coherence protocols used in a multicore
system. Cache coherence methods ensures that cores in all the chips see the same and the
latest value of the shared variable during a read operation. To enforce this, communication
between caches and hence multiple chips is required.
The directory or snooping based cache coherency is one of the primary sources of such mul-
ticast/broadcast messages in a shared memory SiP that uses multicast to invalidate a shared
cache block or broadcast the updated block for the requesting cores. Although snooping-
based cache coherence protocols are simple to implement in bus-based processors, they gen-
erally require additional broadcast-based support for global communication and hence, does
Figure 1.5: Number of multicast messages per 1M instructions in application specific traffic.
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not represent a scalable solution in handling one-to-many traffic in a many core architecture.
On the other hand, directory-based cache coherence protocols with few multicast and direc-
tories acting as ordering points reduce the overhead associated with global communication
and ordered delivery. However, directory-based protocols incur additional area and power
overhead to maintain directories and also lowers performance due to indirection. Irrespective
of the cache coherence protocol used, due to scaling of parallel applications, transaction to
manage shared data among multiple cores/chips in MCMC systems is increasing mainly as
one-to-many traffic pattern. Figure 1.5 shows the number of multicast messages injected per
one million instruction for MESI and AMD Hyper Transport (HypT) cache coherence pro-
tocol in a 64 core system with 64 KB, 2-way L1 cache (ID) and 512 KB of shared, 8-way L2
cache for PARSEC [40] and SPLASH2 [41] benchmark traffic patterns [42]. Though MESI
protocol maintains a low multicast intensity, HypT, on the other hand being a broadcast
based protocol injects a significant amount of traffic in the network. Moreover, the number
of destinations for such multicast/broadcast messages varies from 5 to 27 in such multicore
systems and consequently such one-to-many traffic can be as huge as 80% of the entire ex-
isting traffic in such systems [42]. Therefore, though the number of multicast message per
one million instruction is small, the total amount of multicast traffic is significant, as each
message needs to be delivered to multiple destinations.
Moreover, many control signals such as passing global states, power gating, and bar-
rier synchronization require multicast/broadcast messages to be sent efficiently through the
communication network. In message passing, widely employed collective primitives such
as MPI Allgather or MPI Allreduce use multicast. Finally, novel computing paradigms
such as spiking neural network [43], genetic algorithm-based computation [44] could be also
multicast-driven. As the Last Level Cache (LLC) is distributed and the main memory is
shared among all the cores in such multichip system, the number of one-to-many messages
are significant as discussed in the previous paragraph.
State-of-the-art Wired Interconnect Support for One-to-many Traffic
Traditional NoC-based wired interconnection architectures are mainly designed to handle
on-chip unicast traffic and therefore, the most simple mechanism to handle one-to-many
traffic is to treat them as repeated unicast message. In this unicast-based mechanism the
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one-to-many message is replicated as many times as the number of destinations as each
replica is served independently which makes the mechanism inefficient for large number of
destination nodes. Other one-to-many traffic handling methodologies include either path-
base or tree-based routing schemes [45]. In path-based routing, multiple replicas of the
original message are send to several groups of destinations. Within each group, a copy of
the message is consumed and the original flit is forwarded to the next destination. While
in tree-based routing, a single original message is injected by the source which is replicated
at the intermediate switches and delivered to the desired destinations following a spanning
tree. However, both of the methodologies cause severe local and global congestion as they
generate many replicas of the original message and therefore, incur significant power, area,
and delay overhead.
Figure 1.6: Performance (a) Bandwidth (b) Energy (c) Latency degradation due to one-to-
many traffic in MCMC systems using wired interconnect.
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Impact on MCMC System Performance
In addition, NoC being an on-chip interconnection network cannot mask the high latency
and power overhead caused by chip-to-chip I/Os. Similarly, due to its multihop nature, in
NoC interconnection architecture the multicast/broadcast latency increases with system size.
As a result, even a small amount of such one-to-many traffic can introduce heavy local and
global congestion, and thus can significantly reduce system performance irrespective of the
adopted routing scheme [46]. Figure 1.6 shows the average bandwidth and average packet
energy degradation for a 4 chip system with 16 cores in each chip using conventional wired in-
terconnect for multichip communication. Figure 1.6 is clear representation of the consequence
of having poor one-to-many traffic support on MCMC system performance. The MCMC per-
formance becomes even worse as these systems are scaled. As one-to-many traffic represents
collective communication, it can significantly slow down the execution time of cache coherent
processors with no or limited support [47]. It has been shown in [48] that poor management
of one-to-many traffic arising from synchronization can reduce system performance by 40%.
Switch optimization [49], one-to-many traffic-aware topology [50] can be designed to reduce
average communication latency for such systems. However, such architectural optimizations
non-scalable and often come with huge complexities and overheads. Therefore, to ensure
low-latency for one-to-many data transfer for such MCMC systems, a scalable, one-to-many
traffic aware in-package interconnection architecture referred to Network-in Package (NiP)
is required.
1.4 Millimeter-wave Wireless Interconnect: An Emerg-
ing Solution
Manufacturing and fabrication limitations associated with emerging interconnect technolo-
gies discussed in previous sections limits them from being implemented as a CMOS compati-
ble and energy efficient communication backbone. Research in recent years has demonstrated
that on-chip and off-chip wireless interconnects can establish radio communications within
as well as multiple chips. On-chip antennas with multi Giga Hertz (GHz) bandwidths in
millimeter-wave (mm-wave) bands, specifically, in the unlicensed 60GHz band, ranging up
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to 10m are fabricated and demonstrated [51]. Figure 1.7 shows a conceptual view of mm-
wave wireless communication in a MCMC environment. Throughout this dissertation, such
mm-wave NiP for MCMC will be called as Wireless NiP (WiNiP). While mm-wave intercon-
nects for MCSC system will be termed as Wireless NoC (WiNoC). Recently, the feasibility
of WiNiP in energy efficient chip-to-chip data communication has also been investigated
[3]. Though on-chip antenna operating in Tera Hertz (THz) band using Carbon Nanotube
(CNT) or Graphene-based structures can provide wireless channels with higher bandwidth
[52][53], integration of these antennas with the CMOS process faces significant challenges and
therefore cannot be adopted for intra and inter-chip communication. On the other hand,
mm-wave wireless on-chip embedded antennas for intra-chip and inter-chip communication
are designed and evaluated in [54]. However, such a wireless system has so many challenges
to overcome. The advantages and challenges of mm-wave wireless interconnect architectures
have been discussed in the following sections.
1.4.1 Advantages of Mm-wave Wireless Interconnects
Apart from the low latency and energy efficiency offered by mm-wave wireless interconnects,
one of the key motivating factors of using mm-wave wireless interconnect is the CMOS com-
patibility. The mm-wave transceiver and antenna being CMOS compatible can be readily
integrated with other components in the SoC. Moreover, there is no need for the layout of
physical interconnects, neither metallic nor optical fibers. This implies that the designs will
Figure 1.7: A conceptual view of MCMC mm-wave wireless communication.
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be more flexible and modular. Therefore, systems can be designed in a plug-and-play man-
ner where the interconnect routing and placement will not impose additional constraints
on the system design. Eliminating interconnect place-and-route procedures for large and
complex systems can result in a significant reduction in design, test, and verification times.
Chiplets equipped with wireless transceivers can be just integrated on a physical platform
without the need for physical interconnect layout, thus simplifying the design and integra-
tion process. This will reduce time-to-market for multichip systems, potentially reducing
cost. The omnidirectional mm-wave antenna can be used for efficient multicast/broadcast
transmission. This provides additional advantages for control and cache coherent traffic
transmission. Moreover, the 60GHz spectrum is unlicensed and therefore mitigates channel
acquisition cost.
1.4.2 Challenges of Mm-wave Wireless Interconnects
Mm-wave wireless interconnects have emerged as a CMOS compatible, energy-efficient, low
latency intra and inter-chip interconnect solution. However, many researches have been
going on to address different challenges of mm-wave wireless interconnect to make it the
next generation interconnect for future HPC systems. Some of those challenges have been
described briefly in the section below.
Energy-Efficient and High-Speed Transceiver Design
Inter-chip wireless links require extremely low energy consumption to be competitive with
high-speed wired I/O and other emerging technologies such as photonic interconnects. The
power consumption in data transmission over wireless medium mainly occurs at the trans-
mitters and receivers. The choice of the transceiver is dependent on the choice of the physical
layer and modulation technique. Modulation techniques such as Binary Phase Shift Key-
ing (BPSK) [55], Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) requires sophisticated receiver
design and often consumes high power. Therefore, many mm-wave interconnect designs
consider using non-coherent On-off-Keying (OOK) modulation for its simplicity and energy
efficiency. Non-coherent modulations eliminate power-hungry, high-frequency carrier recov-
ery circuits such as Phase Locked Loops (PLLs) resulting in low power consumption in the
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transceivers. A 20Gbps OOK transceiver operating at 260GHz with a bit energy consump-
tion of 58.65pJ/bit is designed in 65nm technology [56]. Due to the low voltage headroom in
advanced technology nodes, the power output of the transmitter would be limited. However,
Fully Depleted Silicon on Insulator (FD-SOI) processes in advanced nodes such as 45nm
or 28nm can provide higher power-performance trade-offs due to faster transistor switching
[57]. However, irrespective of the technology nodes, significant improvement in data rate is
very challenging using OOK modulation technique.
Antenna Design
The most important criteria for the antenna is that it should be embedded on a die while
supporting high bandwidths. Therefore, it needs a small footprint, which in turn dictates
the choice of the carrier frequency as the antenna size is proportional to the wavelength of
the carrier. In order to provide an energy-efficient alternative to the traditional inter-chip
interconnects the wireless interconnects must also provide competitive data rates. There-
fore, to enable multi-GHz bandwidths and a small antenna footprint, the minimum carrier
frequencies need to be in the mm-wave range higher than a few tens of GHz. Many on-chip
antennas like meander dipole, zigzag dipole, slot, loop, inverted F, bow-tie, and Yagi have
been designed and investigated [58]. In order to improve directional gains of on-chip an-
tennas fixed beam log-periodic antennas are also investigated [59]. Phased antenna arrays
provide the advantage of high directive gain with beam steering although, with additional
feeding circuitry. However, given the wavelengths of a few millimeters and die sizes of few
millimeters across, it is challenging to design antennas arrays to enable beam-steering for
intra and inter-chip wireless communication. A metal mm-wave zigzag antenna [60] has been
demonstrated to possess the required characteristics for intra and inter-chip communication
as they are more compact compared to other antenna structures such as a patch antenna.
In addition, such mm-wave antennas fabricated using top layer metals are CMOS process
compatible making them suitable for near-term solutions to the wired interconnect problem.
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Robust Wireless Channel Modeling
The medium of communication between chips is envisioned to be partially through the air
between the chips and through a stack of silicon/silicon dioxide or packaging and encase-
ment of the individual chips. Due to the wide variety of materials used in the fabrication
of chips even more diversified by the integration of heterogeneous chiplets in a multichip
system specific channel models need to be developed to fine-tune consequent antenna and
transceiver design. This introduces challenges in having universal solutions that will fit all
environments. The distance between the chips will be the dominant factor affecting the
path loss. For normal outdoor and indoor communications, there are many channel models
like log-normal or Saleh-Valenzuela (SV) model [61]. In modern processing platforms, chip
encapsulant (epoxy mold), the substrate (organic, ceramic), underfill (epoxy composites),
and other materials are used to securely pack the silicon die in an end-user package. So, it is
required to characterize their complex permittivity i.e. dielectric constant and loss tangent
in the mm-wave spectrum as in [62]. Furthermore, reflections from the metallic components
in package and encapsulations such as heat-sinks, heat-spreaders, can cause multipath prop-
agation which may cause delay spreads and therefore, create inter-symbol interference (ISI).
The delay-spread and ISI in these environments also need to be captured with small-scale
channel model for transceiver designs. Specific frequencies and structures make it difficult
to generalize channel models to be used in other frequencies and scenarios. All these fac-
tors make the channel in a multichip environment quite hostile and extreme for wireless
communication.
Medium Access Control Design
In order to improve performance, multiple wireless transceivers need to access the wire-
less medium to communicate with other wireless transceivers without interference. Efficient
design of a Medium Access Control (MAC) layer is required to increase the channel uti-
lization of the wireless interconnect. Several MAC mechanisms ranging from token passing
based protocol to complex Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) based mechanisms have
been investigated [63][64][65]. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) based MAC
can increase data rate through simultaneous wireless communication at different carrier fre-
quencies using full channel access [66]. However, the FDMA based approach is non-trivial
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from the perspective of transceiver design and involves significant power, area, and control
overheads. On the other hand, Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) based MAC suffers
from higher contention delay at high injection loads and hence, reduce system performance
[67]. Moreover, different MCMC systems have different traffic interactions and link utiliza-
tion. Therefore, a traffic and utilization-aware MAC design is complicated which varies from
system to system and therefore, has its own implementation challenges.
A Secure Wireless Interconnect Design
Although extensive research has been carried out towards improving performance and energy
dissipation in MCMC systems using WiNiPs [3], relatively little attention has been given
to the information integrity and security or privacy aspects of such wireless interconnects.
Wireless being an unguided, shared transmission medium is vulnerable to many attacks
such as spoofing, Denial-of-Service (DoS), and eavesdropping (ED) [68]. With continuous
increase in device density, heterogenity and integration complexities new threats are evolving
[69][70]. Although WiNiPs can have various kinds of threats from different sources, based
on their effect they can be broadly classified as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
(CIA) threatening attacks. As NoC security is a vast research area, this dissertation mainly
talks about the availability and confidentiality issues in WiNiP caused by DoS attack and
Hardware Trojans (HTs) respectively. Although, DoS and HT induced attacks can originate
from various sources and affect the system in various ways, Figure 1.8 shows some attack
sources, methods specially for WiNiPs and their corresponding effect.
Figure 1.8: Various security threats in WiNiPs.
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In a MCMC system using NoC as communication fabric, a DoS attack is launched to make
the communication resources such as NoC links and switches unavailable to other computing
elements resulting in partial or complete breakdown of the entire communication mechanism.
The DoS attack on wireless interconnect in a WiNiP architecture can be launched very
easily through either an external or internal attacker to breakdown the entire on and off-chip
communication backbone. An external attacker can produce a high energy electromagnetic
radiation that causes interference in the wireless medium used by the Wireless Interfaces
(WIs) deployed in the MCMC system. Moreover, it is also possible that a HT implanted in
the system from a vulnerable design and manufacturing process can cause a WI to transmit
persistent jamming signals to cause DoS for other WIs. In this case, one of the WIs infected
by a HT will send data over the wireless channel irrespective of whether it is enabled by
the adopted MAC mechanism of the WiNoC. This will cause contention or interference with
legitimate transmissions causing DoS on the remaining WIs. While well-known defenses
exist against DoS attacks in large-scale wireless networks [71], those techniques are not
directly applicable to the WiNoC scenario due to specific architecture and MAC constraints
in WiNoCs. Moreover, on and off-chip wireless communication require different solutions in
case of an external DoS attack for MCMC systems.
Due to various technical and economical constraints, most of the design houses have
adopted Fabless manufacturing where the in-house designed IP is outsourced to third party
company for manufacturing. Moreover, to have low cost and strict time-to-market con-
straints, many design houses procure 3PIPs from untrusted sources. These phenomena have
increased the probability of inserting a HT during design or fabrication phase of the chip
to break data confidentiality. HTs are malicious circuits that can alter the functionality
of a chip or leak sensitive information to an attacker once it is triggered. As this trigger
mechanism can be very complex and usually these HTs have very small footprint, it is very
challenging to detect the presence of HTs in a design.
Considering the critical role played by the NoCs and increased use of 3PIPs in modern
SoCs, a NoC embedded HT that exploits the interconnection backbone can reveal the com-
munication patterns in the system. This information when leaked to a malicious attacker
can reveal important information regarding the application suites running on the system,
thereby compromising the user profile. This information in turn, can enable further more
severe attacks not just on the multi/many-core processor infected with the HT, but on the
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systems on which they are deployed. For instance, an adversary obtaining secure military
information through a HT deployed in a router can subvert the military backbone, thus
leading to a compromise of the national security. Therefore, a security-aware wireless inter-
connection architecture can be thought of as the most important design challenge of modern
HPC platforms.
Design for Testability for Wireless Interconnect
The mm-wave wireless transceivers enabling the on and off-chip communication are high-
speed analog components and themselves need to be tested. The transceiver being an analog
module makes it even harder to test the wireless interfaces and usually takes very long time
for comprehensive testing. Therefore, efficient Design For Testability (DFT) architectures
to test the components of wireless interfaces needs to be developed to provide high fault
coverage with handful test vectors. A simplified fault model and detection technique need
to be developed to detect faulty nodes in the system. Using the tested WIs as Test Access
Mechanism (TAM) and interfacing with an external Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) to
reduce die damage and faster test vector delivery across the die is another recent challenge
that the research community is dealing with.
1.5 Research Objectives
Among all the challenges described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.2, it is not only critical to design a
one-to-many traffic-aware interconnection architecture for high performance but also ensure a
secure, sustainable communication in case of various jamming or HT induced attacks. Hence,
the objective of this dissertation is twofold as described in the subsequent subsections.
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1.5.1 Design of a One-to-many Traffic-Aware WiNiP Architecture
for MCMC Systems
With the increase in memory-intensive parallel applications and disintegration, the percent-
age of one-to-many traffic crossing chip boundaries is increasing. It is essential to provide
low latency for such traffic mainly because of two reasons. First, as one-to-many traffic has
many destinations in different chips, a small portion of such traffic can introduce huge local
and global congestion to reduce system performance significantly. Second, state-of-the-art
wired interconnection architectures do not provide a scalable solution to support one-to-many
traffic and therefore, suffers huge latency and power overheads caused by off-chip I/Os.
On the other hand, mm-wave wireless interconnects using omnidirectional antennas have
inherent support for one-to-many traffic. Moreover, the inherent support provided by such
interconnect can be enhanced by making various components of the interconnection ar-
chitecture individually one-to-many traffic aware. Therefore, one of the the goals of this
dissertation is to design a WiNiP interconnect architecture that can efficiently handle one-
to-many traffic patterns in a MCMC environment. This includes design and analysis of
one-to-many traffic aware multichip topology, a starvation free hybrid MAC, a novel flow
control, and eventually a complete interconnection architecture where all of its one-to-many
traffic aware components (topology, MAC, flow control) can be integrated to provide the
support for such traffic. In broad sense, the objective is to reduce the cost or constraints of
one-to-many traffic in MCMC systems so that the performance of wide set of architectures
and programming models are improved while opening a large set of unexplored possibilities.
1.5.2 Design of a Secure WiNiP Interconnection Architecture for
MCMC System
Although mm-wave WiNiP interconnection architecture can provide low latency and energy-
efficient communication for MCMC systems, wireless channel being an unguided and shared
communication medium, is vulnerable to various security attacks such as DoS, ED and HT
induced traffic analysis attacks as describes in Section 1.4.2. Therefore, even if we design
a one-to-many traffic-aware WiNiP as our first objective, the entire MCMC communication
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will collapse if we fail to take defensive measures against such attacks on WiNiP. Securing
the systems against such induced threats with traditional solutions such as encryption often
introduce large area overheads and performance penalties. Therefore, such solutions can not
be directly adopted in a WiNiP architecture. To address and meet such constraints, a secure
WiNiP interconnection architecture needs to be designed that has the in-built intelligence
to detect and defend against potential vulnerabilities in WiNiP with low overheads.
Many security attacks can happen on WiNiP interconnect in a MCMC system and each
of these attacks require its own detection and defense mechanism. For this goal, in this dis-
sertation we mainly focus on persistent jamming-based DoS attack as it is one of the most
common, simple, and yet powerful attack on wireless systems. Moreover, DoS attack is yet
to be explored for a multichip environment using wireless interconnect. In a WiNiP, DoS at-
tack from internal and external sources can completely break down the entire communication
backbone. To address such DoS attacks, we aim to design a persistent jamming-aware WiNiP
interconnection for MCMC system that can detect such attackers as well as sustain on and
off-chip communication even under internal and external jamming. Moreover, continuous in-
crease in using 3PIPs from untrusted sources and Fabless manufacturing model, HT-enabled
novel attacks are emerging. Such attacks can leak sensitive data to breach user profile and
pose severe threat for national security. Analysis and mitigation of such novel threat is also
required to ensure user privacy as well as advanced security for MCMC systems. Therefore,
Figure 1.9: Schematic representation of the objectives of this dissertation.
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this dissertation is also focused to analyze and design a DoS and HT-aware secure WiNiP
interconnection architecture for MCMC system and promote adoption of such techniques for
other systems such as Internet of Things (IoT) to enable a secure communication.
In a nutshell, if we combine the research objectives described in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2,
the ultimate objective of this dissertation is to design a one-to-many traffic-
aware secure WiNiP interconnection architecture for MCMC systems. Figure
1.9 shows the schematic representation of all the objectives of this dissertation.
1.6 Research Contributions
In this dissertation, for both of the research objectives as described in Sections 1.5.1 and
1.5.2, various novel topologies, communication protocols, MAC mechanisms, flow control
and routing methodologies have been explored which eventually guided us for architecting
a one-to-many traffic-aware secure WiNiP communication for MCMC systems. The major
contributions of each of the objectives will be describes in the next subsections. The peer-
reviewed conferences, book chapter and journal papers are listed in appendix C.
1.6.1 Design of a One-to-many Traffic-Aware WiNiP Architecture
for MCMC Systems
As part of this objective, first a one-to-many traffic aware MAC that prioritizes such traffic
to ensure low latency was developed. Later, for the first time, a one-to-many traffic-aware
asymmetric WiNiP topology that can be configured dynamically to provide efficient support
for one-to-many traffic in MCMC system was also explored. Finally, a one-to-many traffic
and power-aware flow control was also developed to design a complete one-to-many traffic-
aware WiNiP architecture by integrating the asymmetric topology with the hybrid MAC
and flow control. Specifically, the contributions of this research goal are
• An asymmetric WiNiP interconnection topology design to handle one-to-many traffic
in MCMC systems.
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• Design of a one-to-many traffic-aware, starvation-free hybrid MAC unit.
• Proposed a one-to-many traffic-aware WiNiP flow control that integrates the MAC
and the asymmetric topology to create a complete one-to-many traffic aware WiNiP
architecture.
• Conducted a comparative study between the proposed and other state-of-the-art WiNiP
and wired interconnection architectures for both synthetic and application-specific traf-
fic pattern.
• Also analyzed the performance of one-to-one traffic in the proposed one-to-many traffic-
aware WiNiP and compared with other state-of-the-art interconnection architectures
for MCMC systems.
1.6.2 Design of a Secure WiNiP Interconnection Architecture for
MCMC System
As a part of this objective, we proposed a WiNiP architecture for MCMC communication
that can detect and defend against persistent jamming-based DoS attack from internal and
external sources using Machine Learning (ML). We re-used the existing DFT hardware to
detect and defend against jamming attack. Moreover, under such jamming attack, specially
for MCMC systems, it is non-trivial to synchronize and inform all other WIs about the pres-
ence of an adversary as chip-to-chip communication happens only through wireless medium
which is itself vulnerable to the attack. We also developed a MCMC wireless communication
protocol along with a reconfigurable MAC that can ensure robust and secure communica-
tion. To handle more intelligently crafted jamming attacks and ensure a robust, accurate
detection and defense mechanism, an Adversarial Machine Learning (AML)-based detection
mechanism have been exploited. A novel HT-based remote traffic analysis attack that can
breach user profile has been also introduced. To combat such attack, a Simulated Annealing
(SA)-based routing obfuscation methodology has also been proposed to enhance the security
of WiNiP architecture. The major contributions of this goal are listed below.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes a solution for persistent
jamming attack in MCMC systems by re-using DFT infrastructure for WiNiP.
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• Proposed a novel dynamically reconfigurable MAC and the corresponding synchroniza-
tion mechanism for all WIs under jamming condition.
• Proposed an AML-based mechanism for high accuracy threat detection and recovery
from persistent jamming-based DoS attacks.
• Developed a novel communication protocol necessary to ensure a robust communication
even under a persistent jamming-based DoS attack.
• Analyzed the performance degradation of the proposed security mechanism for different
WiNiPs and compare it with wired MCMC systems.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work, where, it is shown that by monitoring
traffic patterns in a NoC through HTs, the user profile can be compromised.
• A SA-based novel routing obfuscation methodology has been proposed to defended the
system against such an attack.
1.7 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. This chapter describes the motivation to
go from a SCSC system to MCMC systems and the advantages and challenges of wired and
emerging interconnect technologies. These challenges encouraged us to come up with novel
solutions which is the ultimate goal of this research. Chapter 2 discusses the contemporary
works on different MCMC interconnection architectures as well as one-to-many traffic-aware
interconnect design. Moreover, many recent works on WiNiP design and associated security
vulnerabilities along with proposed solutions have been also discussed. The inefficiency of
state-of-the-art interconnects in handling one-to-many traffic has ultimately motivated us to
design a scalable one-to-many traffic-aware WiNiP architecture for MCMC systems, which is
presented in Chapter 3. The work presented in Chapter 3 is the first work that presents the
concept of using an asymmetric topology, a reconfigurable MAC, and a one-to-many traffic-
aware flow control to handle one-to-many traffic in the MCMC system. Through simulation
we showed that the proposed WiNiP architecture outperforms other state-of-the-art wireless
and wired interconnect architectures in terms of bandwidth, latency, and energy.
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Chapter 4 discusses the design methodology of a secure WiNiP architecture to detect
and withstand persistent jamming-based DoS attack in a MCMC system. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first WiNiP security work that uses the underlying DFT architecture to
detect persistent jamming. Also, an AML-based detection methodology was used to make
the detection more robust. Because of such detection architecture, novel communication
protocol, and reconfigurable MAC the WiNiP architecture could ensure a secure MCMC
communication even under internal and external jamming attack. A novel HT induced
traffic analysis attack has been presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 showed how an external
attacker can use the leaked information from a simple HT to infer the applications running
in the system and hence breach user privacy. As a solution, a novel SA-based controlled
dynamic routing obfuscation methodology has also been discussed in the chapter. Chapter
6 summarizes the important lessons learned while designing a secure and one-to-may traffic-
aware WiNiP interconnection architecture for MCMC systems. Potential future research




With the aim to provide necessary context to this dissertation, in this chapter, we briefly dis-
cuss the state-of-the-art research works in designing a multichip communication fabric using
different interconnects. Starting from the age-old interconnect and integration methodolo-
gies, we review various NoC architectures, state-of-the-art works on MAC design, one-to-
many traffic-aware interconnect design, and WiNiP security in this chapter. All these works
have motivated us to conduct this research on architecting a one-to-many traffic-aware and
secure WiNiP design for MCMC systems.
2.1 Intra and Inter-Chip Interconnects for Multichip
Systems
In traditional multichip platforms, inter-chip communication happens through C4 bumps in
flip chip package [29] or through PCI or PCIe which is a common local I/O bus standard.
Recent trends according to the ITRS [23] predicts that the pitch of the wired I/O inter-
connects, solder bumps or pads in ICs is not scaling as fast as the gate lengths or pitch
of on-chip interconnects. This implies a gap in density and performance of traditional I/O
systems relative to on-chip interconnections. The wiring complexity of both on-chip and off-
chip interconnects exacerbates the problem by posing design challenges, crosstalk, and signal
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integrity issues [30]. Such signal quality deteriorations due to microwave effects, crosstalk
coupling effects, signal reflections, and frequency-dependent lines losses in the transmission
line limit the number of concurrent, high-density inter-chip I/O [30]. Moreover, typically
intra-chip and inter-chip interconnections are designed separately to provide design flexi-
bility and modular design approach. However, switching between protocols is necessary if
the off-chip communication protocol is different from the on-chip one incurring overheads
in inter-chip data transfer. Therefore, the on-chip interconnect has seen a paradigm shift
from bus-based design to NoC based interconnection architectures [72]. The NoC can reduce
global wire delay and increase throughput through multiple simultaneous parallel transac-
tions [22]. Though NoC can have several topologies (mesh, torus, butterfly), the grid-based
mesh is the most commonly used topology as it is relatively easy to design, shows deter-
ministic characteristics and testability [14][16][73]. However, to avoid its multi-hop nature,
insertion of long-range links using conventional metal wires [74] or ultra low-latency and
low-power express channels between communicating cores [75] have been proposed in the
literature. However, such express virtual channel based architecture requires significant con-
trol overhead to assign a proper channel for each incoming packet and therefore prone to
high contentions. The 3D integration methodology can reduce the communication latency of
traditional metal interconnect because of its smaller footprint [31]. Various 3D NoC archi-
tectures have also been proposed as a solution for future high speed interconnect [1]. In 3D
NoC, multiple dies are vertically connected through TSVs. Figure 2.1 [1] shows a MCMC
system using a 3D integrated NoC where multiple dies are connected through vertical NoC
links made from TSVs. TSVs are metallic interconnect that passes through a silicon sub-
Figure 2.1: A 3D integrated MCMC system [1].
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strate and can provide low latency due to its short length (20-100um). However, due to the
vertical stacking of multiple dies, 3D integration suffers from high heat density and peak
temperature [32]. Therefore it requires sophisticated thermal management. These thermal
management techniques vary from dynamic power management methods such as DVFS,
temperature-aware task migration [32] or microfluidic cooling channels for better heat cir-
culation [33]. Microfluidic channels, while very effective at cooling chips, need fluid intake
pipes through the packaging making the whole system complex. Moreover, die thinning for
the fabrication of TSVs, particularly if co-existing with microfluidic channels, resulting in
low yields. In the interposer-based 2.5D integration, conventional metal layers within the
interposer are used to interconnect the dies of a multichip system [34]. The interposer itself
is a relatively large bare silicon die with metal routing layers to provide interconnection
between the dies. These metal layers are fabricated using the same BEOL processes as the
traditional metal interconnect inside dies and placed at the top of the interposer to provide
high-density horizontal connection between active dies. However, interposer metal layer us-
age has been limited by the edge-to-edge connection among neighboring chips making the
available resources underutilized. Moreover, the number of chips that can be integrated us-
ing interposer is limited by the interposer die size. These limitations of metal interconnect
have inspired researchers to look at emerging interconnect paradigms as a solution.
In [2] the authors proposed an all-optical hierarchical network for both intra chip and inter-
chip communication. Figure 2.2 [2] shows the proposed communication architecture. For
inter-chip communication, the architecture used segmentation for higher throughput. While
traditional optical switching needs electrical control involving Electro-Optic (EO)/Opto-
Figure 2.2: An optical interconnection architecture for multichip communication [2].
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Electric (OE) conversion the architecture proposed here needs no conversion for inter-chip
communication and thus saves significant power. Moreover, they proposed an adaptive power
control for laser power for data transmission to reduce power consumption significantly. How-
ever, the proposed architecture is similar to shared bus-based wired interconnection archi-
tecture and does not provide support for one-to-many traffic. In [76] the authors proposed a
3D nanophotonic system many-core architecture called Corona that uses nanophotonic links
for inter-core communication and off-stack memory communication. Dense Wave Division
Multiplexing (DWDM) used in Corona has 256 wavelengths associated with each channel
for unidirectional communication. Due to the spatial proximity of 3D stacking and huge
bandwidth from optical interconnect the system performance improves significantly. In [77]
a hybrid, hierarchical on-chip network architecture called Firefly consisting of clusters of
nodes has been proposed. The architecture used a Reservation-assisted Single Write Multi-
ple Reads (RSWMR) that enabled a significant reduction in energy consumption at the cost
of additional latency. However, low laser efficiency, precise thermal control of the micro-ring
resonators, and incompatibility with the existing CMOS process makes the optical intercon-
nect more challenging to be integrated as a highly reliable interconnect. On-chip antennas
from graphene, CNT based structures are predicted to provide high bandwidth wireless com-
munication channels [52] [53][78]. On-chip antennas realized by Graphene-based structures
are predicted to operate both as modulators as well as antennas providing high bandwidth
wireless communication in the THz frequency channels [79]. However, the feasibility for
such WiNiPs are limited by the physical implementation and precise fabrication environ-
ment control of CNT and graphene-based antennas. The Zenneck SWI interconnect is an
emerging interconnect which is essentially an inhomogeneous 2D EM wave supported by a
surface. The surface is a designed waveguide that traps the EM in two-dimensional media
[39]. Designing such a surface with precise dimension and material is also very challenging.
Moreover, making the surface wave incident at the required Brewster angle for maximum
transmission efficiency requires an additional transducer and hence increase the complexity.
2.2 Mm-Wave Wireless Interconnect Architectures
Research in recent years has demonstrated that on-chip and off-chip wireless interconnects
are capable of establishing radio communications within as well as between multiple chips.
30
On-chip antennas with multi GHz bandwidths in mm-wave bands, specifically, in the unli-
censed 60GHz band, are fabricated and demonstrated [51][80]. Using such on-chip antennas
embedded in the chip [60] or waveguides [81] WiNiP architectures are shown to improve en-
ergy efficiency and bandwidth of on-chip data communication in multicore chips. A detailed
survey of WiNiP architectures and its various components has been presented in [82][83].
Regarding topology, keeping the minimum distance constraint in mind, small-world WiNiP
architectures were proposed [52][65] and evaluated. Small world graphs are a type of complex
network where both short distance, as well as long distance links, create a connected graph.
The long distance, communication beyond a few millimeters happen through wireless links.
In [84], the authors demonstrated that small world based WiNiP architecture is resilient
to failure of CNT based wireless links. In [85], it has been shown that optimizing a small
world WiNiP topology with respect to a particular metric can result in more homogeneous
utilization of NoC links and switches consequently reducing temperature hotspots in the
NoC. While irregular topologies have better connectivity and diameter properties, unequal
wire lengths in irregular topologies like small world networks, make design, implementation,
and verification very challenging. Other works have looked at the hierarchical design of
WiNiPs where subnetworks communicate internally with wired links while inter-subnet data
communication utilizes wireless links [60].
Figure 2.3: MCMC system topology using mm-wave WiNiP interconnect [3].
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A hierarchical mm-wave WiNoC architecture [49], a 2D concentrated mesh-based WCube
architecture using sub-THz wireless links [86] has been presented to explore the topological
impact on system performance. Apart from topology, an energy efficient, dynamic MAC
layer can improve WiNiP performance significantly. In the context of a wireless NoC, several
MAC mechanisms have been proposed over the years. A Synchronous and Distributed MAC
mechanism (SD-MAC) is proposed in [63] for the Ultra-Wide-Band (UWB) WiNiP where
impulse based transceivers are used. However, the communication range for the WIs in such
WiNiP is limited to a millimeter. Authors in [66] have proposed a WiNiP architecture with
multiple non-overlapping channels to enable Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)-
based medium access. However, such an FDMA based approach is non-trivial from the
perspective of transceiver design. A comparative performance evaluation of CSMA and token
based MAC is presented in [87]. In [79], the authors discussed the performance of ALOHA
and CSMA for graphene-based WiNiPs. However, due to contention-based retransmission,
such MAC suffers from performance issues as demonstrated in [67]. In [88], a distributed
token-based MAC arbitration mechanism has been proposed that utilizes orthogonal codes to
request channel access. However, the code design does not consider realistic on-chip wireless
channel models assuming only a single Line-of-Sight (LOS) path between communicating
pairs. Moreover, token-based MAC limits the number of concurrently communicating pairs
over a single channel to one. Authors in [3] proposed a WiNiP interconnection architecture
for MCMC communication which uses a distributed token-based MAC. Figure 2.3 [3] shows
their proposed MCMC topology. However, the proposed MAC did not consider providing
priority to one-to-many traffic and focused on one-to-one traffic performance evaluations only.
In [89], an efficient Radio Access Control Mechanism (RACM) is proposed for wireless NoCs.
However, such MAC results in inefficient support for many-to-few hotspot traffic which is very
common for state-of-the-art memory intensive systems. To address the spatial and temporal
traffic variations in WIs, two demand aware, distributed dynamic token-based MAC has
been proposed in [90]. In [91], authors present the MAC design challenges, requirements
in the context of various on-chip systems, workload variations, and performance objectives.
However, no literature has presented a one-to-many traffic aware MAC design that can also
get support from the underlying topology.
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2.3 Handling One-to-many Traffic in NoC Environment
Conventional wired NoC interconnection architecture handles one-to-many traffic as multiple
unicast traffic which creates congestion and a severe queueing delay. In [92] authors proposed
a hypercube based multichip interconnection architecture on silicon interposer to support
one-to-many traffic. However, the interconnection complexity increases with system size
scaling. A dynamic path multicast mechanism where the network is recursively divided into
multiple small destination regions is proposed in [93]. To meet the requirements of the cache
coherence communication, an XY-tree multicast NoC incorporating an ACK aggregation
network is proposed in [94]. However, in these systems, the underlying NoC is still a mesh
network. In a mesh NoC, the network latency is usually high due to the inherent multihop
nature of the system. Multicast support using high-radix switches have been proposed in [95].
However, such switches involve high complexity and cost for implementation. A multicast-
aware wired NoC with clockless repeater (referred to as SMART NoC) is also proposed
[49]. The performance advantages of the SMART NoCs mainly come from the SMART
control mechanism which involves more complex router design and high control overhead.
A topology-aware one-to-many traffic support using 3D interconnect has been studied in
[96]. The authors proposed different routing algorithms for regular and irregular 3D NoC
topologies. However, as the proposed routing mechanisms still use dimension ordered routing,
the local and global congestion due to one-to-many traffic can not be avoided in such system.
Figure 2.4: OrthoNoC: A broadcast-aware mm-wave WiNoC architecture [4].
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A comparative study for multicast message communication using emerging technologies
has been done in [97]. Photonic interconnects implementing Single Write Multiple Read
(SWMR) architecture [98] inherently support one-to-many traffic. However, each connected
node in optical waveguide add logarithmic losses and hence limit the scalability due to static
laser power allocation. One-to-many traffic support using RF interconnect was studied
in [99]. The obtained low latency for such traffic came with a huge cost of additional
power and area overheads to implement the on-chip transmission line and hence does not
provide a scalable solution. Broadcast message support with wireless interconnects has
been investigated in [100]. However, in [100], the authors conducted only a study of the
effect of system size, link capacity, broadcast percentage scaling on a single chip system
and did not propose any optimized architecture for one-to-many traffic transmission. In [4],
the authors proposed two separate communication planes for on-chip communication using
wireless-wired hybrid interconnect. Where the wireless plane is used for multicast/broadcast
and the rest of the NoC communication happens through wired interconnect. Because of
using two orthogonal communication plane, they called the architecture as OrthoNoC as
shown in Figure 2.4 [4]. The work only focused on the inherent broadcast capability of
WiNoC and did not propose any architectural novelty to exploit the inherent broadcast
capability. In [101], the authors proposed a congestion-aware multicast routing with network
coding for WiNoC architecture to efficiently handle heavy multicast traffic. The performance
benefit came with the cost of increased routing complexity due to additional wired links.
Also, the authors did not take into account the associated area, power overhead with such
routing and did not leverage the MAC for high performance.
Figure 2.5: Prometheus: A DoS, ED and snooping-resistant WiNoC architecture [5].
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2.4 Design of a Secure Mm-wave Wireless Interconnect
Architecture
While securing wired NoCs have received attention from researchers in recent years [102][103],
mechanisms to secure WiNiPs, in particular, have not been well developed. In [104], a small-
world graph based WiNoC architecture was proposed to mitigate DoS attacks. However,
small-world irregular topologies have negative implications on the design and verification
effort. Moreover, the proposed architecture showed DoS resiliency due the inherent con-
nectivity only and such solution is not suitable for DoS attack introduced by from wireless
jamming. A hash-based authentication to prevent eavesdropping has been proposed in [105].
In [5] a secure WiNiP architecture has been proposed that can protect against DoS, eaves-
dropping, and spoofing. As shown in Figure 2.5 [5], three different modules were design to
address each of the vulnerability. However, this work does not address the issue of jamming
attack from an external attacker assuming that the packaging will protect against such at-
tacks. This may not be true for all kinds of chips or packaging materials. Furthermore,
the solution is too naive and not efficient to detect complex and sophisticated DoS attacks.
Persistent jamming-based DoS attack for on-chip wireless interconnect has been addressed
in [106]. In case of external jamming, the authors in [106] utilized the underlying wired
NoC to sustain communication. However, such solution can not be adopted for WiNiP, as in
WiNiP, off-chip communication happens only through wireless interconnect. Moreover, the
ML model used in [106] is unaware of the adversarial conditions that an intelligent attacker
can exploit to camouflage its presence. In [5], authors developed a spoofing detection and de-
fense mechanism based on received signal power for on-chip wireless interconnect. However,
the proposed mechanism in [5] imposes placement restrictions for WI nodes to distinctly
identify the senders that are equidistant from the receiver. Such WI placement restrictions
can have significant performance impacts and placement challenges. Moreover, such mech-
anism can not be extended for WiNiP systems specially in the presence of an internal or
external jammer. Though persistent jamming attacks are less studied in WiNiPs, a vast
amount of research is performed in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) for potential solutions.
For instance, frequency hopping has been traditionally employed in order to overcome the
presence of a jammer [107]. However, multiple jamming devices operating on different bands
can effectively block the entire spectrum. Using a directional antenna can be another means
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to combat the jammer [108]. However, a directional antenna limits the multicast capability
and limit WiNiP performance. In [109], authors developed a replay message based DoS
attack and also proposed the solution for that. Though Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) has proven robustness against side-channels in the networking domain, adapting it
for WiNiP communications adds large processing overheads and thus is not feasible [110].
Although many works have been done on energy-efficient and high-performance NoC ar-
chitecture design, only a handful of works have explored routing as a solution to secure the
NoC, especially against side-channel attacks that focuses on reverse engineering. In [111],
authors proposed Region-based Routing (RBR) and Segment-based Routing (SBR) for a
secure NoC communication. The proposed routing mechanism in [111] assumes the NoC
to be partitioned into different security zones and minimizes the inter-zone traffic to ensure
better NoC security. However, with increasing number of security zones, it is hard to re-
duce inter-zone traffic and requires complicated scheduling policy. In [6], authors proposed
to use west-first and adaptive XY routing as they offer more paths for routing and reduce
interference with attacker to improve NoC security. Figure 2.6 [6] shows the available paths
between A,B and C,E using XY/YX and west-first routing respectively. However, all the
routing algorithms implemented in [6] are only partially adaptive and therefore, vulnerable to
Figure 2.6: Pseudo adaptive (XY/YX (A,B) and west first (C,E)) routing for NoC [6].
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an attacker exploring the routing paths. In [112], authors proposed Non-Interference Based
adaptive (NIBR) Routing to secure NoCs from side channel and DoS attacks. Both 1-D and
2-D interference were considered to avoid timing channel attacks. However, the proposed
NIBR is a hybrid routing mechanism mainly based on Dimension-ordered Routing, (DOR)
and requires additional hardware overhead to make the routing decision. Moreover, being a
priority-based routing mechanism, it might not be efficient to separate traffic flowing from
applications having similar priority. In [113], a risk-aware NoC routing has been proposed
for sensitive traffic. The risk of the path is evaluated at the destination interface. If the
measured risk is above the pre-determined threshold, a new low-risk path is explored. How-
ever, all the four routing algorithms considered in the paper are constrained by the minimal
path and hence restrict the search of low-risk paths. In [114] an overview of the reverse
engineering attacks, their countermeasures have been discussed.
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Chapter 3
A One-to-many Traffic-Aware WiNiP
Architecture for Multichip Systems
Platform-based computing modules such as embedded systems and micro-servers are MCMC
systems with in-package memory and processing chips. Such systems consist of both one-
to-one (unicast) and one-to-many (broadcast/multicast) traffic patterns. State-of-the-art
wired interconnection architectures such as NoC are specially designed to handle on-chip
unicast traffic and cannot mask the high off-chip communication latency caused by the
chip-to-chip I/Os. Moreover, with the increase in memory-intensive applications and hence
one-to-many traffic in a multichip system, this scenario gets even worse as conventionally
one-to-many traffic is handled as multiple unicast traffic in a multihop NoC infrastructure.
Consequently, a small proportion of such one-to-many traffic increases energy consumption
and message latency significantly for chip-to-chip communication. Therefore, to support
such one-to-many traffic, these MCMC systems with in-package memory need one-to-many
traffic-aware interconnection infrastructure. To address these issues, the design of one-to-
many traffic-aware WiNiP architecture that utilizes a novel asymmetric WiNiP topology and
a traffic-aware MAC mechanism has been discussed in this chapter. With cycle-accurate
simulations, it has been demonstrated that the proposed WiNiP architecture reduces the
energy consumption and latency up to 46.96% and 47.08% respectively for multichip data
transfer compared to state-of-the-art wired NiPs for application-specific traffic.
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3.1 Motivation
High-performance processors in computing nodes such as blade servers and embedded sys-
tems have already undergone a massive shift from traditional SCSC architecture to the
MCSC paradigm. NoC has emerged as a scalable, modular interconnection architecture for
such large parallel architectures [21] with hundreds of cores. However, the scalability of
NoC-based multicore processors is limited as the number of cores continues to increase in a
single chip. This is because, for a large single chip, different factors such as sub-wavelength
lithography, line edge roughness, and random dopant fluctuation can cause a wide process
variation, which can result in higher fault density and hence, lower manufacturing yield.
Therefore, the disintegration of large and complex multicore processors into smaller chips
[25] is used to alleviate the effect of higher fault densities in advanced technology nodes and
thus reduces manufacturing cost per die. An example of such a MCMC processing plat-
form is the AMD EPYC series released in 2017 [27]. The EPYC Threadripper processor
node is available as a 4-chip SiP with 8 cores in each chip, fabricated in 14 nm lithography
technology.
However, each chip in the SiP needs an efficient intra-chip as well as an inter-chip inter-
connection network as disintegration increases inter-chip traffic significantly. Therefore, the
performance of the MCMC system is mostly limited by the high latency and power-hungry
off-chip I/Os. Conventionally, C4 bumps coupled with in-package transmission lines or flip-
chip packaging is used to interconnect chips within a multichip system [29]. However, signal
quality deteriorations due to micro-wave effects, crosstalk coupling, and frequency-dependent
line losses in the transmission line limit the number of concurrent, high-speed inter-chip I/O
and hence chip-to-chip bandwidth. Therefore, to efficiently handle higher off-chip traffic
resulting from disintegration, an in-package interconnection network called NiP needs to be
designed that can mask the high latency and power consumption of off-chip I/Os in multichip
systems.
Moreover, in such SiP with an in-package memory module, traffic pattern not only con-
sists of the core to core unicast (one-to-one) messages but also significant memory to core
multicast/broadcast messages. Directory or snooping based cache coherency protocols in a
shared memory SiP use multicast to invalidate a shared cache block or broadcast the up-
dated block for the requesting cores. 3.1 shows the number of multicast messages injected
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per one million instruction for MESI and AMD Hyper Transport cache coherence protocol
in a 64 core system with 64 KB, 2-way L1 cache (ID) and 512 KB of shared, 8-way L2 cache
for PARSEC and SPLASH2 benchmark traffic patterns [42]. However, the number of desti-
nations for each multicast message varies from 5 to 27 in such multicore systems, resulting in
a significant increase in network traffic [42]. These coherence transactions also increase with
system size scaling. Moreover, many control signals such as passing global states, power gat-
ing, and barrier synchronization require multicast/broadcast messages to be sent efficiently
through the communication network, NiP. Widely used parallel programming commands
such as MPIallgather, MPIbcast, MPI allreduce, etc use multicast and broad-cast. Finally,
novel computing paradigms such as spiking neural networks [43], genetic algorithm-based
computation could be also multicast-driven.
Traditional NiP architectures are multihop in nature and provide very limited support for
multicast/broadcast as they handle those traffics either as repeated unicast messages or fol-
low a tree-based replication strategy. However, repeated unicast-based multicast/broadcast
protocol introduces local congestion at the source node, global congestion in the network,
and large power overhead. This is especially true for MCMC systems where traffic needs
to go through off-chip I/Os. On the other hand, tree-based routing requires additional
circuit/control overhead to replicate the message inside the network and hence leads to a
significant delay, area, and power overhead. Therefore, a one-to-many traffic-aware NiP in-
terconnection architecture is required to overcome the performance bottleneck introduced
by off-chip I/Os. Various novel interconnect technologies such as vertically integrated 3D
Figure 3.1: Number of multicast messages per 1M instructions in application specific-traffic.
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integration [31], photonic interconnects [2], inductive or capacitive coupling based intercon-
nects [115], utilization of metal layers in the interposer [34], and wireless interconnects [3],
[116], [83] are being explored to mitigate the performance issues of conventional I/O based
multichip systems.
Research in recent years has demonstrated that intra- and inter-chip wireless interconnects
are capable of establishing radio communications within as well as be-tween multiple chips
[3], [54]. Wireless data communication links with integrated transceivers, with multi GHz
bandwidths in mm-wave bands, are fabricated and demonstrated [51], [117]. In this chapter,
we present the design of a traffic-aware WiNiP architecture with novel asymmetric topology,
flow control, and a hybrid wireless MAC that can handle concurrent unicast, hotspot as
well as multicast/broadcast messages. The novel, reconfigurable multicast/broadcast aware
MAC, asymmetric topology, and flow control exploits each other to enhance the multi-
cast/broadcast performance of the system. Through cycle-accurate simulations, it has been
demonstrated that the proposed WiNiP architecture out-performs other state-of-the-art NiP
architectures under synthetic as well as application-specific workloads. Hence, the contribu-
tions of the design are
• A novel asymmetric WiNiP architecture that can fully utilize the benefits provided
by the proposed MAC and increase system performance in terms of peak achievable
bandwidth per core and energy consumption per packet.
• A novel, starvation free, dynamically reconfigurable MAC, capable of handling unicast,
and multicast/broadcast traffic
• A back pressure and one-to-many traffic-aware flow control for such WiNiP architec-
ture.
• To study and compare the performance and energy benefits of such architecture with
other state-of-the-art NiP architectures.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the proposed novel asym-
metric topology, traffic-aware re-configurable MAC, and the overall flow control. Section 3.3
briefly describes the physical layer. The evaluation methodology, results, and implementa-
tion overheads are described in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Proposed WiNiP Architecture
The proposed one-to-many traffic-aware WiNiP architecture comprises of the asymmetric
topology, traffic-aware MAC and flow control. In this section the fundamental components
of the WiNiP architecture will be discussed.
3.2.1 Asymmetric Topology
In this section, the proposed asymmetric topology of the MCMC interconnection architecture
will be discussed. As current and future applications are memory intensive, a system with
multiple multicore processors along with in-package memory modules was considered. Each
memory module is considered to be a stacked DRAM mounted on top of a base logic die. Such
stacked RAM subsystems are becoming the solution for high-density memory technology
[118]. The layers of the memory stacks are interconnected using TSVs mounted on top of
the base logic die and to enable memory-core communication, this logic die is equipped with
a WI as shown in Figure 3.2. Although each memory module is in close proximity to its
adjacent chip, it can be accessed by any core of other chips through the wireless interconnects
and thus represents a globally shared memory system.
Each tile in the multicore chips is composed of a processing core, a switch, L1 private cache,
and a distributed shared LLC. In such multicore systems, the placement of the memory
controller impacts the performance by ensuring low memory access latency between tiles
and the memory subsystem. In [119], different memory controller placements, and their
performance have been evaluated. Though optimal memory controller placement can be
found through exhaustive simulation for specific systems, it is shown in [119] that a cluster of
4 processors with one memory controller provides, the least average hop count and uniformity
of processor to memory traffic for small chips having less than 8x8 tiles. Therefore, we
adopt this cluster-based memory controller placement where the tiles are connected with the
memory controller in a regular mesh. Having a mesh topology rather than a star topology
increases the scalability of the cluster if necessary and increases the reliability.
To provide fast multi-gigabit direct connections between all the memory controllers and
the memory banks, each memory controller was equipped with a switch along with a WI
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having both transmitter and receiver modules and call it transmitter-receiver WI (TR-WI)
as shown in Figure 3.2. These TR-WIs are not only used to establish a memory controller to
memory communication but also to enable the cluster to cluster communication both inside
and outside of the chip. Packet communication inside a cluster utilizes the intra-cluster mesh
links whereas, tiles communicate through the TR-WIs for communication with cores outside
the cluster. The routing algorithm required to enable this communication is explained in
Section 3.2.4.
Each tile within a cluster was also equipped with a WI that has only the receiver module
in it and hence call it a receiver only WI (R-WI). An R-WI serves the purposes of low latency
multicast/broadcast message reception with a small area and power consumption compared
to a TR-WI. The R-WIs are normally off during any unicast message transmission and only
turned on during multicast/broadcast transmission based on a SLEEP/AWAKE signal as
discussed in Section 3.2.3. Having R-WI in each tile of the cluster node leverages the proposed
MAC to support the efficient reception of multicast/broadcast messages by utilizing single-
hop wireless communication. In addition to that, selective power on-off mechanisms for WIs
provides higher power efficiency as shown in Section 3.4.3. Deploying R-WIs in every tile can
result is significant area overheads. However, modern mm-wave transceivers and antennas
have small form factors of a fraction of a square millimeter making the area overheads worth
Figure 3.2: Proposed asymmetric WiNiP topology.
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the improvement in performance. As some tiles in the proposed topology have TR-WIs and
some have R-WIs, the proposed topology is therefore, called an asymmetric WiNiP topology.
3.2.2 Proposed Adaptive, Starvation-free Wireless MAC with Uni-
cast and Multicast Support
For the one-to-many traffic-aware WiNiP, a hybrid adaptive MAC that can efficiently handle
unicast, hotspot as well as multicast/broadcast traffic patterns has been proposed. The MAC
is described in the following paragraphs.
MAC for Unicast/Hotspot Traffic
Token [3], [60] or CSMA [79] based TDMA and FDMA [66] based MAC limits the number
of concurrent communicating pairs to one or only a few due to resource-limitations of an
integrated transceiver. To provide concurrent communication links between multiple pairs of
nodes in a WiNoC without requiring transceivers tuned to various non-overlapping frequen-
cies, a CDMA based MAC was proposed in [65]. Due to the concurrent communication and
higher channel utilization, the CDMA based interconnection provided better performance
compared to token-based TDMA. Therefore, to handle one-to-one (uniform random) and
many-to-few (hotspot) traffic, we consider a simplified code-division multiplexing scheme so
that concurrent transmission can happen between multiple communicating pairs.
Moreover, to aid the many-to-few traffic, the T (transmitter)-protocol [120] was used in
which each transmitter encodes the data according to a unique code. At the receiver, the
received signal is correlated with all the code words to decode the transmissions from each
transmitter. So, the T-protocol can operate normally under one-to-one or many-to-few type
of traffic scenarios where each receiver can receive data from multiple transmitters at the
same time on different code-channels specific to each transmitter. For this work, we choose
Walsh-Hadamard codes as they have short length there-by minimally affecting the data rate
on each wireless link. Walsh codes are not robust against loss of synchronization and can
cause inter-channel interference when synchronization is lost between multiple transmitters.
However, in [65] it is shown that the Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) results
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in an acceptable Bit Error Rate (BER) of less than 10−12 in on-chip environments even with
the loss of synchronization among multiple transmitters. Therefore, CDMA communication
channel model was adopted from [120].
MAC for One-to-many Traffic
To provide low latency and faster transmission of the one-to-many (multicast/broadcast)
messages, a TR-WI with such traffic switches the MAC protocol to a Distributed Arbitration-
based Full Channel Access (DAFCA) scheme that acquires the whole wireless channel band-
width during multicast/ broadcast communication. Figure. 3.3 briefly describes how the
proposed MAC switches from CDMA to DAFCA and vice versa for multicast and unicast
transmission respectively. As shown in Figure. 3.3, to initiate a multicast/broadcast commu-
nication, the sending TR-WI sends a multicast/broadcast request to all the other TR-WIs
using its CDMA channel. The request for the multicast/broadcast message is sent as a
header flit of the multicast/broadcast packet along with information regarding the sender,
flit type, and the length of the message. Upon reception of the header, the TR-WIs decodes
the header to identify if it is a multicast/broadcast request.
These requests are then sent to the Multicast Queue (MQ) as shown in Figure. 3.4. As mul-
tiple multicast/broadcast requests can originate at the same time, every TR-WI is equipped
with an arbiter that grants the whole channel to the requesting TR-WIs. In DAFCA mode,
starvation in granting whole channel access to any TR-WI with multicast/broadcast mes-
sages is avoided by granting next access to the TR-WI in the MQ, which is least recently
Figure 3.3: Simplified flow diagram for the proposed MAC and flow control.
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serviced among the queued requesters. The Least Recently Served Queue (LRSQ) maintains
the list of all TR-WIs that received whole channel access for multicast/broadcast messages
where the most recently served TR-WI is enqueued at the top. Both the queues are updated
after each multicast transmission in DAFCA mode as described in the next paragraph.
The LRSQ is initialized with all the TR-WI entries in order of their address. However,
each entry in the LRSQ is updated using a counter-based policy once the channel access is
granted to a TR-WI requesting multicast transmission. The old position of the transmitting
TR-WI in LRSQ is removed and updated to the top of LRSQ. Any TR-WI entry above
the old position is shifted one position down in the queue. Any TR-WIs below it is kept
in the same position while updating LRSQ. The arbitration logic services the first TR-WI
that is in MQ and holds the oldest served entry in the LRSQ. The served TR-WI and the
corresponding request is removed from MQ by updating a tag indicating the invalid request.
For example, in Figure. 3.4(a), WI-3, being the bottom most entry in LRSQ, holds the
Least Recently Served (LRS) position. The arbitration logic finds the LRS node from MQ
LRSQ and therefore grants the next access to WI-3. Meanwhile, the LRSQ is updated by
putting WI-3 as top entry indicating it as the Most Recently Service (MRS) node as shown
in Figure. 3.4(b). MQ is also updated by removing the particular WI-3 request from the
queue. Similarly, after WI-3, WI-1 will get the next channel access in DAFCA mode as
it is the LRS node in the LRSQ and also present in MQ. As every TR-WI maintains the
same MQ and LRSQ, therefore, each of them will grant access to the same requesting node
even for multiple concurrent multicast requests and thus avoid channel contention using this
distributed arbitration mechanism. Figure. 3.5(a) shows different functional blocks of the
proposed MAC including LRSQ and MQ. Next, the proposed flow control mechanism to
Figure 3.4: MQ and LRSQ entries (a) Before (b) After channel access.
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support this hybrid MAC will be discussed.
3.2.3 Proposed Wireless Flow Control
The multicast/broadcast message is requested through the packet header. A field in the
header of the multicast/broadcast packet as shown in Figure. 3.5(b) indicates that it is a
multicast/broadcast packet. The type of any message is determined by the data/control
field of the header. Moreover, the flit type (header, body, tail) detects the type of the
flit to be transmitted. The header also has the source and destination addresses to ensure
the appropriate R-WIs are awake. As it has been shown in [42] that the average and the
maximum number of destinations for a 64 core system is 14 and 27 respectively and it
increases with system size scaling, using an N bit destination address field for multicast
messages reduce the header flit size significantly. In an N bit destination address, the Nth bit
represents whether or not the Nth core is a destination. For unicast, we use the conventional
Figure 3.5: (a) Block diagram of the MAC unit (b) Header flit structure.
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M bit address which is the most efficient way to represent each of the 2M destinations for
such messages.
One critical case might arise after receiving the multicast/broadcast header. The broad-
cast/multicast request might reach the TR-WI while it is in the middle of a unicast com-
munication with other TR-WIs. In such a scenario, we prioritize the broadcast/multicast
transmission to ensure the fast transmission of such traffic and propose a flow control called
Store-and-Continue (SC) that can re-initiate the unicast communication at flit level gran-
ularity. In the proposed SC flow control, each output VC requires an additional register,
Radd of the same size as that of a flit. The header flit of a unicast packet is temporarily
stored in that register till the tail flit passes through the VC. When a TR-WI receives any
broadcast/multicast message request during any ongoing unicast transmission, the ongoing
unicast communication stops immediately once the current flit transmission is complete. The
MAC switches to the DAFCA mode for the duration of the multicast/broadcast after which,
the unicast transmissions resume by following the below process.
In order to resume the unicast message transfers, the output VCs use the previously
stored header from Radd. The output wireless port of a sending TR-WI uses the same VC
arbitration logic as that of the input VC arbiter in the input port of the receiving TR-WI.
We adopt the VC allocation arbiter from [22]. Therefore, a packet in the output port of the
sending WI is mapped to the same input VC of the receiving TR-WI as long as we have the
header flit available in the output VC of the sending TR-WIs. This mirror arbiter in the
output VCs of the TR-WIs is necessary as VC information cannot be back-propagated over
wireless channels to enable traditional flow control available in wired NoCs. We consider 8
VCs for each output port with a unicast flit size of 64 bits which results in 8 Radd registers
per TR-WI node for storing the header flit.
To enable backpressure flow control in the CDMA unicast messages, whenever a VC in the
input buffers of a downstream WI is full or empty, the information is packetized into a small
packet of a few bits and sent up-stream along the CDMA uplink. Any ongoing unicast data
transmission will be halted using the above-mentioned SC protocol immediately before the
VC overflow and the control packet will be prioritized to be sent upstream using the CDMA
link between the downstream TR-WI. The flow control in the wireline links will follow the
conventional backpressure flow control.
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After receiving the multicast/broadcast request, the TR-WIs append the request to the
MQ, and based on the entries in the LRSQ as discussed in Section 3.2.2, it grants the whole
channel access to a particular TR-WI. The decoder logic determines the destination R-WIs
from the header of the multicast/broadcast request packet and asserts an AWAKE signal
to those R-WIs. On the other hand, after receiving the AWAKE signal each R-WI receiver
sends back its acknowledgment to the TR-WI in its cluster using wired links of the control
bus. Once all the destination R-WIs in a cluster acknowledge, each TR-WI sends the Clear to
Send (CTS) signal to the arbitrated (granted) multicast/broadcast requesting node through
their respective CDMA channel and goes into SLEEP mode itself. The CTS signal from
all the destination TR-WIs enables the sender to switch the MAC mode to DAFCA to start
the broadcast/multicast transmission as shown in Figure. 3.3 To switch back to the CDMA
mode, the R-WIs monitor the multicast message for tail flit and the MQ queue.
If there is no other broadcast/multicast request in the MQ and tail flit of the transmitting
multicast message has passed, then the R-WIs assert an AWAKE signal for the TR-WI and
put themselves into SLEEP mode. With the all TR-WIs in AWAKE state, the system
restores the CDMA mode. The SLEEP/AWAKE mechanism of the WIs causes a latency
overhead around 4-10 cycles [121] and have been considered in simulations. The broadcast
transmitting node also monitors the multicast message for tail flit and the MQ. It changes
the transmission mode to CDMA once it is done with all flit transmissions and if there is no
request remaining in the MQ. However, if there is no recipient in a cluster, the TR-WI of
that cluster wakes up based on a counter that counts up to the “packet size” defined in the
header once the multicast transmission began.
Moreover, to avoid starvation for unicast messages, the number of consecutively served
multicast requests was restricted to 8. This number represents the maximum number of
multicast messages that can be present in such MCMC systems for a span of 10 cycles
and obtained by analyzing the traffic traces generated by SynFull [122] for PARSEC and
SPLASH2 benchmark suites used in Section 3.4.8. However, this is a design knob that
affects MQ and VC implementation overheads and can be statically or dynamically optimized
depending on the percentage of one-to-many messages in the system. The overall flow control
of the proposed WiNiP architecture is summarized in Figure. 3.3 with a simplified flow
diagram showing the MAC switching and on-off phases of R-WIs and TR-WIs.
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3.2.4 Routing Protocol for Wireless Architectures
A multicast/broadcast message originating in any core and having destinations outside of its
cluster is first routed to the TR-WI in its cluster. Then, as discussed in the previous section,
the TR-WI requests access to the wireless channel for multicast/broadcast transmission.
Upon acquiring the channel, the TR-WI transmits the packet to the R-WIs which are put in
the wake mode by their respective TR-WIs. The proposed architecture requires control to
turn on the receivers using SLEEP/AWAKE signal during multicast/broadcast communi-
cation. In Section 3.4.9 the overheads for these mechanisms are shown to be negligible due
to a simple logical implementation. In case there are multicast destinations within the same
cluster, the message is replicated and copies are routed to the tiles within the cluster using
the mesh-based wired links adopting X-Y dimension order routing.
In case of unicast packets, the originating core sends the packet to the TR-WI in its
cluster, which then sends it to the TR-WI of the destination cluster using its transmitter
code channel as discussed in the previous subsection. Upon receiving the packet at the
destination TR-WI, it is routed to the final destination core in the cluster. To support the
unicast message transmission within a cluster, we use the X-Y dimension order routing. As
we consider each cluster to be a mesh connected network, such dimension order routing
avoids deadlock without degrading the performance. Deadlock is avoided in this proposed
routing mechanism as X-Y routing is adopted for message routing inside a cluster, which is
known to be deadlock-free. Moreover, once a message leaves a cluster through the TR-WI it
can never be addressed back to that cluster as all intra-cluster messages are rout-ed using the
mesh-based links without engaging the TR-WI and the multicast messages with destinations
inside the same cluster are split from the inter-cluster multicast message as discussed earlier.
As a message can never return to the same cluster from where it is transmitted deadlock is
avoided for the inter-cluster messages as well [123].
3.3 Physical Layer
Non-coherent OOK modulation allows relatively simple and low-power circuit implemen-
tation without power-hungry carrier recovery circuits like PLL. In addition to the OOK
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modulator and demodulator, a CDMA encoder and decoder are also designed specifically
suitable for the OOK modulation. In the transmitter, the data bitstream is first encoded by
XORing with the code specific for that channel and then modulated with a 60 GHz carrier
generated from a Volt-age Control Oscillator (VCO) and amplified by a Drive Amplifier (DA)
before being coupled to the on-die antenna as shown in Figure. 3.6(a). The wireless channel
is assumed to be an additive multipath channel. This implies that individual transmissions
encoded into different codes are added over the channel. At the receivers, the received sig-
nal is amplified by a Low Noise Amplifier (LNA). Then this signal is sent to an Envelope
Detector (ED), which eliminates the carrier frequency. This signal is then amplified by a
baseband amplifier (BA). In the R-WIs, as the whole channel is used for multicast this OOK
receiver is sufficient for the R-WIs as shown in the grey box in Figure. 3.6(b).
In the TR-WIs, due to unicast messages and the adopted T-protocol for the CDMA based
MAC, the receiver needs to have CDMA decoders for every code-channel. Therefore, in the
Figure 3.6: (a) Transmitter (b) TR-WI receiver block diagram with only R-WI receiver in
grey box.
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receivers of the TR-WIs, the output of the OOK demodulator is further sent to a CDMA
receiver during unicast transmission. An Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) converts the
received envelope from the additive multipath channel. Then, the signal is correlated with
each codeword from the codebook to create separate receive channels corresponding to every
codeword as shown in Figure 3.6(b). The code words being only in ‘0’ or ‘1’ enables us to
adopt a digital correlator receiver that accumulates and compares the positive and negative
part of the received symbols to compute the received digit for each channel [120] as shown
in Figure 3.6(b). As each transmitter uses its predetermined specific code, a single receiver
can receive transmissions from multiple transmitters at the same time forming a SWMR.
This also provides support for hotspot or many-to-few kinds of unicast messages.
The R-WIs only has an LNA and an envelope detector [124] to only receive simply OOK
modulated signals re-ceived via multicast or broadcast in DAFCA mode. The CDMA re-
ceiver is Power Gated (PG) during DAFCA mode as the entire channel is acquired by the
transmitter for such messages. For transmitting such messages, the transmitter bypasses
the CDMA encoder and simply modulates, amplifies, and broadcasts the message over the
antenna. The on-die antenna is adopted from a design for similar multichip environments
in [3]. Circuit level designs and implementation of the modulator, demodulator are outside
the scope of this paper and have been already demonstrated to perform in on and off-chip
realizations with bit error rates of less than 10−12 considering thermal noise at the receiver
while consuming 23.6mW peak power with an active footprint of 0.12 mm2 [124], [125].
3.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, the performance and energy consumption of the proposed WiNiP intercon-
nection architecture will be evaluated in terms of peak achievable bandwidth per core, aver-
age packet energy consumption, average packet latency, and average Energy Delay Product
(EDP). The peak achievable bandwidth per core is measured as the maximum sustainable
data rate in number of bits successfully routed per core per second at network saturation
with maximum injection load. Average packet energy is the energy consumed to transfer
an entire packet from source to destination in the multichip system on an average. Average
packet latency is the average number of clock cycles required between packet injection at
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Power(mW ) 0.103 0.050 0.045 0.101 0.117 0.416
Area(um2) 33.48 13.68 15.4 27.36 48.24 138.1
Delay (ns) 0.272 0.122 0.220 0.122 0.266 1.002
the source and absorption at the sink. The average packet latency involves both multicast
and unicast packet latency. For multicast/broadcast packets, packet latency is defined as
the average number of clock cycles required to absorb a packet in all destinations. EDP is
measured by the multiplying average packet latency and average packet energy.
The in-package memory module was considered to be a High Bandwidth Memory (HBM)
consisting of 4-layered vertically stacked DRAM mounted on top of a base logic die [118].
Each memory stack is assumed to have four channels. The base logic die works as an
interface between the memory stacks and multicore chips. In this section, first the system
will be evaluated for various types of synthetic traffic as well as with real application-based
traffic. Synthetic traffic is used to illustrate the behavior of the system under various specific
conditions followed by real application-based traffic.
3.4.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation of wireless interconnection requires the amalgamation of multiple simulation
tools that are described here. Interconnection network switches are designed using Register
Transfer Level (RTL)-level designs and extracting post-synthesis performance parameters
using Application-Specific IC (ASIC) design flows such as Synopsys Design Compiler (DC)
using 65 nm standard cell libraries from Chip Multi Projects (https://mycmp.fr/). The
characteristics of the digital MAC units are obtained from post-synthesis RTL models as
shown in Table 3.1. The delay and energy dissipation on the intra-chip wireline links is
obtained through Cadence simulations considering the specific lengths of each link based
on the NoC topology in each multicore die. The characteristics of the antenna, transceiver
circuits are simulated in High-Frequency Structural Simulator (HFSS) [126] and Cadence
Virtuoso respectively, and were adopted from [124], [125]. Table 3.2 shows the parameters
used for the simulations.
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The characteristics of the antennas, transceivers, routers, and wired links are annotated
into a system-level, cycle-accurate simulator based on NOXIM [127]. However, NOXIM does
not have the inherent capability to simulate MCMC systems and complex wireless inter-
connect architectures. Therefore, additional code has been plugged in to modify it to the
necessary interconnect simulator and evaluated the performance of the proposed WiNiP sys-
tem. Figure. 3.7 captures the interaction between simulators at various levels of abstraction.
The proposed architecture was characterized with synthetic traffic as well as evaluate it with
application-specific traffic patterns. As shown in Figure. 3.7, the synthetic traffic used in
these experiments is uniform random spatial distribution and directly fed into the simulator.
However, traffic traces for each of the PARSEC and SPLASH2 benchmark suite were gener-
ated using SynFull [122] and then the traffic traces were used in the cycle-accurate simulator
for performance evaluation.
Figure 3.7: Overview of the simulation process.
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Table 3.2: Component configuration for simulations
Components Configuration
NoC Router 3 stage pipelined [37], 5 ports (except wireless)
Total VC 8, Each 4 flits deep
Flit width 64 bits
Wired NoC links 64-bit flits, single cycle latency, 0.2pJ/bit/mm
Wired Interposer links 64-bit flits, single cycle latency, 0.2pJ/bit/mm
OOK Wireless transceiver 16Gbps, 2.03pJ/bit, OOK modulated at 60GHz
CDMA encoder, decoder
and ADC
16Gbps, 0.66pJ/bit, OOK modulated with ADC and CDMA decoder [33] at 60GHz
HBM link 128Gbps, 6.5pJ/bit [30]
Technology node 65nm, 1V supply, 1 GHz system clock
3.4.2 Architectures for Comparison
Several configurations for the MCMC systems were considered for the comparative perfor-
mance evaluation. In all cases, a 4 chip system was considered with 16 processors arranged
in a 4x4 grid, and the memory stacks are considered to be mounted on both sides of the
processing chip array. Table. 3.3 lists the architectures and their properties.
The Asymmetric Token-only WiNiP (ATWiNiP), Asymmetric CDMA-only WiNiP (ACWiNiP),
and Symmetric WiNiP (SWiNiP) architectures are used to evaluate the performance of the
proposed hybrid MAC and the asymmetric architecture separately. On the other hand, the
BDXNiP [25] and ONWiNiP [4] represents the state-of-the-art wired and wireless architec-
ture to be compared with the proposed Multicast-Aware WiNiP (MAWiNiP) architecture.
The BDXNiP topology combines the different topological aspects of Butterfly and Folded
Torus topology and extends the interposer to multiple chips. In BDXNiP architecture, cores
in every 2x2 grid share an interposer router. The misaligned topology also offsets the loca-
tion of the boundary interposer routers that connect the edge cores of two adjacent chips.
In ONWiNiP architecture, broadcast traffic is transmitted using the wireless plane where
the unicast traffic uses the wired path. The plane selection, blocking, and switching is con-
trolled by a hybrid controller integrated into Network Interface (NIF). The proposed hybrid
interconnection architecture uses a CSMA based MAC proposed in [128] and a wireless link
speed of 64Gbps having 2pJ/bit energy efficiency. Though the topology can be configured
in various ways, we use Ort41 configuration as it closely matches with other architectures
considered in this section. The Wired NiP (WNiP) is our baseline architecture which is an
extended mesh topology connecting multiple chips.
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R-WIs TR-WIs MAC type Interchip links
WNiP Mesh No No N/A Wired
ATWiNiP Mesh Yes Yes Token Only Wireless
ACWiNiP Mesh Yes Yes CDMA Only Wireless
SWiNiP Mesh No Yes Proposed Hybrid MAC Wireless
MAWiNiP Mesh Yes Yes Proposed Hybrid MAC Wireless
BDXNiP Butterfly+Folded torus No No N/A Active Interposer Links
ONWiNiP Mesh No Yes CSMA Wired + Wireless
In the case of wireline configurations, the memory stacks are connected to the I/O modules
of the processing chips through 4 channels each consisting of 128 bit (assuming µ-bump pitch
of 50µm and 10mm die edge) [34] wide channel operating at 1GHz. Hence, this wide I/O
provides a total bandwidth of 128Gbps per channel with its neigh-boring processing chip
with an energy consumption of 6.5pJ/bit [118]. The 4 channels of the HBM memory are
connected with this wide I/O to the adjacent 4 cores along the boundary of the adjacent
chips. Table 3.2 shows bandwidth and energy consumption for wired and wireless links.
3.4.3 Performance Evaluation of the Proposed MAC and Topol-
ogy with One-to-Many Traffic
In this section, the performance benefit of the proposed hybrid MAC and asymmetric topol-
ogy of the proposed MAWiNiP architecture will be evaluated over other wireless multichip
communication architectures discussed in Section 3.4.2. The one-to-many traffic pattern was
synthetically modeled as multicast traffic originating primarily due to cache coherence and
other control signals such as barrier synchronization. A certain percentage of the traffic is
modeled as one-to-many (i.e. multicast), and the rest of the traffic is modeled as one-to-one
unicast traffic. 30 cores were selected randomly as multicast destinations among all the
multicore chips based on the findings of a study of multicast messages in such multicore
systems [42]. For simulation, 1%, 5%, and 10% traffic packets originating from any core
were considered to be multicast traffic along with 10 % core-memory traffic based on the
traffic patterns investigated in [47]. The remaining traffic was modeled as one-to-one uniform
random unicast traffic among cores in the system.
For this experiment, a 4 chip system with 4 in-package memory modules were considered
where, each chip has 16 processing cores in it. The peak achievable bandwidth per core
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and average EDP for the wireless architectures under multicast traffic patterns are shown
in Figure. 3.8. A maximum traffic load of 1 flit per core per cycle is used to observe the
performance at maximum load. Among all the wireless architectures studied in Figure. 3.8,
the proposed MAWiNiP interconnection architecture provides the highest peak achievable
bandwidth and lowest EDP.
Figure 3.8: (a) Peak achievable bandwidth (b) Average EDP for different one-to-many traffic
percentages.
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ATWiNiP and ACWiNiP both being the asymmetric WiNiP topologies, the comparative
results shown in Figure 3.8 reveals the performance benefit due to only the proposed hy-
brid MAC of the MAWiNiP architecture. The proposed multicast aware MAC prioritizes
the one-to-many traffic. Switching to DAFCA mode during multicast transmission allows
the multicast transmitter to capture the entire wireless channel bandwidth and along with
support from the asymmetric topology, it ensures very low latency for multicast traffic. For
unicast traffic, the proposed MAC exploits the multiple simultaneous wireless communication
by switching the MAC to CDMA mode. Therefore, faster transmission of the one-to-many
traffic in DAFCA mode coupled with the concurrent unicast transmission in CDMA mode
increases the peak bandwidth with low EDP.
The ATWiNiP suffers from additional token round trip time while only one TR-WI has
access to the medium at a particular point of time. In the ACWiNiP channel bandwidth is
wasted during multicast traffic transmission as only one code-channel is used by each TR-
WI. Therefore, both ATWiNiP and ACWiNiP provide lower performance compared to the
hybrid MAC in MAWiNiP. To be accurate the proposed MAC of the MAWiNiP ar-chitecture
achieves a bandwidth gain of 30.42% and 24.47% for 10% broadcast traffic compared to
ATWiNiP and ACWiNiP architectures respectively.
The SWNiP architecture uses the proposed hybrid MAC but with a symmetric topology
with no R-WIs in it. Therefore, the performance comparison of the MAWiNiP with the
SWNiP presented in Figure 3.8 provides the performance gain only due to the asymmetric
topology of the MAWiNiP architecture. The MAWiNiP architecture achieves 28.79% higher
bandwidth and 74.75% lower EDP compared to SWiNiP architecture for 10% broadcast
traffic. This is because, during multicast message trans-mission in DAFCA mode, the MAC
can exploit the underlying asymmetrical topology by activating the R-WI of each multi-
cast receiving node. Hence, it enables single-hop reception of the multicast flits in every
destination node directly and reduces the overall network congestion, latency, and EDP.
In a nutshell, the proposed architecture enables faster and low latency transmission of the
multicast messages that significantly reduces the network congestion and improves overall
bandwidth and energy consumption by
• simultaneous packet transmission for unicast mes-sages.
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• higher overall available bandwidth enabled by the proposed hybrid MAC in multicast
transmission, and
• selective activation of the R-WI in each destination node during multicast ensuring
single-hop multicast reception and low power consumption during only unicast message
transfer.
As these one-to-many packets can be latency-critical, the average broadcast packet la-
tency was also evaluated and compared for different broadcast traffic percentage with all the
wireless architectures considered in this section. From Figure 3.9 it can be observed that
the proposed MAWiNiP architecture has the lowest broadcast packet latency for different
broadcast load compared to other wireless interconnection architectures. It can also sustain
a higher volume of broadcast traffic compared to any other architecture. This is due to the
symbiotic relationship among the asymmetric topology, broadcast aware MAC and the SC
flow control, the MAWiNiP architecture prioritizes broadcast packets and grants immediate
access to the entire channel to ensure low latency for broadcast traffic. The relative latency
gain of the hybrid MAC and asymmetric topology can be measured separately by comparing
the results of ATWiNiP, ACWiNiP, and SWiNiP respectively.
Figure 3.9: Average broadcast packet latency for different architectures with different broad-
cast traffic percentages.
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3.4.4 Latency Comparison with State-of-the-art Architectures
Several state-of-the-art on-chip and multichip architectures have been proposed to handle
one-to-many traffic resulting from cache coherence and system synchronization events. In
this section, one-to-many traffic performance of our proposed MAWiNiP architecture with
other state-of-the-art wired and wireless interconnection architectures will be compared in
terms of average packet latency. As state-of-the-art wired architecture, we consider WNiP
and BDXNiP architectures as described in Section 3.4.2 For wireless interconnection, we
consider ONWiNiP as described in Section 3.4.2 and extend it for MCMC communication.
As one-to-many traffic affects the overall system latency, the average packet latency was
considered as a performance metric. The considered architectures were evaluated for differ-
ent injection load with 10% broadcast traffic and the rest of the traffic is considered to be
uniform random. From Figure 3.10, it can be observed that the ONWiNiP inter-connection
architecture outperforms the WNiP and BDXNiP wired architectures. This is because the
ONWiNiP architecture provides a separate plane for broadcast communication and therefore
the multicast/broadcast traffic does not have to contend for resources with unicast traffic
which results in overall low latency for ONWiNiP architecture at low load. However, as the
traffic load increases, most of the traffic is routed using the wired network to avoid wire-
less channel congestion which results in higher average packet latency. The BDXNiP wired
architecture having less network diameter compared to WiNiP architecture provides lower
Figure 3.10: Average packet latency under various injection load.
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latency than the WiNiP architecture. However, with increased congestion at higher injec-
tion load, the average broadcast packet latency increases. Finally, the proposed MAWiNiP
architecture outperforms all the wired and wireless interconnection architecture in terms of
average packet latency at different traffic loads. The one-to-many traffic prioritized by the
pro-posed hybrid MAC, instant channel access provided by the SC flow control, and the un-
derlying asymmetrical topology can efficiently support broadcast traffic. On the other hand,
multiple simultaneous unicast transmission using CDMA mode enables the architecture to
provide low latency even at a higher injection rate compared to other architectures.
The broadcast traffic percentages were also varied to measure the average packet latency
gain of the MAWiNiP, BDXNiP, and ONWiNiP architectures with respect to the WNiP ar-
chitectures. It is interesting to see from Figure 3.11 that at low broadcast traffic percentage,
the ONWiNiP architecture has a lower speedup than BDXNiP. This is because, at a low
broadcast percentage, as the unicast traffic uses the underlying wired interconnect, which is
essentially a mesh for ONWiNiP architecture, the performance gain of using wireless links is
masked by the high latency of the wired interconnect in the ONWiNiP compared with that
of the BDXNiP. However, with the increase in broadcast traffic ONWiNiP outperforms the
BDXWiNiP architecture due to the low latency separate wireless broadcast plane. MAW-
iNiP shows the highest latency speedup among all the architectures because of its broadcast
awareness through the symbiotic relationship among MAC, topology, and flow control. How-
ever, at high broadcast load, as the network is already saturated the latency gain stabilizes
Figure 3.11: Average packet latency gain with higher broadcast traffic.
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at a certain value for all the architectures.
3.4.5 Analysis of Unicast Message Latency
In a MCMC system, as most of the messages are unicast, it is essential to study the latency
behavior of such messages in presence of one-to-many traffic. Therefore, in this section, the
average unicast message latency of all the MCMC architectures considered in Sections 3.4.3
and 3.4.4, in presence of one-to-many traffic will be evaluated. For each MCMC system, 1%,
5%, and 10% broadcast traffic were considered, and the rest of the traffic was modeled as
uniform random unicast traffic. Figure 3.12 shows the average unicast message latency of
all the multichip architectures considered in this paper.
As unicast message queuing latency significantly increases with the increase in broadcast
traffic percentage [88], for wired multichip architectures, such as WNiP and BDXNiP, the
average unicast message latency in-creases drastically with the increase in broadcast traffic
percentage. On the other hand, the hybrid ONWiNiP architecture provides limited support
by using its wireless broadcast plane for a low percentage of broadcast traffic. However,
for higher broadcast traffic percentage, the wired unicast plane gets quickly saturated by
Figure 3.12: Average unicast latency for different multichip systems.
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broad-cast traffic which results in a large average unicast latency for such systems.
ACWiNiP, ATWiNiP, and SWiNiP being the WiNiP architectures utilizing the asymmetric
topology or the hybrid MAC, provide better average unicast latency compared to WNiP,
BDXNiP, and ONWiNiP architectures. At lower broadcast traffic percentage (1%), because
of the reconfigurable hybrid MAC, one-to-many traffic-aware SC protocol, and the underlying
asymmetric topology, MAWiNiP can ensure faster transmission of one-to-many traffic to
reduce overall network congestion. Therefore, it eventually helps to reduce the large queuing
delay of unicast traffic and as shown in Figure 3.12, it ensures better average unicast latency
compared to ACWiNiP, ATWiNiP, and SWiNiP architectures.
With the increase in broadcast percentage, large average broadcast latency due to only
CDMA mode transmission in ACWiNiP and limited access to wireless channel along with
the under utilization of bandwidth in ATWiNiP results in higher queuing latency for unicast
messages in these systems. In MAWiNiP architecture, as the broadcast-aware SC protocol
prioritizes more number of broadcast messages with the increase in broadcast traffic per-
centage, the average unicast latency for MAWiNiP system also increases. However, this in-
crease is marginal compared to ACWiNiP and ATWiNiP architectures at a higher broadcast
percentage. To be specific, for MAWiNiP architecture, the worst average unicast message
latency increment is 1.02% compared to ATWiNiP architecture for 10% broadcast traffic.
Due to the multihop wired path and similar MAC, average unicast latency for SWiNiP is
always higher than MAWiNiP architecture.
There is no way to ignore the fact that some time-critical unicast messages exist in such
systems and those messages can also be handled by the proposed flow control and reconfig-
urable hybrid MAC. The existing flow control can provide higher priority to such time-critical
unicast messages by treating it as a multicast message with a single destination. The appli-
cation layer can identify such messages to set the corresponding multicast and destination
bits in the packet structure as shown in Figure 3.5(b) and the proposed flow will ensure low
latency for the message. Moreover, multi-level priority can also be introduced to handle such
messages with additional encoder and decoder overheads. However, it is also obvious that
such messages are few and the ultimate goal of the paper is to introduce novel wireless in-
terconnection architecture to achieve low latency for one-to-many traffic transmission which
eventually leads to lower congestion, better unicast as well as overall network latency.
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3.4.6 Evaluation for System Size Scaling
Scalability has always been an area of interest for on-chip and off-chip interconnection ar-
chitectures. In this section, the performance of the proposed MAWiNiP architecture will be
evaluated in comparison with the BDXNiP, WNiP, and ONWiNiP interconnection architec-
tures as the number of multicore chips scale up. Such system scaling affects the chip-to-chip
and most importantly chip-memory traffic as more chips will be sharing the in-package mem-
ories. Each system is evaluated in the presence of 10% broadcast along with 10% memory
traffic from each core. The rest of the traffic is considered as one-to-one unicast traffic pat-
tern between all cores. We consider three MCMC configurations of 4, 9, and 16 processing
chips, with each chip having 16 cores. We considered 4 memory stacks in each configuration.
A cluster size of 4 was considered including one memory controller in each cluster resulting
in 4 clusters or 4 memory controllers in each chip.
As each of the memory controllers is equipped with a TR-WI, increasing the number
of chips for MAWiNiP system introduces additional codeword overhead for CDMA mode
which makes the wireless links slower. For the WNiP and BDXNiP wired architectures,
increasing number of chips in the system increases off-chip traffic, which needs to travel
through long multi-hop paths. Similarly, for ONWiNiP architecture, its wireless plane suffers
from higher contention due to CSMA MAC protocol and wired plane encounters rapid latency
increase similar to WNiP architecture. Therefore, the system bandwidth decays for all the
Figure 3.13: Peak achievable bandwidth with system size scaling.
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architectures significantly with system size scaling as shown in Figure 3.13. It can be also
observed from Figure 3.13 that, though MAWiNiP system also requires long codeword for
unicast transmission with system size scaling, due to its efficient one-to-many traffic support
it provides the highest overall system bandwidth among all the architectures.
3.4.7 Effect of Flit Size Variation
Different computing nodes and protocols might re-quire different flit sizes for inter, intra-
chip, and chip-memory communication. The multicast/broadcast latency can vary due to
flit size variation. Therefore, in this section, the effect of increasing flit width has been
analyzed on average packet latency for MAWiNiP, ONWiNiP, and BDXNiP interconnection
architectures compared to WNiP architecture. A 4 chip system with 4 in-package memory
modules was considered for all the architectures and the relative latency gain with uniform
random traffic patterns was measured with 10% broadcast traffic with respect to WNiP
architecture.
For performance evaluation with variation in flit width, three different flit sizes of 32, 64,
and 128 bits were considered. This is because as noted in [129], higher flit widths beyond
128 are shown to provide marginal gains in performance of even a conventional wired NoC
based system while considerably increasing energy or power consumption of the data com-
munication hardware. In the case of WNiP and BDXNiP wired architectures, an increase
Figure 3.14: Average packet latency gain over WNiP for flit size variation.
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Table 3.4: Core configuration for application-specific traffic simulation
Component Configuration
Cores Out-of-Order, 16cores/chip, 1GHz
L1 Cache 32KB, 4-way, LRU policy, private
LLC (L2) Cache 512KB, 8-way, LRU policy, shared
Cache Coherency Directory-based MOESI
in flit-width translates into increasing the band-width of the chip-to-chip and chip-memory
links by increasing the number of parallel wires. On the other hand, the data rate of the wire-
less links is governed by the speed of the transceiver, modulation scheme, and band-width
of the antennas, which do not change with flit width. Hence, while the wireline communi-
cation becomes faster with an increase in flit size in WNiP and BDXNiP architectures, the
wireless communication speed remains constant in MAWiNiP and ONWiNiP architectures.
This results in a reduction in latency gain for the wireless architectures with increased flit
width as shown in Figure 3.14. On the other hand, BDXNiP, being completely wireline,
shows an increment in latency gain with larger flit width as the link width increases with the
increase in flit-size. However, as the wired network is already congested with 10% broadcast
traffic, therefore, even with a flit width of 128 bits a relative average packet latency gain of
2.22 and 4.3 can be observed compared to BDXNiP and WNiP architectures respectively for
MAWiNiP system.
3.4.8 Evaluation with Application-Specific Traffic
After evaluating the performance of the proposed architecture under various synthetic traffic
scenarios, this section evaluates the performance of the MAWiNiP, BDXNiP, WNiP, and
ONWiNiP multichip architectures with application-specific traffic patterns from PARSEC
and SPLASH2 benchmark suites. For evaluation a 4 chip system with 4 in-package memory
modules was considered. To generate the application-specific traffic patterns, a multicore
chip with 16 out-of-order cores were considered whose features are listed in Table 3.4. These
core configurations are then used to ex-tract the core-to-memory and cache coherency traffic
for these applications when they are executed until completion using SynFull [122]. In order
to map these traffic patterns to the MCMC environment, it was considered that multiple
threads of the same application kernel running on the MCMC system where each processing
chip executes a single thread, and the memory stacks are shared among threads.
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The average packet latency and average packet energy of the wired and wireless architec-
tures for different application-specific traffic patterns are shown in Figure 3.15. The latency
best represents the performance in these cases as the interconnection network is not satu-
rated in the steady-state. The average packet latency and average packet energy for the
wireless MCMC systems vary between applications due to the variation in off-chip traffic
patterns from different memory access patterns. However, for all application-specific traffic
Figure 3.15: Performance evaluation of the multichip system with application specific traffic
(a) Average packet latency (b) Average packet energy.
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patterns considered here, the performance of the proposed MAWiNiP multichip system is
better than all other interconnection architectures studied in the paper. This is because
of the proposed multicast-aware, dynamically reconfigurable MAC, and the support from
the underlying asymmetric topology and flow control. For the MAWiNiP architecture, the
average reduction in latency with respect to WNiP, BDXNiP, and ONWiNiP architecture
is 47.08%, 30.12%, and 20.75% respectively. Similarly, the average reduction in packet en-
ergy with respect to WNiP, BDXNiP, and ONWiNiP systems is 46.96%, 15.23%, 25.61%
respectively.
3.4.9 Area Overhead Analysis
This section discusses the area overhead for all the R-WIs and TR-WIs in a 10×10 mm2
multicore chip in 65nm technology node. Each receiver in R-WI occupies 0.093mm2 and
each transceiver for TR-WIs takes 0.17mm2 active area in silicon [124], [125]. Hence for a
16 core multicore chip, R-WIs and TR-WIs take up to 1.116 mm2 and 0.68 mm2 silicon area
respectively with the smallest cluster size of 4. Therefore, all the R-WIs and TR-WIs together
in a multicore chip take only 1.796% of the active silicon area of the multicore chip. The
length of each antenna is 0.4 mm, but it does not occupy any active area being fabricated
using upper layer metal processes [3]. Additionally, the area, delay and power overhead
for the digital MAC unit components corresponding to each TR-WI have been shown in
Table 3.1. Therefore, for each multicore chip, having 4 TR-WIs will have an additional area
overhead of 552.4 µm2 making the total overhead of the wireless interconnection less than
1.8 mm2 per chip.
3.5 Chapter Summary
Modern computing platforms experience multicast/broadcast traffic due to their multicore,
multiprocessor architecture as well as for the rapid growth of memory-intensive applications.
In the near future it is obvious that for massive computing platforms consisting of thousands
of cores/processors, this one-to-many traffic will be the major performance bottleneck if
the architecture and the interconnect fail to provide the required support for such traffic.
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Motivated by the limited support of the state-of-the-art wired interconnects, in this chapter a
novel one-to-many traffic-aware asymmetric WiNiP topology along with a novel dynamically
reconfigurable MAC and flow control has been proposed. The proposed topology exploits the
MAC and the flow control through a symbiotic relationship and provides the required support
not only for one-to-many traffic but also for many-to-few hotspot traffic. Through system-
level simulation, we show that the proposed WiNiP architecture can reduce the system
latency in presence of such one-to-many traffic by 47.08% compared to WNiP. Even with the
scaling of system size or cluster size the proposed architecture outperforms the other wired
and wireless architectures in terms of energy, bandwidth, latency and hence, represents a
scalable interconnect solution for future MCMC-based HPC nodes.
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Chapter 4
A Jamming-Aware Secure WiNiP
Architecture for Multichip Systems
Mm-wave enabled wireless interconnection architectures have emerged as an energy-efficient,
low-latency, and scalable solution for future MCMC-based HPC systems. Despite providing
performance enhancements, wireless channel, being an unguided medium, introduces po-
tential security vulnerabilities inherited from traditional wireless networks such as jamming
induced DoS and eavesdropping. Securing the systems against such induced threats often
introduce large overheads and performance penalties. To address these challenges, in this
chapter, the architecture of a WiNiP architecture that reuses the in-built DFT hardware for
securing against external and HT induced internal attacks has been discussed. The proposed
architecture is capable of securing against adversaries with a reconfigurable wireless inter-
connection (AWARe-Wi). To ensure higher accuracy, ML classifier was deployed to detect
the threats. In addition, for a robust threat detection against crafted attacks, an AML-based
approach has been also introduced. Moreover, to enable sustainable multichip communica-
tion in such systems even under jamming attack from both internal and external attackers,
design of a reconfigurable MAC and a suitable communication protocol have been discussed.
The simulation results show that, the ML and AML classifiers can achieve an accuracy of
99.87% and 95.95% respectively for attack detection while the proposed WiNiP can sustain
chip-to-chip communication even under persistent jamming attack with an average 1.44×
and 1.56× degradation in latency for internal and external attacks respectively.
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4.1 Motivation
High-performance computing nodes such as blade servers and embedded systems have al-
ready undergone a massive paradigm shift from single core, single chip architecture to MCMC
architecture. This paradigm shift is justified as follows, for a large single chip, different
factors such as sub-wavelength lithography, line edge roughness, and random dopant fluctu-
ations can cause wide process variations, which can result in higher fault density and hence,
reduces the manufacturing yield. Therefore, the disintegration of larger single chips into
smaller chips, forming multichip compute systems, such as the AMD EPYC [27] series re-
leased in 2017, aid in alleviating the effect of higher fault densities in advanced technology
nodes and eventually leading to reduced manufacturing cost per die. Despite the achieved
yield enhancements, each chip in the SiP of MCMC demands an efficient intra-chip as well
as an inter-chip communication, as disintegration increases inter-chip traffic significantly.
Although NoC has emerged as a scalable, modular on-chip interconnection architecture, it
cannot provide low latency for large systems due to its multi-hop nature [60][52].
On the other hand, the performance of the MCMC system is mostly limited by the high
latency and power hungry off-chip I/Os. Conventionally, C4 bumps coupled with in-package
transmission lines or flip-chip packaging [29] is used to interconnect chips within a MCMC
system. However, signal quality deterioration due to microwave effects, crosstalk coupling
effects and frequency-dependent line losses in the transmission line limit the number of
concurrent, high-speed inter-chip I/O and hence chip-to-chip bandwidth. In recent literature
is has been shown that WIs operating at GHz bandwidth in mm-wave bands can mask off-
chip I/O delay by establishing single hop, energy-efficient chip-to-chip communication links
[3][54]. We refer such MCMC systems with mm-wave wireless interconnect as WiNiP here.
Although extensive research has been carried out towards improving performance and
energy dissipation in WiNiPs [3], [83], relatively little attention has been given to the infor-
mation integrity and security or privacy aspects of WiNiPs. Wireless being an unguided,
shared transmission medium is vulnerable to many attacks such as DoS, eavesdropping, and
spoofing. Although each of these attacks require its own detection and defense mechanism,
this chapter is focused on persistent jamming-based DoS attack as it is one of the most
common, simple and yet powerful attack on wireless systems. Moreover, such attacks are
yet to be analyzed for MCMC systems using wireless interconnect.
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To replicate such an attack, an external attacker that produces a high energy EM radiation
that causes interference in the wireless medium of the WiNiPs was considered. In addition, to
address the complexities and vulnerabilities arising from hardware design and manufacturing
process, a HT was considered to be maliciously embedded in MCMC system during the design
or fabrication process. In this case, one of the WIs infected by a HT will transmit the data
over wireless channel irrespective of whether it is enabled by the adopted MAC protocol of
the WiNiP. This will cause contention or interference with legitimate transmissions causing
DoS on the remaining WIs.
While well-known defenses exist against DoS attacks in large scale wireless networks,
those techniques cannot be adopted and applied directly to the WiNiP scenario due to
large power, area and timing overhead of the existing security implementations [108]. To
address and meet such constraints, in this chapter, a persistent jamming-based DoS attack
resistant architecture has been proposed that re-uses the existing DFT hardware to detect
and defend against jamming attack in WiNiPs. Moreover, under such jamming attack,
specially for MCMC systems, it is non-trivial to synchronize and inform all other WIs about
the presence of an adversary as chip-to-chip communication happens through only wireless
medium which is itself vulnerable to the attack. To address this issue, a novel MCMC wireless
communication protocol was also developed along with a reconfigurable MAC that can ensure
robust and secure communication under internal and external persistent jamming attack. To
handle more intelligently crafted jamming attacks and ensure a robust, accurate detection
and defense mechanism AML and adversarial training for the deployed ML classifiers have
been utilized. The research contributions of this work can be outlined as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes a solution for persistent
jamming attack by re-using DFT infrastructure for WiNiP.
• We propose a novel dynamically reconfigurable MAC and the corresponding synchro-
nization mechanism for all WIs under jamming condition.
• We propose an AML-based mechanism for high accuracy threat detection and recovery
from persistent jamming-based DoS attacks.
• We describe a novel communication protocol necessary to ensure a robust communica-
tion even under a persistent jamming-based DoS attack.
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• We analyze the performance degradation of the proposed security mechanism for dif-
ferent WiNiPs and compare it with wired MCMC systems.
4.2 Fundamentals of DFT Architectures
Before discussing the proposed jamming-aware WiNiP interconnection architecture, a brief
of the IEEE P1500 and IEEE 1149.1 test architectures will be discussed in this section.
As such DFT architectures have been re-used to detect persistent jamming attack in this
chapter, the fundamental of those DFT architectures is required to understand the secure
WiNiP architecture described in the next section.
The IEEE P1500 standard has been developed to ensure a scalable, plug-and-play testing
methodology for embedded cores in a SoC environment. IEEE P1500 test standard man-
dates a test wrapper around each core. The wrapper architecture is comprised of an Wrapper
Instruction Register (WIR), Wrapper Boundary Register (WBR), Wrapper Bypass Register
(WBY) along with Wrapper Interface Ports (WIPs) with the on-chip Test Access Mecha-
nism (TAM). The WIPs in the wrapper can be classified as mandatory Wrapper Serial Ports
(WSPs) and optional Wrapper Parallel Ports (WPPs). The instructions in WIR can config-
ure the cells in WBR to parallelly or serially load the test data to perform the vector-based
testing of the functional core. Figure 4.1(a) shows the IEEE P1500 architecture.
The IEEE 1149.1 standard or Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) was introduced by a group
Figure 4.1: (a) IEEE P1500 (b) IEEE 1149.1 (JTAG) test architecture.
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of European engineers to address the difficulties of so-called ”bed-of-nails” technique to test
electronic devices on a printed circuit board. As the proposed solution involved serial shift
register around the boundary of the chip, it is also known as boundary scan. The basic JTAG
architecture is comprised of four mandatory test ports namely Test Data In (TDI), Test Data
Out (TDO), Test Mode Select (TMS) and optional Test Reset (TRST) port. These ports are
collectively referred to as Test Access Port (TAP). To apply the test vectors, Boundary Scan
(BS) cells on the device primary input, output pins are placed serially along the boundary
of the chip to form a scan chain. Moreover, the architecture also use Instruction Register
(IR) and Bypass Register, which along with the TAP controller perform the intended tests
on selected chips. Figure 4.1(b) depicts the JTAG test architecture with two chips.
The Built-in-Self-Test (BIST) is an on-chip test methodology proposed for faster and low-
cost testing of the modern complex SoCs. In BIST, additional hardware is designed inside
the chip to generate and apply the test pattern by itself for self testing. The pseudo-random
pattern is mainly generated by a Linear Feedback shift Register (LFSR). LFSR implements
a higher degree polynomial function to generate the pseudo-random pattern. Based on the
initial value (seed) and the tapping points, LFSRs can produce random sequence of very
long cycle. Such LFSRs have been re-used to secure the multichip wireless communication
described in Section 4.3.3.
4.3 WiNiP Interconnection Architecture
This section discusses the proposed WiNiP interconnection architecture which covers the
adopted topology, the proposed hybrid MAC and physical layer.
4.3.1 Adopted Multichip Topology
To meet the increasing memory demands for current and emerging applications and mimic
real MCMC architectures, we consider an MCMC system with multicore processors and in-
package memory modules. The memory modules are connected to the edge cores through
wired interconnect. Each tile in the multicore chips is composed of a processing core, a
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switch, L1 private cache and a distributed shared LLC. Tiles in each chip are connected
with each other through a regular wired mesh-based NoC. For inter-chip communication, in
each chip, two NoC switches were equipped with WIs as shown in Figure 4.2. Keeping the
number of WIs minimum for inter-chip communication helps to reduce the communication
overhead during jamming attack for our proposed approach.
However, a minimum of two WIs are necessary for each chip to ensure connectivity and
reliable communication with the rest of the system even if one of them is compromised by
an internal HT. A higher number of HTs within a single chip is assumed to be unlikely as
it will make HT detection easier. Typically, the footprint of HTs are minimal by design and
hence a maximum of a single HT per chip was assumed in our analysis. Although inter-chip
communication happens only through the WIs in functional mode, the MCMC system is
compliant to JTAG test architecture where their boundary scans are daisy chained. We
leverage this JTAG infrastructure for enhancing the security of MCMC system.
Figure 4.2: Proposed multichip WiNiP topology.
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4.3.2 Persistent Jamming-Aware Reconfigurable MAC
A wireless MAC mechanism enables a contention-free communication over the shared wire-
less channel among multiple transceivers. So far, no MAC has been proposed which is
jamming-aware and can sustain communication in both normal and attack scenario. There-
fore, a reconfigurable MAC mechanism operating in two modes was proposed for sustainable
communication even under persistent jamming attack. In the absence of persistent jamming
attacks, a reservation-based MAC, termed as Normal MAC (NMAC) was considered active
for MCMC communication. In NMAC, to get the channel access, each sender sends a non
overlapping reservation request to all the receivers encoded by a Common (C) code. Figure
4.4 shows the structure of the reservation packet and is discussed in details in the next sub-
section. As each receiver is equipped with same arbitration logic, each of them grants access
to the same transmitter that gets the whole channel access at a time. In NMAC, as one
sender gets the whole channel access, it ensures a contention free, high bandwidth off-chip
communication.
The above mentioned mode of WiNiP communication is unaware of any persistent ex-
ternal jamming. Therefore, the MAC is switched to Pseudo-random Noise (PN) encoded
Asynchronous Code Division Multiple Access (ACDMA) during external jamming attack
and call it Attack MAC (AMAC). In this work, by ACDMA we only refer to using PN
sequences and not other protocol overheads present in ACDMA communication in mobile
cellular network. Data encoded with PN sequence is jamming and eavesdropping resistant
because of the spread spectrum technology where the transmitted signals appear as noise
to every receiver, except the one that has the PN code which was used to encode the data
Figure 4.3: Overview of the reconfigurable MAC.
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during its transmission. Therefore, any transmission not encoded with the same code ap-
pears as noise due to the weak cross-correlation, making this AMAC resilient to jamming.
The PN codes used for ACDMA communication should have a strong auto-correlation and
weak cross-correlation property. While maximal-length sequence (m-sequence) and Kasami
sequence can be used to generate PN sequences, these sequences have worse cross-correlation
property to Gold sequence [130]. Moreover, Gold sequence can also support more users than
both Kasami and m-sequence. Therefore, PN codes were generated using Gold sequence.
The hybrid Transmitter-Common (TC) [120] PN code protocol was used to enable com-
munication in AMAC mode where each transmitter have specific codes to encode packets
they transmit and receivers have decoders for all channels to be able to receive data simulta-
neously from multiple transmitters. The common channel is used for arbitration and attack
information propagation. The AMAC mode is not used in normal, attack free operation
circumstances, as it reduces communication bandwidth of each link by its spreading factor.
The focus of this paper is to ensure robust WiNiP communication in presence of persistent
jamming attack on a high bandwidth WiNiP not to ensure high performance during such
attack. Figure 4.3 shows the proposed reconfigurable MAC with the underlying operations.
Figure 4.4: Channel reservation process.
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4.3.3 Flow Control and Communication Protocol
Some of the key challenges of such jamming-aware hybrid MAC is to ensure proper switching
and synchronous operation across MCMC system for both NMAC and AMAC modes with
low overheads. In this section, the proposed flow control that addresses these issues will be
discussed.
To ensure low area and latency overhead, we adopt a VC-based wormhole switching proto-
col for routing data where packets are broken into smaller flow control units or flits for both
wired and wireless links. A forwarding-table based routing over pre-computed shortest paths
is adopted to minimize the packet latency. The routing tree is constructed using Dijkstra’s
algorithm, which extracts a Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) providing the shortest path
between any pair of nodes in a graph. Consequently, deadlock is avoided by transferring
packets along the shortest path routing tree, as it is inherently free of cyclic dependencies.
For high bandwidth off-chip communication during NMAC, each WI sends its reservation
signal encoded by a fixed common PN code to all other WIs. The PN code being common to
every WI increases the chance of corrupting the source-destination addresses of the multiple
simultaneous requests. Therefore, a non-overlapping/non-interfering source-destination rep-
resentation was proposed. As shown in Figure 4.4(a) and (b), each transmitter has its own
slot to define its intended receivers. The slots being non-overlapping and orthogonal does not
create any interference with each other in their aggregate signal as shown by Figure 4.4(c).
Hence, receivers can arbitrate among multiple requests and grant the channel to a single
transmitter in NMAC mode. The adopted arbitration logic considers channel access starva-
tion for WIs and provides priority to multicast traffic [131]. We re-use such non-overlapping
signals to ensure synchronous operation even under jamming attack as discussed in the next
paragraph.
When the MCMC system is under attack, all the WIs in the system changes its MAC
to ACDMA mode and continue their communication, but with a reduced bandwidth as the
data is now encoded with PN sequence. The attack condition is provided the highest priority
which is indicated by the attack flag in Figure 4.4(d). After detecting a potential external
jamming attack as described in Subsection 4.4.2, a WI uses such signaling encoded by fixed
PN code to inform other WIs during external jamming. All the other WIs in MCMC system
78
after receiving the attack signal switches to AMAC mode simultaneously due to the priority
in attack bit. The PN sequence generation and AMAC communication are described in the
next subsections.
PN Code Selection and Generation
The PN codes are binary sequences that appears to be random, but, they can be generated in
a deterministic manner. However, to generate Gold sequence, two preferred m-sequences of
the same length are required. In each of the transmitters, we configure two LFSRs according
to the preferred polynomial pair and XOR their output to finally generate the desired Gold
sequence. Figure 4.5 shows the LFSR configuration to generate a 32 bit gold code. Moreover,
to generate a different PN sequence for each of the transmitter, different seed values were
chosen for each of the transmitters.
ACDMA Communication Mechanism Under Attack
During any persistent jamming attack, all the WIs in the MCMC system change the MAC to
ACDMA mode as discussed in Section 4.3.2. In ACDMA mode, the PN codes are managed
using TC protocol. Before any transmission, similar to reservation assisted NMAC mode,
the senders use a common PN code to send non overlapping send requests as shown in
Figure 4.5: PN code generation using Data and MAC LFSR.
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Figure 4.4. However, based on the received requests, multiple receivers can grant access to
multiple transmitters as now communication happens through different ACDMA channels.
We consider the LFSR length to be 5 so that each PN sequence repeats after 32 cycles which
is exactly the same time duration of a single bit of the baseband signal. Therefore, each
signal in a particular transmitter will be modulated by the same PN sequence. However,
different transmitters use different codes of the same length because of having different seed
values. Each receiver stores the seed values in a small tamper-proof Read-Only-Memory
(ROM) where the address of the seeds matches their transmitter address. Therefore, the
receiver already know which PN code to use for demodulation in a particular channel while
granting the channel access through reservation requests. Hence, the additional delay for
seed search does not have any impact on data transmission. To enhance security the seed
values can be dynamically changed as commonly practiced in cellular networks [132]. The
AMAC steps are also depicted in Figure 4.3. The transmitter and receiver architecture will
be discussed in the next section.
4.3.4 Physical Layer
To combat the persistent jamming, physical layer implements the components required for
both NMAC and AMAC protocols along with WIs. On-chip miniature zig-zag antennas
operating in the unlicensed 60 GHz mm-wave band was used to establish direct communica-
tion channels between the WIs. Such antenna provides a bandwidth of 16GHz for both intra
and inter-chip communications [3]. The transceiver design was adopted from [125] [124].
Non-coherent OOK-based transmitter and receiver design is chosen, as it allows a relatively
simple and low-power circuit implementation without the need for power-hungry carrier re-
covery circuitry [3]. In addition to the OOK modulator and demodulator, a CDMA encoder
and decoder is also designed for reservation and AMAC mode communication.
Irrespective of the NMAC or AMAC mode, as shown in Figure 4.6(a), each transmitter
sends a C channel encoded reservation request to access the channel which is decoded in
receiver’s C channel decoder as shown in Figure 4.6(b). Then only base-band data or PN-
encoded data is transmitted during NMAC and AMAC mode respectively. As only one
transmitter is active during NMAC, the transmitted data is captured directly at the receiver.
However, due to the adopted TC protocol for AMAC, the receiver needs to have CDMA
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decoders for every ACDMA code-channel. Therefore, in the receivers, the output of the OOK
demodulator is further sent to a CDMA receiver during an external jamming attack.The
signal is correlated with each regenerated PN code in the receiver side to create separate
receive channels. The PN codes are regenerated by retrieving the seed for the sender from
the ROM as soon as the receiver responds to the sender’s reservation request and thus, hides
the run time PN code regeneration latency.
4.4 Attack Model and Detection
This section discusses the attack model, proposed detection, and defense mechanism that
ensures robust communication under external and internal jamming attack scenario using
ML and AML approach.
Figure 4.6: (a) Transmitter (b) Receiver block diagram
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4.4.1 Attack Model
In this chapter, as aformentioned, a persistent jamming-based DoS attacks was considered on
the wireless interconnections of a WiNiP. In the presence of such a persistent DoS jamming
attack either from an external or internal attacker, there will be interference among the
attacker and the legitimate transmitter. This interference will cause high error rates due to
interference noise. Moreover, as the attack is persistent, it will cause errors in contiguous
bits of flits resulting in burst errors. Over the duration of the attack, these errors will span
multiple flits and therefore, cause burst errors in consecutive flits of a packet.
Burst errors in both wired and wireless links can happen as a random event as well such as,
power source fluctuations, ground bounce or crosstalk [133]. However, the burst errors due
to random events such as crosstalk will be relatively short lived, due to the data transition
pattern in that cycle. On the other hand, burst errors resulting from jamming attacks could
be sustained for longer duration as a shorter DoS attack is not effective. A few burst errors
caused by a short-lived DoS can be corrected/detected by a burst error correction/detection
(BEC) code or retransmissions. Therefore, to be truly effective as an attack, the jamming has
to be persistent to cause enough flits to be in error such that the existing BEC mechanism
either cannot correct it or causes a prohibitively large number of retransmissions. Hence, we
consider persistent jamming attacks either from a single external attacker or a single internal
HT which affect the WIs in the WiNiP. For the internal attacker, a single HT per chip was
considered in the MCMC system as that is a smarter HT insertion approach because the
probability of HT detection increases with increase in the number and footprint of HTs [134].
ML techniques were employed for attack detection as discussed in the next subsection.
Despite ML being robust to random noises, it has been shown that ML techniques are
vulnerable to crafted threats, termed as adversarial samples [135, 136]. Adversarial samples
exploit the sensitive features in the input or the ML model, adding noise to which can lead
to misleading the output of the ML model [137, 138]. In similar manner, in this chapter,
adversarial attacker will be introduced who can attack the system by cognitively crafting
the attack.
The first step to launch such an adversarial threat is to determine the model (and/or
parameters). This is performed through reverse engineering process by iteratively sending in
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the data and obtaining the responses, similar to that in [139]. Once the reverse engineered
model is built, then, the attacker tries to estimate the model and introduce the perturbations
by incrementally increasing the noise to the input features that are sensitive similar to [140]
to evade detection or to induce false alarms. In this work, we utilize Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) attack [135] to craft such an adversarial attack. However, it needs to be
noted that direct application of FGSM is not feasible, as it does not have a notion of relativity
between individual features when crafting an adversarial sample. To combat such scenario,
we introduce the relationship between different features such as number of errors not more
than the total number of packets sent in the form of constraints.
4.4.2 Attack Detection Methodology
To detect a persistent jamming attack with less area overhead the JTAG test infrastructure
has been re-used for probing the wireless interconnect. The architecture of the proposed
security framework is shown in Figure 4.7. When the probe (PRB) signal is asserted to
the security controller from the Attacker Detection Unit (ADU) as shown in Figure 4.7,
the MCMC system suspends its normal WiNiP operations and enables an LFSR called
MAC-LFSR to enter into the probe mode. Only a single MAC-LFSR is necessary for the
entire MCMC system. The MAC-LFSR grants access of the wireless medium to each WI
Figure 4.7: Proposed security framework.
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in a pseudo-random pattern to transmit normal data packets such that performance is not
impacted in the probe mode. The MAC-LFSR sets the MAC controller of each WI among
various chips by utilizing the serial JTAG boundary scan chain as it is not vulnerable to
wireless jamming. Each WI is equipped with a Data-LFSR. On being enabled by the MAC-
LFSR, the Data-LFSR creates a packet with pseudo-random bits to be sent from the WI.
This data includes the destination address of the target WI making the selection of the
destination pseudo-random as well. Data padding is done to embed the source address of
the sending WI in the packet. In addition, each receiver of a WI is equipped with a Wireless
Security Unit (WSU) that will enable detection of persistent jamming from both internal
HTs as well as external attacker. In the next subsection, the architecture of the WSU will
be briefly discussed.
Architecture of WSU
In the normal mode of operation, the data flits are received at the deserializer buffer of a
NoC switch equipped with a WI. Upon reception of flits at the receiver’s buffer, flits are sent
to the Burst Error Unit (BEU). The BEU employs the BEC proposed in [133] to detect burst
errors. The corrected flits after burst error correction are sent to the input VCs of the NoC
switch to be routed downstream in parallel to the error related information as discussed in
the next subsection, being sent to the ML classifier, to remove the DoS detection mechanism
from the critical path of the data transfer. If the ML classifier detects an attack as opposed
to a random burst error, it asserts a flag to the ADU. The ADU receives the input from ML
classifier and determines if the attack is internal or external as discussed below.
Machine Learning for Attack Detection
As aforementioned, the considered attacks in this chapter primarily result in causing contin-
uous sustained burst errors in the flits (data corruption). This can be detected by observing
the number of flits in error. In the proposed WiNiP, the output of BEU, which is the
number of burst errors within a block, is fed to an ML classifier to detect and differenti-
ate attacks. Multiple ML classifiers such as multi-layer perceptron (MLP), support vector
machine (SVM), k-nearest neighbors (KNN), Decision tree (DT), and J48 were investigated
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to evaluate the robustness and efficiency of attack detection. For the MLP, a single hidden
layer with 10 nodes is utilized, with two neurons in the output layer. A polynomial kernel
based SVM has been utilized for detection, as it considers the combination of the input
features as well as input features for classification. Similarly, experiment was also done with
k-nearest neighbors with k=1 and 3 in this work. In addition, two variants of decision classi-
fiers namely DT and J48 were tested, where J48 is an optimized version of DT with reduced
search space [141].
In order to train the ML classifier, cycle accurate WiNiP simulator was modeled to operate
in one of the three modes: normal, random burst errors and attack. In the normal mode,
the wireless interconnects are assumed to work with the reliability level determined by the
operation of the transceiver and their operating thermal noise. This type of noise is shown
to result in a random BER of 10−10 or less [124]. The second mode (random burst errors)
is modeled with higher BERs as the burst errors are contiguous bits of flits. BERs of 10−5
is used in this case [133]. Lastly, under DoS attack, a high BER of 0.5 is assumed as for
identically and independently distributed (iid) data bits even a very high power jamming
signal can cause errors only half of the time on an average. This is because the adopted
modulation mechanism in these wireless interconnects is OOK, where on an average the
data bits are represented as presence or absence of transmission. Therefore, a jamming
signal will only cause errors when the transmission is supposed to be absent, which can be

















n = number of bits per flit; Np = Normal Probability; Rp = Random Probability; Dp = DoS Probability
Figure 4.8: Markov Chain to generate training and test data.
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The simulator is modeled to create flit errors based on these BERs, which are then assumed
to be detected by the BEU. The simulator is made to operate in one of the three modes
dynamically by using a Markov Chain driven process, as shown in Figure 4.8. The probability
of staying in the attack mode, when already under attack is considered high, as a jamming
attack is effective only when it is sustained for sufficiently long duration. The probability of
staying in a random burst error mode when already in it is modeled low, as random burst
errors are short-lived phenomena. The probability of transition into normal mode from a
random burst error mode is therefore high. The specific probability values can be altered
to model any particular scenario. This observed data (number of flit errors) along with the
operating mode (attack class i.e., random or burst) is used to train ML classifiers.
Strengthening Attack Detection with Adversarial Learning
In order to craft the adversarial perturbations, a functionally reverse engineered ML classifier
was considered i.e., a neural network with θ as the hyper parameters, x as the input to the
model (communication information such as number of packets transmitted, packet errors),
and y as the output for a given input x, and L(θ, x, y) as the cost function used to train the
neural network. Then the perturbation required to misclassify the ongoing communication
is determined based on the cost function gradient of the neural network (in this case). The
adversarial perturbation generated based on the gradient loss, similar to the FGSM [135] is
given by
xadv = x+ εsign(∇xL(θ, x, y)) (4.1)
where ε is a scaling constant ranging between 0.0 to 1.0 is set to be very small such that
the variation in x (δx) is undetectable. In case of FGSM the input x is perturbed along
each dimension in the direction of gradient by a perturbation magnitude of ε. Considering a
small ε leads to well-disguised adversarial samples that successfully fool the machine learning
model. In contrast to the images, where the number of features are large, the number of
features in our environment i.e., flit errors are limited. Thus the perturbations need to
be crafted carefully and also ensured that they can be generated during runtime by the
applications. For instance, a flit error higher than transmitted flits makes no sense and is
impossible to implement. Hence, we include a lower bound on the adversary values that can
be predicted.
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Once the adversarial pattern is predicted or determined, the attacker crafts the attacks
through induced errors or by spacing the attack in time so that the errors split over time as
predicted. The attacker internal or external, is modeled to display the adversarial behavior
as discussed above to create errors in the communicated flits only when the adversarial
model allows rather than assuming constantly high BERs when in the attack state of the
Markov Chain as in the previous subsection. Therefore, even when the simulator is in the
attack stage, BERs may not be consistently high making the attack more sophisticated
and decrease the likelihood of a detection. In order to defend against such threats, we
incubate a hardener unit. The hardener unit predicts the adversarial samples, similar to
the aforementioned attack and updates the ML classifier model through adversarial training
[142]. The hardener is allocated off-chip (on a connected system), but it updates the weights
of the ML classifier to robustify against the adversarial threats. One can argue that the
adversarial training is inefficient in defending against wide range of crafted threats and large
range of perturbations. However, in this given context, crafting too many vivid range of
threats is not feasible due to the correlation between features. Further, large variations
or perturbations can be easily caught, as large deviation in the errors clearly indicate the
presence of anomaly.
Attacker Detection Unit
It is essential to differentiate between internal and external jamming attack as defense mech-
anism depends on attack type. The ADU takes as an input the signal from the ML classifier
that detects the type of a jamming based DoS attack. On the detection of an attack through
ML classifier, the ADU activates the probe mode and all the WIs operate according to the
NMAC mechanism controlled by the MAC-LFSR. The MAC-LFSR generates an encoded
signal which is decoded to create a one-hot signal and is sent over JTAG boundary scan
chain to the transmitters of all the WIs. A parallel-load shift register is used to serialize this
one-hot signal. At each transmitter this signal is ANDed with the CLK signal as shown in
Figure 4.7. Thus, only one transmitter is enabled to transmits data flits over the WI in one
instance.
The very first MAC is initialized as an all-zero signal to disable all WIs from transmitting.
In this case, if any of the WIs still receives wireless transmission, it implies that the jamming
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source is an external attacker as none of the internal transmitters are powered on. An
External Jamming (EJAM) flag is sent to the Defense Unit (DU). However, if in this case,
there is no RF transmissions received, the MAC-LFSR progresses to further probing by
cycling through the MAC-LFSR where, only one transmitter is powered on in each cycle.
In these cases, where the enabled WI is not the internal attacker, there will be interference
in received flits at the WIs due to continuous jamming from the attacker. Only in the
case where the MAC-LFSR enables the attacker there will be no interference and correct
reception will be received at the WIs. So, the algorithm declares the WI that is enabled by
the MAC-LFSR in which case there is no interference, as the internal attacker. The ID of
this WI and an Internal Jamming (IJAM) flag is passed to the DU. For external attacker an
invalid (out of range) ID is sent.
4.5 Defense After Detection
DU implements different defensive measures based on the attack type. The ADU passes the
address of the WI that is determined to be the attacker to the DU. If the address passed
on to the DU indicates the address of an internal attacker, the DU sends IJAM signal to
disable only the power supply to the indicated WI and updates the routing table of its NoC
switch to prevent the use of the WI equipped port. Moreover, as there are at least 2 WIs
in each chip, the WI that is not compromised will inform other WIs in the MCMC system
to update their routing table for the compromised WI. Now, all the incoming packets at the
compromised WI will be diverted to the other WI on the chip via wired links. Hence, only
the HT infected WI is disabled and other WIs continue to use the wireless medium.
In case the attacker is an external agent, the DU of the enables the detecting WI to send
control signal as shown in Figure 4.4(d) over the common reservation channel by setting
the EJAM and attack flag on the transmitter side. The reservation channel like the other
ACDMA channels is resilient to jamming. The attack condition is provided the highest
priority and therefore, should be decoded immediately. As the signal has the attack flag
set and is broadcast in nature, every WI in MCMC can switch the MAC mode to AMAC
simultaneously and continue communication even under external persistent jamming attack.
In AMAC mode, before any transmission, similar to reservation assisted NMAC mode, the
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Table 4.1: Component configuration for simulation
Component Configuration
System size 64 cores, Out-of-Order, 16cores/chip
Cache 32KB (private L1), 512KB (shared L2), MOESI
NoC router 3 stage pipelined 5 ports,0.078pJ/bit(wired)
Total VC 4, each 8 flits deep, 32 bits/flit
Wired NoC links 32-bit flits, single cycle latency, 0.2pJ/bit/mm
OOK transceiver 16Gbps, 2.03pJ/bit, 60GHz, 2WIs/chip
CDMA encoder, decoder [65], 16Gbps, 0.66 pJ/bit
HBM links 128Gbps, 6.5pj/bit
Technology 65nm, 1V supply, 1GHz clock
senders use a common PN code to send non overlapping send requests. However, based on
the received requests, multiple receivers can grant access to multiple transmitters as now
communication happens through different ACDMA channels. As such AMAC mode uses
TC protocol, different transmitters use different PN codes of the same length because of
having different seed values. Each receiver stores the seed values in a small tamper-proof
ROM where the address of the seeds matches their transmitter address. Therefore, the
receiver already know which PN code to use for demodulation in a particular channel while
granting the channel access through reservation requests and hence, reduce communication
delay. Moreover, for an external attack, the ADU periodically probes the system to restore
the system to NMAC mode once the external jammer is no longer active.
4.6 Results and Analysis
Here, the performance of the proposed secure WiNiP interconnection architecture under dif-
ferent attack scenarios has been evaluated. We also compare the performance of various ML
classifiers for attack detection with and without adversarial learning. The section concludes
with our study on the code length selection and system scaling.
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4.6.1 Simulation Setup
Simulation of wireless interconnection requires a combination of multiple simulation tools.
ASIC design flows have been utilized through Synopsys Design Compiler with 65nm CMP
standard cell libraries (https://mycmp.fr/) to model the digital parts of the WiNiP such as
NoC switches and the WSU. The BEU encoder and decoder is implemented as two pipelined
stages in the WIs to accommodate their delay [133]. The characteristics of the antenna and
the transceivers are simulated in HFSS and Cadence Virtuoso respectively. The delay and
energy dissipation on the wireline links are obtained through Cadence simulations consid-
ering the specific lengths of each link based on the NoC topology assuming 20mm×20mm
chips. The power and delay overheads of the NoC switches, wired and wireless links, and
transceivers were considered during simulation. The power and delay overheads of the pro-
posed WSU were also considered while running the cycle-accurate simulation. The simulation
parameters are listed in Table 5.1.
The proposed system has been evaluated in terms of average packet latency and average
packet energy for application-specific traffic patterns from PARSEC and SPLASH2 bench-
mark suites. We consider a 4 chip system with 4 in-package memory modules. The core
configurations in Table 5.1 have been used to extract the core-to-memory and cache co-
herency traffic for these applications when they are executed until completion using SynFull
[122]. In order to map these traffic patterns to the MCMC environment, multiple threads
of the same application kernel were considered running on the MCMC system where each
processing core executes a single thread and the memory stacks are shared among threads.
Figure 4.9 shows the simulation process considering the traffic and Markov states. Before
discussing the results for application specif traffic we first evaluate the performance of the
ML classifiers.
4.6.2 Performance of the Attack Detection
Table 4.2 presents the accuracy and robustness of different ML classifiers when deployed to
detect the DoS attacks. To compare the ML classifiers with a heuristic method as proposed
in [5], a similar threshold-based approach was considered. For the neural network (MLP) a
single hidden layer with 10 nodes is utilized. One can observe from Table 4.2, among different
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classifiers, KNN achieves high attack detection accuracy of nearly 99.87%, higher than other
techniques. This behavior was anticipated, as no assumptions are made regarding the data
during the training phase of KNN. Experiments were done with k = 1, 3 for KNN and
have observed a similar performance, hence considered k = 1 due to its reduced complexity.
Although SVM showed high accuracy, it is observed in experiments that it is not able to
detect sporadic variations such as spontaneous random errors, and is hence not the best
option. It can be argued that the hyper-parameters of other ML classifiers can be tuned
to improve the performance, however optimizing the ML classifiers is not the focus nor
contribution of this work.
During the runtime for the attack detection, the KNN classifier is fed with the information
whether a flit is received or not and whether a burst error is detected or not, to detect the
mode of operation of the system. The simulation data for a hundred thousand cycles was used
to train each of the ML Classifiers and is then tested on a new hundred thousand cycles of
simulation which were not used in training. The KNN classifier achieves a detection accuracy
of 99.87% accuracy. Also, it has a Recall, F-score and Area Under the Curve (AUC) of 0.99,
0.99 and 0.99 respectively, showing high robustness. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4.2,
Figure 4.9: Simulation process using Markov model.
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the threshold based mechanism is not as accurate as the chosen machine learning (KNN)
approach.
In this threshold-based approach, two thresholds are necessary, to separate between the
attack mode, burst error mode and normal mode. The thresholds are computed based on the
same data that was used to train the machine learning algorithms. The threshold between
the attack mode and burst error mode is chosen to be equidistant from the average number
of erroneous flits in burst errors and jamming induced errors. Likewise, the threshold to
separate the burst error mode from the normal mode is chosen to be equidistant from the
average number of flit errors in burst mode and normal mode. We further evaluate the
detection accuracy in presence of adversarial attacks next.
4.6.3 Detection Accuracy with Adversarial Attacks
This section evaluates the impact of the crafted adversaries on the traditional ML-based
threat detectors and the impact on the enhanced detector i.e., hardener unit trained with
adversarial samples. Table 4.3 presents the performance of the traditional and hardener
detectors. As one can observe that under normal threat conditions, the ML classifier (KNN)
is able to achieve an accuracy of 99.87%. However, under the adversarial scenarios, the
accuracy of the same KNN drops to 85.67%. A similar degradation in terms of performance
is observed in other metrics too. Subsequently, through the adversarial training an improve-
ment in the accuracy to 95.95% is observed with a similar trend in other performance metrics.
One can observe that the performance with adversarial training makes the classifier to have
lower accuracy compared to the normal classifier. However, it should be noted that in this
case the system is under attack from a smarter attacker which has adversarial knowledge of
the system and that without the adversarial training the WSU would be much less accurate.
In addition to the performance benefits, ML classifiers also incur silicon and resource
overheads. To obtain these metrics, the post-synthesis models of the ML classifiers with 65nm
standard cell libraries (https://mycmp.fr/) are designed using Synopsys. Table 4.4 presents
the incurred overhead in terms of area, power and delay of the deployed ML Classifiers. In
addition to KNN performing a good attack detection, KNN also incurs lowest area and power
consumption, hence, we adopt the KNN Classifier for the evaluation of overall system. It
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Table 4.2: Attack detection performance of ML classifiers
ML classifier Accuracy (%) Recall F-score AUC
ANN 47.86 0.48 0.65 0.47
SVM 98.96 0.98 0.98 0.99
KNN 99.87 0.99 0.99 0.99
DT 52.46 0.52 0.69 0.53
Table 4.3: Attack detection in presence of adversaries
Accuracy (%) Recall F-score Precision
After attack 85.67 0.94 0.86 0.79
W Adv. Training 95.95 0.97 0.97 0.97
can be argued that the delay of the KNN classifier is not the optimal, however, we choose
KNN for attack detection, as the ML Classifier is not in the path of data transmission of the
WiNoC, as shown in the proposed secure wireless architecture in Figure 4.7. Therefore, the
ML classifier does not add latency overhead to the data transmission of the WiNiP. Despite
having low latency, threshold-based approach has higher area and power consumption due
to the involved floating point computations and comparisons, as shown in Table 4.4. As the
hardener unit does not involve additional operations during inference rather than change in
the weights of the classifiers, it does not incur additional overheads.
4.6.4 Performance Evaluation Under Persistent Jamming
As the proposed architecture takes different defensive measures for internal and external
attack, in this subsection, the impact of such measures on system energy and latency has
been studied using application-specific traffic patterns.
Table 4.4: Overhead analysis for different ML classifiers
Classifier Area (µm2) Power (µW) Timing (ns)
ANN 34448.79 6299.3 0.41
SVM 5412.01 8076.1 0.37
KNN 105.28 27.075 0.56
DT 127.32 41.12 0.23
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Internal jamming
Disabling a compromised WI (CWI) in case of internal attack, forces the incoming flits to
change its route toward the remaining WI for chip-to-chip communication. Therefore, it in-
troduces congestion for other WI nodes and increases latency as well as energy consumption.
Three scenarios were considered for our performance evaluation under internal attack. First,
MCMC system with one CWI was considered for the entire (4 chip) system (1-CWI/sys).
Second, an MCMC system having one CWI per chip (1-CWI/chip) was considered. These
two scenarios Were compared with a wired-only MCMC system where the cores at the edges
of each chip are connected to corresponding cores in the other chip with a mesh topology
over high-speed I/Os.As a maximum of two WIs per chip was considered, a system having
more than one CWIs in a chip indicate a complete system failure and JTAG chain can be
used for MCMC communication with huge latency penalty It can be observed from Figure
4.10 that, although both the latency and energy consumption of the WiNiP increase with
increasing number of compromised nodes, it is still lower than the wired MCMC system as
each flit does not have to traverse through energy and latency-hungry NoC links and I/O
modules. However, the average packet latency is 1.44× of the baseline system.




In the presence of an external persistent jamming attack, the MAC switches to ACDMA
which ensures secure communication. However, it increases the average packet latency due
to the encoding and decoding through PN sequence. Moreover, the runtime PN sequence
generation through LSFRs and CDMA transceivers introduces additional energy overhead.
The energy and latency overhead increases with the PN Code Length (CL). The relative
performance degradation of ACDMA communication under external persistent jamming with
respect to the baseline NMAC mode communication for different PN CL in bits (16b, 32b,
64b) has been shown in Figure 4.11. It can be observed from the figure that, using a higher
CL increases latency and energy consumption while providing higher security.
4.6.5 Optimum CL Selection
In AMAC mode communication, the system performance and communication security are
heavily depended on PN code length. Figure 4.11 shows the effect of PN CL on system
latency and energy. This subsection analyzes the effect of CL on system security.
In ACDMA, all the simultaneous wireless transmissions appears as noise for a particular
receiver. Moreover, the attacker can also introduce its interference noise and vary its output
Figure 4.11: Performance evaluation (a) Latency (b) Energy under external jamming attack
for different PN code length.
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power to decrease the SINR. Therefore, we determine the maximum power of the attacker
that can be tolerated for a reliable communication for each of the CL considered above. We
target an SINR of 15dB [3] that results in a BER of 10−15 which is comparable of wired link’s
BER. For each transmitter and receiver pair we adopt the transmitter power of -23.93dBm,
the noise floor of -69.43dBm and the path loss of 26.5dB [65]. For SINR calculation, one
valid communicating WI pair was considered and other WIs’ communication including the
attacker transmission were modeled as noise in the receiver side. Figure 4.12 shows the SINR
variation for various PN CL (in bits) in any receiver after considering the auto and cross-
correlation among PN codes. The 16b PN code results in lower SINR although it showed
better latency and energy performance in Figure 4.11. The 64b PN code though provide
marginally better SINR than 32b PN, its latency and energy performance is worse than
wireline interconnection architecture as shown in Figure 4.11. From Figure 4.11 it can be
seen that the 32 bit PN sequence increases the average packet latency by 1.56× and average
packet energy by 1.31× compared to baseline while still outperforming the wired counterpart
and therefore, we choose the 32b PN code for the best trade-off between performance and
security.
Figure 4.12: SINR value for different PN code length.
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Table 4.5: Overhead analysis of WSU and Tx-Rx
Component Area (mm2) Power (mW) Delay (ns)
WSU 0.0047 1.01 1.12
Tx-Rx 0.12 23 0.0625
4.6.6 Overall Area Overhead
In the previous sections, the area overheads incurred by the ML classifiers have been dis-
cussed. Here, the overall overhead of other components of the WSU has been summarized.
Based on post-synthesis RTL models in the 65nm technology node, the area overheads of
the WSU is 0.0047 mm2 per WI including the data, MAC LFSRs. The area overhead of the
transceiver (Tx-Rx) is around 0.12 mm2 [125][124], making the overhead only 3.9% of the
transceivers. Table 4.5 summarizes the area, power and delay overheads of the WSU and
transceiver. In WSU, only the BEU is in critical data path providing a delay of 0.8ns [133].
4.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a persistent jamming-aware mm-wave wireless interconnection architecture
for MCMC systems has been presented. With the proposed ML-based attack detection and
defense scheme, the proposed WiNiP architecture can detect both external and internal
persistent jamming-based DoS attack with an accuracy of 99.87%. Moreover, the proposed
ML is also robust and shows an accuracy of 95.95% even in presence of adversaries. Most
importantly, with the re-configurable MAC proposed in this chapter, the MCMC system
could sustain on and off-chip communication even under persistent jamming attack with an
average latency increment of 1.56× compared to baseline for a 32b PN code length. However,
the secure WiNiP interconnection architecture outperformed the wired counterpart for both
internal and external persistent jamming attack with very minimal area overhead.
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Chapter 5
Securing WiNiP from HT-Enabled
Emerging Attack on Wired NoC
In chapter 4, we talked about securing wireless communication fabric in a WiNiP inter-
connection architecture from persistent jamming attack. However, WiNiP interconnection
architecture also has underlying wired interconnect fabric used for mainly on chip commu-
nication. The objective of designing a secure WiNiP architecture would be incomplete if we
do not consider threats in its wired fabric. Due to the increased use of third-party IPs and
fabless manufacturing, the underlying wired NoC fabric is highly vulnerable to new emerg-
ing threats from HTs. Given the criticality of the interconnects, the system can be severely
subverted if the interconnection is compromised. The threat of HTs penetrating complex
hardware systems such as multi/many-core processors are increasing due to the increasing
presence of third party players in a SoC design. Even by deploying näıve HTs, an adversary
can exploit the NoC backbone of the processor and get access to communication patterns in
the system. This information, if leaked to an attacker, can reveal important insights regard-
ing the application suites running on the system; thereby compromising the user privacy and
paving the way for more severe attacks on the entire system. In this chapter, it has been
demonstrated that one or more HTs embedded in the NoC of a multi/many-core processor
is capable of leaking sensitive information regarding traffic patterns to an external malicious
attacker; who, in turn, can analyze the HT payload data with machine learning techniques
to infer the applications running on the processor. Furthermore, to protect against such
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attacks, a SA-based randomized routing algorithm in the system. The proposed defense is
capable of obfuscating the attacker’s data processing capabilities to infer the user profiles
successfully. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed randomized routing
algorithm could successfully reduce the accuracy of identifying user profiles by the attacker
from >98% to <15% in multi/many-core systems.
5.1 Motivation
Computing demands of the modern digital world require powerful computing platforms such
as multi/many-core processors or blade servers and embedded platforms with multiple pro-
cessors. Interconnection networks in multi/many-core processors such as a NoC [72] that
connects processing units to memory and peripherals impact the capabilities of the current
systems, as efficiency of the data movement plays a pivotal role. Due to this important role
played by the NoC, they form one of the largest surface areas for attack in the system both
physically, due to use of use of global interconnects and functionally, as it is responsible for
all data communication in the system between processors, caches and memory.
On the other hand, to alleviate the operating costs, many chip vendors are becoming
fabless. Further, to minimize the time-to-market and design costs, modern SoCs use 3PIPs,
which maybe procured from untrusted organizations. An adversary either at the foundry or
at the 3PIP design house can introduce a malicious circuitry, to jeopardize a SoC, which is
known as HT. [143]. HTs can be used for various malicious purposes, including information
leakage, functionality subversion and battery exhaustion [143, 144, 145].
Considering the critical role played by the NoCs, embedding a HT that exploits the inter-
connection backbone can reveal the communication patterns in the system. This information
when leaked to a malicious attacker can reveal important information regarding the applica-
tion suites running on the system, thereby compromising the user profile. This information
in turn, can enable further more severe attacks not just on the multi/many-core processor
infected with the HT, but on the systems on which they are deployed. For instance, an ad-
versary obtaining secure military information through a HT deployed in a router can subvert
the military backbone, thus leading to a compromise of the national security [146].
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In this chapter, first a lightweight NoC-based HT has been introduced, which, in its
simplistic form, is a simple counter, which, when inserted in one or a few switches of the NoC
can count the number of packets traversing the specific switches over a time window. The HT
can then periodically, packetizes this count and send it to an external attacker program for
payload analysis, severely compromising user profile confidentiality. This packetized count,
which is the HT payload, can be subsequently analyzed by the external attacker using
data processing techniques to infer the applications running on the system. To analyze the
retrieved information, the attacker trains a sophisticated Machine Learning ML algorithm,
that can create training samples and maps packet traversal frequencies at specific switches
to the application suites. The work presented in this chapter has been able to demonstrate
that the application suites running in the system can be detected with only 4 or 8 counter-
based HTs with more than 98% accuracy using ML techniques. This is possible because
specific routing protocols are proposed for these particular system configurations, which
when adopted result in application-specific traffic patterns. Therefore, observing the traffic
patterns with the help of the HTs can enable inferring the application(s) being executed in
the system.
In order to defend against such a HT, a novel SA-based randomized routing algorithm
has been proposed for the NoC which can obfuscate the HT-based attack discussed above.
SA is a type of genetic algorithm that allows sub-optimal traversal of the search space for
optimization to avoid being stuck in local optima [147]. Random packet routing over the
interconnection can severely degrade performance of the system due to packets not being
routed over shortest paths. Therefore, instead of simply adopting random routing, a param-
eterized SA-based approach has been investigated that can be tuned to achieve a desired
trade-off between the defense against the attack and loss in performance. Due to SA-based
random routing, the path for each packet is unpredictable and therefore, makes the map-
ping of packet traversal frequency through specific switches and corresponding applications
unreliable. It has been demonstrate through cycle-accurate simulations that this SA-based
randomized routing can reduce the effectiveness of the attack. To the best of our knowledge,
the work presented in this chapter is a first of its kind where it is shown that by monitoring
traffic patterns in a NoC through HTs the user profile can be compromised; and defended the
system against such an attack with controlled random routing.
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5.2 Threat Model
The proposed threat model envisions a multi-user or multi-tenant server or data center where
the processing engines are multicore processors connected with a NoC. Since the NoC may
be procured from an organization different from the system integration designer, one or more
HTs can be inserted in the routers of the NoC during the design and fabrication process.
These HTs can be simple in functionality such as counting the number of packets traversing
the switch over an observation window and sending that information to an external attacker
in order to thwart detection. The attacker can then employ large-scale compute capabilities
and algorithms to perform a traffic analysis attack on the packet count from one or more
routers. This kind of attack can reveal the applications running on the system, since the
traffic interaction in multi/many-core processors is always application dependent, and thus,
compromise user privacy by revealing the applications that is being executed. Figure 5.1
shows the attack model discussed here. The functionality and design of the HT is described
next.
Figure 5.1: Multicore NoC with proposed threat model.
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5.3 Hardware Trojan Design
This section describes various aspects of the particular attack model that have been studied.
The HT in particular is a counter that is capable of counting the number of packets getting
routed by the switch where it is inserted. It was assumed that a HT has been inserted inside
the routing block of the NoC or interconnection switch. There maybe one or more such
infected switches in the system. The functionality of this counter is that it will count up
whenever a new packet accesses the router of the switch to get routed to its next destina-
tion. After counting for a pre-determined duration it packetizes this count by appending a
destination address and other header information and inserts this packet into the NoC as
the HT payload. Such processing systems are typically multi-user platforms where different
parts of the processor are virtualized and allocated to various applications from myriad of
users. As the attacker can be disguised as one of the multiple users of this shared virtual-
ized multi/many-core processor hosting multiple users simultaneously, the destination of the
payload will be a legitimate I/O port where the malicious program is hosted. Therefore, the
packet is unlikely to be flagged by any other security measure in the system, as it does noth-
ing anomalous compared to other packets in the system. The payload then gets analyzed by
the external attacker.
The HT is a 16-bit counter that counts the number of packets being routed through the
switch. This count is packetized every five thousand cycles and sent to the external attacker.
The observation window is maintained by another 16-bit down counter that functions as
the timer. The payload is launched from the HT when this timer expires. As the packets
consist of multiple flits [22], taking several clock cycles to be routed through a switch [22],
the maximum packet count will be less than the duration of the counting and hence the 16-
bit counter will be sufficient. This particular HT also does not impact the data path of the
legitimate packets getting routed in the NoC as it is not sequential to the routing logic and
the counting happens in parallel to the routing. Therefore, timing analysis can not detect the
HT(s). Moreover, even a few such counters of these moderate sizes are also undetectable in
the large multi/many-core processors both in terms of area overhead or power consumption
as even a single NoC switch with a size of ∼30-40K gates [22] is orders of magnitude more
complex compared to the HT and also has many register files resembling counters.
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5.3.1 Hardware Trojan Trigger Design
It was envisioned that the proposed HT does not lie in the data-path of the packet transfer
mechanism over the NoC. It recognizes the flit-type and in case of a header, it increments a
counter. This happens in parallel with the function of the routing block. Due to no impact
on delay, the HT is difficult to detect based on timing analysis methods alone. Moreover,
due to the nature of the payload as described below, the area and power footprint of the HT
is negligible compared to the NoC or the entire processor. Therefore, the HTs can remain
in always-on state without the need for a sophisticated trigger.
In lieu of an always on Trojan, a conditional trigger, like a counter-based trigger or an
input combination-based trigger can be designed [143]. However, we do not use such an
approach for two reasons: (1) The conditional Trojan incurs extra overhead in terms of
hardware, power and area; which may lead to detection, and, (2) our proposed HT needs to
collect data for a continuous time in order to analyze efficiently, as described in Section 5.3.
Therefore, turning on the Trojan conditionally is not beneficial and can lead to information
loss.
Since the proposed HT is always triggered, the probability of detection analysis framework
is not applicable here [148]. The HT payload is the number of packets that traversed the
particular router over the observation window.
5.3.2 Off-Chip Hardware Trojan Payload Analysis
An HT payload analyzer was crafted using ML techniques to demonstrate the threat that
such an HT based attack can pose. For the purpose of training the machine learning classifier,
an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was chosen due to its ability to map complex patterns
efficiently as well as its resilience to variations. Initially a dataset was built consisting of
eighty different features (payloads) obtained from simulating a system with 64 cores and 16
memory controllers, with permutations of twelve different applications with no more than
three running on the system simultaneously. It was assumed that a maximum of three
applications running simultaneously in the system signifying up to three independent users
hosted on the system executing three applications running simultaneously although a larger
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number of users can be easily accommodated only requiring creating training data with that
assumption. This data was created in the same manner as an actual attacker who may be
able to create using an emulator or a simulator of the real system. Specifically, we use a
cycle-accurate simulator described in Section 5.5, which monitors the movement of packets
broken down into flits in a NoC. Various permutations of the applications from a common
parallel benchmark suites [122] were executed on the simulator to create traffic traces that
were visible to the HTs and those traffic traces consisting of number of packets traversing
HT infected switches were used as the training dataset.
As the traffic patterns i.e., packet counts depend on the executing applications and the
on-chip traffic, as well as the mapping of the applications to the cores, the observed patterns
will not be constant for a given set of applications. To capture such variations, a random
noise following a negative binomial distribution has been added with the simulation data as
a part of data augmentation and making the ANN robust to such variations. For generating
this random noise, a M/M/1 queuing model was considered for the NoC routers and a
Poisson arrival process for the incoming packets in each cycle. For such queuing model,
the number of packets in the router buffers at every simulation cycle follows a geometric
Figure 5.2: NoC switch components with inserted HT.
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distribution and the total number of packets in the buffers over the simulation period can be
computed as the convolution of the geometric distributions resulting in a negative binomial
distribution [149], which is used for the random noise generation. Furthermore, the ANN
model was trained with all the features available. This yields high accuracy in predicting the
application(s) running on the system. However, the caveat here is that although the ANN
could be trained on a large set of features, yet, it is not feasible to expect a HT to snoop on
all switches simultaneously. Doing so would contribute a significant latency and overhead,
eventually leading to HT detection. Thus, to reflect the real-world scenario, the attacker
intends to insert a HT which focuses on the dominant features that still enable it to predict
with high accuracy. We translated this approach by using correlation-based feature selection
i.e., determine the routers in which the HTs need to be embedded (performed offline) that
reduces latency without compromising the performance.
To be particular, a 5 layer ANN (N -800-500-200-64-12 neurons; N represents number of
features at input) was deployed with ReLU as activation functions for hidden layers and
softmax as the activation function for the output layer. There are twelve final outputs for
the ANN, which are the number of individual applications used to build the dataset. To
represent simultaneous execution of multiple applications, one-hot encoding is utilized. A
5-fold cross-validation is utilized to analyze performance, determined based on grid-search.
As the ANN is deployed off-chip, the area and other overheads are not of concern, except
the accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score.
5.4 Obfuscation using Random Routing
The proposed random routing should not only increase NoC resilience against aforementioned
and similar attacks, but also ensure low latency for latency-sensitive messages. Additional
issues such as deadlock, live-lock, and in-order packet delivery also need to be addressed.
Here, we discuss the proposed routing methodology, live-lock and deadlock freedom.
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5.4.1 Routing Methodology
The proposed defense mechanism against the HT-based traffic analysis attack, is based
on obfuscating the traffic analysis mechanism by introducing controlled randomness in the
routing. The underlying principle is that with deterministic routing, the number of packets
through a particular router is highly correlated to the application or the architecture of the
system. However, if the routing is based on random walk, the number of packets through any
particular switch is essentially random, losing predictable correlation with underlying system
parameters. However, completely random routing is shown to increase latency and negatively
impact performance of the system. For the work presented in this chapter, a distributed
random routing for NoC architectures based on SA heuristics has been proposed. Such
SA-based random routing methodology enable designers to have a degree of controllability
over the randomness of the routing decisions. According to SA heuristic, which is used
to approximate the solution of an optimization problem, at the beginning of the annealing
schedule, the probability of taking random non-optimal decisions are higher. However, the
probability of accepting random non-optimal solution decreases as temperature is reduced
Figure 5.3: Pseudo code for the proposed random routing.
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according to the annealing schedule. Similar to the SA, in the proposed routing algorithm,
initially the probability of selecting a random output port for each new injected packet in
the NoC fabric is high and decreases over the lifetime of the packet in the NoC. Therefore,
with progression of time, the routing decisions are constrained to be optimal (shortest-path)
with only occasional random sub-optimal decisions. Figure 5.1, shows the shortest (in green)
and SA-based random path (in orange) for a particular Source, (S)-Destination, (D) pair.
Similar to the Metropolis criterion in SA, the probability of taking a random output port
for the next hop is defined as
Ri = e
α(Tinj−Ti) (5.1)
Where Tinj is the packet injection time and Ti is the current time in clock cycles. This
time difference, ∆T is embedded in the packet header and incremented in each clock cycle.
α is a designer parameter that controls the degree of randomness in the routing and will
be described in later sections. As shown in Figure 5.2, any switch in the routing path of
the packet generates a random number using a Linear Feedback Shift Register, (D-LFSR)
which represents the probability of taking the shortest path. If this number is less than
the probability stored in a Random Look-Up-Table, (R-LUT) based on equation 5.1 and
current ∆T value, then the proposed routing chooses any of the ports of the switch that
leads to non-optimal path with equal probability. The non-optimal random port, (R-Port) is
generated by another LFSR, (R-LFSR). Otherwise, the optimal port is chosen by the router
depending on the adopted shortest path algorithm.
However, according to equation 5.1, the probability of taking non-optimal, random paths
decreases with the current time, Ti. Therefore, with elapsed time, each packet is more likely
to take the optimal routing decision determined by the adopted optimal routing algorithm in
the system. Thus, each packet is guaranteed to reach its destination as the time progresses
and therefore, the proposed SA-based random routing is guaranteed to be live-lock free.
For this work, shortest path routing based on Dijkstra’s algorithm has been adopted in the
proposed NoCs architectures as it is applicable to multiple NoC topologies such as trees,
meshes and random topologies. Dijkstra’s algorithm, extracts a MST providing the shortest
path between any pair of nodes in a graph. We consider each switch to be equipped with a
forwarding table having the list of pre-computed shortest path to reduce routing delays that
will be caused by route computations once for every packet.
To ensure application performance, latency critical messages should experience less ran-
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domness in routing compared to other messages. Therefore, to control the degree of random-
ness in routing, the proposed methodology introduced the parameter α in equation 5.1. For
latency critical messages a higher α value is preferred as it rapidly diminishes the probability
of taking non-minimal paths. The latency critical messages then follow the shortest path
determined by adopted shortest path algorithm in the system. Other latency-tolerant mes-
sages can have smaller α value to have more randomness in their routing and ensure better
NoC resiliency against threats. The value of α was considered to be a tunable parameter to
be determined by the designer keeping the security-performance trade-off, applications, and
run environment in mind.
5.4.2 Deadlock Avoidance and In-order Packet Delivery
In any random or dynamic routing, deadlock is one of the most common and challenging
issues to address. Although the proposed routing takes random paths for each new injected
packet, it eventually follows the Dijkstra’s path as the time elapses. Dijkstra’s routing is
inherently cyclic dependency free. Therefore, for the proposed routing, deadlock should be
avoided only when the routing is more likely to take random paths. To avoid deadlock, the
VC occupancy of the output ports have been considered before routing an incoming packet.
If the VC occupancy of an output port is less than a pre-determined threshold, the packet
is not routed immediately and waits in the input VCs to be rerouted. This ensures that a
heavily utilized port causing a deadlock is avoided. Figure 5.3 describes this mechanism by
using a pseudo-code for the proposed routing algorithm. Additionally, due to the exponential
decaying probability of taking random paths, a packet is more likely to be routed toward
the deadlock free port following the Dijkstra path as elapsed time increases.
As each packet follows a different path, such random routing also need to ensure in-order
packet reception for each message in the system. For this work, the in-order packet delivery
mechanism described in [150] has been adopted, where a lookup table entry is compared with
the packet identifier of a message at the re-convergent switches. If the identifiers match, the
packet is granted arbitration and the look-up table identifier value is incremented and thus
in-order packet reception is ensured without significant re-order buffer overheads.
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Table 5.1: Component configuration for simulation
Component Configuration
System size 64 cores, Out-of-Order, 16cores/chip
Cache 32KB (private L1), 512KB (shared L2), MOESI
NoC router 3 stage pipelined 5 ports,0.078pJ/bit
Total VC 4, each 8 flits deep, 64 bits/flit
Wired NoC links 64-bit flits, single cycle latency, 0.2pJ/bit/mm
Technology 65nm, 1V supply, 1GHz clock
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, the performance of the proposed SA-based routing will be evaluated in terms
of average packet latency for different α values as discussed in Section 5.4.1. Also the ML
detection accuracy will be compared as a measure of security between our proposed and
deterministic routing.
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the ML accuracy and average latecncy, a 64 core system arranged in a regular 8x8
mesh NoC fabric with 4 in-package memory modules was considered. The core configurations
in Table 5.1 have been used to extract the core-to-memory and cache coherency traffic for
PARSEC and SPLASH2 benchmark suites when they were executed until completion using
SynFull [122]. In order to map these traffic patterns to the 64 core NoC environment, it has
been considered that multiple threads of the same application kernel running on the system
where each processing core executes a single thread and the memory stacks are shared
among threads. Moreover, other NoC configurations such as number of VCs, topology,
cache distribution/access using Uniform Memory Access, (UMA) and Non-Uniform Memory
Access, (NUMA) have been varied to analyze corresponding ML results. Table 5.2 lists the
NoC architectures considered in this chapter.
The evaluation framework used ASIC design flows with Synopsys Design Compiler with
65nm CMP standard cell libraries (https://mycmp.fr/) to synthesize the NoC switches. The
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Table 5.2: Architectures for evaluation
Architecture name Topology VCs Cache access
Mesh Mesh 4 UMA
V2Mesh Mesh 2 UMA
DMesh Mesh 4 NUMA
Torus Torus 4 UMA
FTorus Folded Torus 4 UMA
delay and energy dissipation on the NoC links are obtained through Cadence simulations con-
sidering the specific lengths of each link based on the NoC topology assuming 20mm×20mm
chips. The power and delay overheads of the NoC switches, NoC links were considered
during simulation. In order to train the ML classifier, a cycle accurate simulator based on
NoXim [127] was modeled to implement the proposed SA-based random routing and track
the number of packets passing through each switch for each of the traffic traces. Figure 5.4
shows the flow diagram for performance evaluation and attacker training data generation.
5.5.2 Average Packet Latency with α Variation
Although it has been considered that the degree of randomness, α to be a designer’s pa-
rameter, this section studies the latency distribution of the routed packets and variation in
latency distribution for different values of α. For analysis, the value of α was considered to
be 100, 0.01 and 0.005, where α = 100 represents deterministic routing. The corresponding
Figure 5.4: Simulation flow diagram for performance evaluation and attacker training.
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effect of having different α values on latency has been observed on a 8x8 mesh connected NoC
running Fast Fourier Transform, (FFT) traffic traces obtained from SynFull [122]. Following
equation (1), higher α values result in a lower probability of taking more random paths which
diminishes rapidly with elapsed time. Therefore, with a large value of α = 100, the average
packet latency is same as the average packet latency achieved using deterministic routing as
it represents no randomness in the routing. From the latency distribution shown in Figure
5.5 (a), it is observed that the most of the packets were delivered to their destinations within
30-55 cycles using deterministic routing. On the other hand, smaller values of α increases
the probability of taking more random paths and hence increases average packet latency
along with its distribution spread. Figure 5.5 (b) and (c) show the distribution of packet
latency for α = 0.01 and α = 0.005 respectively. From Figure 5.5 (b) and (c), it can be
observed that the majority of the packets incurred a latency between 125-175 and 150-275
Figure 5.5: Latency variation for (a) α = 100 (Deterministic) (b) α = 0.01 and (c) α =
0.005. .
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cycles for α = 0.01 and α = 0.005 respectively. The average packet latency for α = 100, α
= 0.01, and α = 0.005 were found to be 38.98, 149.45, 215.56 cycles respectively for FFT
traffic. This latency penalty can be thought as the cost of improved security provided by the
proposed random routing. Keeping this security-performance trade off in mind, designers
can choose α values that can provide meet system performance and security requirements
making such NoC routing secure-by-design. It is also interesting to note that, with smaller
α values, the standard deviation (σ), in latency also increases. The standard deviation for
deterministic, α = 0.01, and α= 0.005 was 12.52, 47.05, and 62.52 cycles respectively. The
99th percentile of the latency distribution was approximately at 70, 270 and 360 cycles for
deterministic routing, α = 0.01 and α= 0.005 values respectively providing designers upper
bounds of latency for their design guidelines.
5.5.3 ML Performance with Deterministic Routing
Here, the effectiveness of the proposed attack model will be measured for the architectures
considered in Table 5.2 using Dijkstra’s shortest path routing only. Dijkstra’s routing has
been considered as it can be generalized to all topologies and in the case of mesh topologies
is identical to the dimension-order routing yielding same latency performance. The packet
count is leaked by the inserted HT as payload to the ML-based attacker in a periodic interval
of 5000 cycles. Therefore, as attack efficiency metric, the accuracy, F1-score, recall and
precision of the ML engine have been considered which is placed on the attacker side. The
number of observed features (number of inserted HTs) were also varied in the system and
the change in the performance metric was measured. As shown in Figure 5.6, for a 64 core
system, the attack efficiency increases with the increase in feature size. Even with a feature
size of 4 i.e., with 4 HTs embedded, the attack accuracy varies between 85-98% for all the
architectures considered in Table 5.2. A similar trend can be observed for the other metrics
as F1 (98%), recall (97.9%), and precision (98%) with 16 features, but omitted for brevity.
Thus, it can be concluded that the proposed attacker can efficiently interpret the user profile
with very small footprint/overhead within the chip.
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5.5.4 ML Performance with Proposed SA-based Routing
In this section, the performance of the proposed attack model with the proposed SA-based
random routing has been discussed. As the degree of randomness for the proposed random
routing can vary depending on α, we consider α = 100 (deterministic), α = 0.01, and
α = 0.005 and analyze the accuracy of the attacker with different feature sizes. Figure 5.7
shows the accuracy of the attacker on folded torus architecture for deterministic and random
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Figure 5.6: Plot of accuracy observed for deterministic routing with different features (num-
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Figure 5.7: The performance with proposed routing with α = 0.01, 0.005 and Deterministic
routing (D).
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introduced by decreasing α values in the proposed SA-based random routing, the accuracy
of the attacker falls down significantly (<15%) compared to deterministic routing for smaller
α values with higher feature sizes. Moreover, from Figure 5.7, it can also observed that, for
smaller α values, increasing feature size, does not increase the accuracy significantly and
thus, represents the robustness of the proposed random routing. If we combine Figure 5.7
and Figure 5.5, it is interesting to note that, the attacker accuracy is similar for both α =
0.01 and α = 0.005, however, using α = 0.005 increases average system latency by 46.13%
compared to α = 0.01. Therefore, it can be concluded that, reducing α further to zero will
realize a completely random routing, but the increase in obfuscation will be marginal while
resulting in significant increase in average packet latency.
5.5.5 Evaluation of ML Classifiers for an Efficient Attacker Design
Multiple ML classifiers such as ANN, SVM, KNN, and DT were investigated to evaluate
their accuracy for application detection to determine an efficient computing model for the
proposed attacker. A 5 layer ANN (N -800-500-200-64-12 neurons; N represents number of
features at input) was deployed with ReLU as activation functions for hidden layers and
softmax as the activation function for the output layer. For simplicity, a linear kernel based
SVM has been utilized for application detection. Similarly, experiment was also done with
k-nearest neighbors with k=12 and 78 in this work. As k=12 and k=78 provide similar
performance, we enlisted only the performance for k=12 in both Table 5.3 and Table 5.4
as it provides less delay and computation overhead. We considered 12 application-specific
traffic obtained through SynFull [122] from PARSEC and SPLASH2 benchmark suites with
maximum of 2 applications running simultaneously. For each of the ML model, a 16 feature
input was considered. From the performance metrics listed in Table 5.3, it can be observed
that the ANN, KNN, and DT classifiers have similar performance in detecting application
suites running within a NoC using deterministic routing. Therefore, it can be argued that
any of these classifiers can be used to design an efficient attacker to launch proposed traffic
analysis attack. However, apart from the 12 base classes (for 12 applications), considering
a maximum of 2 simultaneous running applications, the KNN, SVM, and DT classifiers
required additional 12C2 = 66 classes to be created during training to enable detection of 2
simultaneously running applications. Therefore, the complexity of training and computation
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Table 5.3: Performance of the ML classifiers for deterministic routing
ML classifier Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F-score
ANN 98.18 0.98 0.98 0.98
SVM 74.3 0.72 0.72 0.74
KNN 98 0.98 0.98 0.98
DT 98.9 0.98 0.98 0.98
overhead of those ML classifiers increase as the attacker intends to detect larger number of
simultaneously running applications. For example, for a similar SoC, to detect a maximum
of 4 simultaneously running applications, the attacker needs to create 12C4 = 495 additional
classes to train those classifiers. The number of required classed also increases as the number
of baseline applications which is 12 in our case, increases. Due to the increased training
complexity and the huge time required by the classifiers like KNN and DT, an attacker with
such ML classifiers does not represent an efficient attacker as it is not scalable in terms of
detecting multiple applications in a typical ever increasing multi user environment. On the
other hand, due to the softmax activation at the output layer and one-hot encoding, ANN
can detect multiple applications without any additional complexities and hence best suites
the attacker purpose for the proposed traffic analysis attack.
Moreover, from Table 5.4 it can also be observed that for a NoC employing SA-based
routing, the ANN classifier provides higher application detection accuracy compared to other
ML classifiers. As from attacker’s perspective it is desired that the ML classifier should
provide a better accuracy irrespective of the routing algorithm used in a NoC, from Table
5.4 it can be concluded that an attacker equipped with ANN classifier can provide better
application detection accuracy compared to other ML classifiers even in presence of novel
routing algorithms like SA-based routing proposed in this chapter. In summary, due the low
complexity in detecting multiple simultaneous applications in a large multi user environment
and better accuracy in presence of novel routing algorithms, the ANN classifier best serves
the purpose of an attacker targeting such traffic analysis attack on a NoC-enabled SoC.
Although it can also be argued that various other experiments can be done and the existing
classifiers can be optimized to come up with an ultimate ML classifier that best suites the
purpose of the attacker, however, it is necessary to understand here that the objective of this
chapter is to present the vision of a novel HT-enabled traffic analysis attack and a probable
solution, not optimization of attacker efficiency. It can be explored later as a future work.
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Table 5.4: Performance of the ML classifiers for SA-based routing
ML classifier Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F-score
ANN 17.42 0.10 0.17 0.11
SVM 6.41 0.01 0.01 0.06
KNN 6.41 0.03 0.02 0.06
DT 1.28 0.003 0.001 0.01
5.5.6 Routing and HT Overheads
The increased security offered by the proposed SA-based random routing comes with ad-
ditional overheads in routing logic as shown in the inset of Figure 5.2. The D-LFSR was
considered to be 8 bit wide whereas the R-LUT had 300 entries with each having 8 bits for
each of the α values. Considering a system having three α values, the routing logic consumes
additional 7685.07um2 of area, 1.82uW of power and 0.93ns of delay in 65nm technology
node. Moreover, each HT takes 1551.6um2 area, 125.88nW power and 0.2ns delay for its
hardware realization in same technology node.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter a novel HT induced attack has been described. Such simple HT when inserted
into NoC switches can monitor and leak traffic patterns of the system to an external attacker.
Sophisticated ML mechanisms can be used by the attacker to analyze the HT payload to
infer the application suites running in the system with high accuracy of more than 98%.
As solution a genetic algorithm-based randomized routing approach was also proposed that
offers a trade-off between performance of the system and the degree of security against such
an attack. Through system-level simulations it has been demonstrated that the proposed
routing is able to obfuscate this particular attack and reduce the accuracy of inferring the
user profile to below 15%.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Works
The inefficiency in handling one-to-many traffic by state-of-the-art interconnects has become
a major constraint in designing future MCMC-enabled HPC systems. Similarly, the existing
and emerging security vulnerabilities on communication fabric of a systems needs to be
analyzed and resolved to ensure a sustainable communication. Therefore, the objective of
this dissertation was to develop a one-to-many traffic-aware, secure WiNiP interconnection
architecture for MCMC systems. This chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing
the significant contributions of this research. Moreover, based on this dissertation, some
promising future research directions have also been discussed later in this chapter.
6.1 Conclusion
Device scaling trend according to Moore’s law will no longer be able to satisfy the ever
growing performance demand of the high-end sophisticated computational devices like servers
and embedded systems. In fact, we have already entered the multicore-multiprocessor era to
enable faster computation by exploiting thread level parallelism. However, such multicore
systems suffer from scalability issue due to process dependent faults that result in lower
yield. Therefore, a system with multiple chips known as the multichip system has no other
alternative that can ensure the required scalability with lower faults to provide the necessary
reliable infrastructure required by future computation expensive applications. However, the
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performance of the multichip system is limited by the chip-to-chip communication as traffic
has to go through the latency and power hungry off-chip I/Os. The situation gets even
worse for one-to-many traffic as traditional wired based interconnection architecture such as
NoC is mainly designed for unicast traffic and therefore, does not provide the support to
ensure low latency required for such traffic having many destinations. As this traffic can
have many off-chip destinations and therefore a small amount of such traffic can introduce
huge local and global congestion with significant power consumption while crossing through
the chip boundaries. Moreover, due to increase in memory intensive parallel applications,
collective communication in parallel programming models and disintegration, increase in
such has traffic has become a significant design bottleneck for future HPC MCMC systems.
To address these one-to-many traffic challenges in MCMC system, in Chapter 3 a scalable
one-to-many traffic-aware MAWiNiP interconnection architecture has been proposed. The
proposed MAWiNiP wireless interconnection architecture can mask the high I/O latency
and power consumption for chip-to-chip communication by establishing single hop commu-
nication among multiple chips through wireless links. Moreover, the proposed MAWiNiP
architecture introduces a novel asymmetric topology with a hybrid MAC that can exploit
each other through a supportive flow control to prioritize and ensure faster transmission of
the one-to-many traffic. As different parts of the proposed wireless interconnection architec-
ture are individually one-to-traffic aware, the proposed MAWiNiP architecture outperforms
state-of-the-art wired and wireless interconnection architectures in terms of peak achievable
bandwidth and energy consumption under both synthetic and application-specific traffic. To
be specific, the proposed MAWiNiP system can reduce average system latency by 47.08%
compared to the state-of-the-art wired interconnection architecture. Even with the scaling
of system size or cluster size, the proposed architecture outperforms the other wired and
wireless architectures in terms of energy, bandwidth, and latency.
Although Chapter 3 was mainly focused on improving performance and energy dissipation
in WiNiPs in presence of one-to-many traffic, no attention has been given to the vulnera-
bilities affecting confidentiality, availability, and integrity of on and off-chip communication
in WiNiPs. Wireless being an unguided, shared transmission medium is vulnerable to many
security attacks such as DoS, ED, and spoofing. Although such attack can break down the
entire on and off-chip communication in WiNiP, so far, various attack methodologies and
their mitigation techniques have remained unexplored. For example, to introduce a DoS
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attack, an external attacker can produce a high energy EM radiation that causes interfer-
ence in the ongoing wireless transmission. Moreover, it is also possible that a HT planted in
the system from a vulnerable design and manufacturing process can cause a WI to transmit
persistent jamming signals to cause DoS for other WIs. In this case, one of the WIs infected
by a HT will send data over the wireless channel irrespective of whether it is enabled by
the adopted MAC mechanism. This will cause contention or interference with legitimate
transmissions causing DoS on the remaining WIs.
In Chapter 4, a mechanism to detect and recover from persistent jamming based DoS
attacks that can disable the wireless communication in WiNiPs has been proposed. While
designing such security architecture, the existing DFT hardware has been re-used and a ML
classifier was deployed to detect and defend against persistent jamming-based DoS attack.
To handle more intelligently crafted jamming attacks and ensure a robust, accurate detec-
tion, and defense mechanism an AML and adversarial training for the deployed ML classifiers
have been used. Moreover, under such jamming attack, specially for WiNiP architectures, it
is non-trivial to synchronize and inform all other WIs about the presence of an adversary as
inter-chip communication happens through only wireless medium which is itself vulnerable
to the attack. To address this issue, a novel MCMC wireless communication protocol along
with a reconfigurable MAC that can ensure robust and secure communication under internal
and external persistent jamming attack, have been developed. With the proposed ML-based
attack detection and defense scheme, the proposed WiNiP architecture could detect both
external and internal persistent jamming-based DoS attack with an accuracy of 99.87%.
Moreover, the proposed ML is also robust and showed an accuracy of 95.95% even in pres-
ence of adversaries. Most importantly, with the re-configurable MAC proposed in Chapter 4,
the MCMC system could sustain on and off-chip wireless communication even under persis-
tent jamming attack with an average latency increment of 1.56× compared to baseline for a
32b PN code length. Most importantly, the secure WiNiP interconnection architecture out-
performed the wired counterpart even under both internal and external persistent jamming
attack with very minimal area overhead.
Moreover, the threat of HTs penetrating complex hardware systems such as multi/many-
core processors are increasing due to the increasing presence of third party players in a SoC
design. With increasing device density and design complexity, various novel HT induced
attacks are also increasing. Even by deploying näıve HTs, an adversary can exploit the NoC
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backbone of the processor and get access to communication patterns in the system. This
information, if leaked to an attacker, can reveal important insights regarding the application
suites running on the system; thereby compromising the user privacy and paving the way for
more severe attacks on the entire system. Such novel HT-based attacks need to be analyzed
and mitigated in advance to ensure high degree of data confidentiality in MCMC systems. In
Chapter 5, we demonstrate that one or more HTs embedded in the NoC of a multi/many-core
processor is capable of leaking sensitive information regarding traffic patterns to an external
malicious attacker; who, in turn, can analyze the HT payload data with machine learning
techniques to infer the applications running on the processor. Furthermore, to protect against
such attacks, we propose a SA-based randomized routing algorithm in the system. The
proposed defense is capable of obfuscating the attacker’s data processing capabilities to
infer the user profiles successfully. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
randomized routing algorithm could successfully reduce the accuracy of identifying user
profiles by the attacker from >98% to <15% in multi/many-core systems.
6.2 Future Works
The research work presented in this dissertation was focused on performance as well as
communication security in multichip system which are two major topics that modern HPC
systems are concerned with. This research work opens up many doors in NoC security and
performance domains where future extensions of this work can be directed. Some of the
research directions are briefly discussed in the following sections.
6.2.1 Advanced HT and Attacker Design to Extract more System
Level Information
In Chapter 5, a simple HT-based traffic analysis attack has been discussed. The proposed
HT leaked the packet count passing through the compromised switch to an external attacker
which was analyzed to breach the user privacy by revealing the applications running in the
system. The HT used to design such attack in that chapter was an always on HT which
increases the chance of detection in case of low activity even it had low power and area
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overhead. Moreover, to launch the attack efficiently, the attacker needed to be someone
within the organization. Sophisticated HT trigger mechanism can be designed to efficiently
hide the presence of such HT in the system. Trigger mechanisms that are more controllable
for attacker residing outside of the organization can also be designed to make the HT more
stealthy. For example, recent trends of using multicore processors in cloud computing data
centers expose these systems to new threats as different co-scheduled applications are forced
to share the underlying hardware resources. Therefore, in cloud computing environment,
HT in a compromised NoC can be triggered or controlled by an accomplice application
by establishing a run-time covert channel with the HT compromised switch. Such trigger
mechanism will make an HT more attacker friendly and efficiently hide its presence.
On the other hand, the work presented in Chapter 5 only focused on detecting applications
running in the system. However, the packet count in each switch is also depended on the
underlying NoC topology and cache organization. Therefore, using similar analysis on the
attacker side the architectural information of the NoC can also be extracted. Figure 6.1
shows the attacker accuracy on detecting the various NoC topologies using deterministic
and proposed SA-based routing in Chapter 5.
Moreover, the attacker proposed in Chapter 5 assumed the NoC uses a deterministic
routing to route packet and trained the ANN engine with the packet count obtained from
deterministic routing. However, the attacker can be intelligent enough to train the ANN
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Figure 6.1: Attack accuracy with proposed routing for topology detection.
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west-first routing. As the proposed SA-based routing had a some randomness in it, training
the ANN with such pseudo-random routing might improve detection accuracy even the
system is using SA-based random routing. In addition, designing a run time HT detection
mechanism for the proposed HT will also be a very challenging work.
6.2.2 A DoS and QoS-Aware Fair Arbitration Mechanism for NoC
As the number of processing cores or the applications running in the system increases, they
compete with each other for shared resources of NoC which might result in performance
degradation. Different applications running in the system might require different level of
services from the NoC. For example, a Guaranteed Service (GS) communication requires a
consistent latency compared to fluctuating Best Effort (BE) communication. Therefore, to
ensure the required service for different applications/traffic, Quality of Service (QoS) is often
implemented in NoC. One of the common approach in VC-based NoC is to statically assign
VC priority for particular application/traffic such as GS and serve those VCs prior to others
in a particular port.
Besides, in a NoC enabled multicore/multiprocessor environment, depending on the ap-
plications running on different cores of the NoC, the message generated by those processing
cores can have built-in higher priority than other messages existing in the communication
fabric. Moreover, the priority of different messages from the same application on the same
core can be different. For example, a request for memory access from any core should be
prioritized from any other requests due to its latency sensitivity. Similarly, multicast enabled
cache-coherence messages is likely to have higher priority and needs to be served faster to
ensure data integrity while computation.
The priority based QoS implementation discussed in the previous segment can introduce
vulnerability in the communication fabric and can easily cause DoS attack. It can be done
either by running a malicious application or by an HT inserted compromised core to generate
continuous high priority messages which would be served continuously by the communication
fabric causing starvation for other nodes in the system and potentially leading to a DoS
attack. Moreover, in a system implementing wormhole switching, the attacker can exploit
such priorities and inject a packet without a tail flit to reserve a path for eternity. In
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worst case, these priority based QoS can be exploited to send undesired messages towards a
particular destination from multiple compromised nodes causing a Distributed DoS (DDoS)
attack on the destination node.
To combat such attack in NoC, we propose a DoS and QoS-aware arbitration mechanism.
In the proposed DoS resilient VC arbitration we consider separate arbitration schemes for
input VC and output VC arbitration. For, input VC arbitration we utilize a runtime priority
generator. In this scheme the priority of other VCs requesting the same output port is
increased if any particular VC has transmitted more flits than a certain threshold. We
define this dynamic priority as fairness metric for arbitration and consider two seperate
thresholds for GS and BE traffic respectively to ensure both DoS resiliency as well as better
QoS for any incoming packet.
Figure 6.2: A hierarchical WiNiP security architecture for MCMC systems.
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6.2.3 A Hierarchical Secure Interconnection Architecture for Run-
time Anomaly Detection
Increasing use of untrusted 3PIPs, design houses or fabrication process has introduced various
novel threats in modern SoCs and many threats are still evolving. In such SoCs using NoC as
communication fabric, some of the attacks can be detected and mitigated with appropriate
detection and prevention mechanism locally in each NoC switch. For example, if a malicious
application running in a core injects too many packets to the network to flood the network,
a security wrapper implanted locally in the switch can be enough to detect and prevent
it. However, other kinds of attack such as packet misdirection or DDoS requires a global
detection and prevention methodology.
We envision a hierarchical security architecture for MCMC communication as shown in
Figure 6.2 where, we implement a Local Security Wrapper (LSW) at each switch to han-
dle threats that can be prevented locally. However, all the LSW send data to a Central
Security Engine (CSE) that can detect threats which requires data from multiple switches
for accurate detection. The CSE is essentially a ML engine that tests the received data for
the presence of any anomaly. The LSW/CSE communication happens through only WIs
deployed in the system and we call this wireless communication plane as Security Plane as
only security packet is exchanged through it. The regular on and off-chip packets are routed
using wired interconnect. Such hierarchical architecture is inspired from Federated learning
(FL) which is one of the recently introduced concepts by Google [151] for distributed learning
while preserving the communication privacy. Using such FL methodology, a robust, training
agnostic threat detection and defense mechanism can be developed.
6.2.4 Detection and Prevention of Jamming-based DoS Attack for
WiNiPs Using Different MACs
In Chapter 4, the detection and prevention of persistent jamming-based DoS attack were
discussed. We assumed a reservation-based MAC that uses the full channel access for wireless
data transmission as our baseline multichip system. We characterized the DoS attack state
based on the BER of the of received flits. However, DoS attack in a WiNiP architecture
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using a CSMA MAC can not be characterized by analyzing the BER of the received flits.
This is because WIs in a multichip system using CSMA MAC would not transmit anything if
it can sense the presence of a wireless transmission using the same carrier frequency. In such
systems, DoS attack needs to be characterized by the delay of the wireless transmission.
Therefore, it would be very challenging to develop an architecture to detect internal and
external jamming attack for such WiNiPs using CSMA MAC.
Moreover, for CSMA MAC, along with the detection, a HT that can cause internal jam-
ming attack on such systems needs to be designed which is nontrivial. Besides, as CSMA
senses the carrier before transmission, it can be thought as an alternate solution for external
jamming discussed in Chapter 4. The performance evaluation for external jamming with
this solution can be compared with the previously discussed solution in Chapter 4. This also
opens up the scope to analyze persistent and non-persistent jamming attack more closely and
apply different solutions based on the type of jamming. Similarly, a solution to the jamming
attack in WiNiPs using CDMA MAC needs to be developed as SINR in such systems are
highly sensitive to attacker power.
6.2.5 A Congestion-Aware and Fault-tolerant WiNiP Intercon-
nection Architecture for MCMC Systems
With continuous technology shrink and increase in device density, the reliability of modern
devices in advanced nodes has become a significant concern. In advanced process nodes,
different factors such as sub-wavelength lithography, line edge roughness, and random dopant
fluctuation can cause a wide process variation, which can result in higher fault density. WIs
being mostly composed of analog components are more vulnerable to faults. Besides, wired
NoC links are also vulnerable to faults from electromigration, aging or any physical damage.
Transient and intermittent failures can also occur due to crosstalk and noise in the signal,
clock or power nets. If this faults are not addressed by the interconnection network, it
can disable both on and off-chip communication. To address such faults in communication
fabric, in [7], we proposed a fault-aware wireless interconnection architecture for multicore
systems where we utilized a dynamic routing and two state MAC to continue communication
in presence of faulty WIs. Figure 6.3 shows the topology of the proposed fault-tolerant
architecture. However, research is still going on to integrate and differentiate such fault
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tolerant architecture with jamming-aware architecture proposed in Chapter 4 to come up
with an ultimate jamming and fault-aware solution.
6.2.6 A Traffic-Aware and Secure Interconnection Architecture
for Heterogeneous MCMC Systems
Heterogeneous multichip architectures have gained significant interest in HPC clusters to
cater to a wide range of applications. In particular, heterogeneous systems with multiple
multicore CPUs, GPUs, and memory have become common to meet application require-
Figure 6.3: Proposed fault-tolerant WiNiP topology [7].
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ments. In such CPU-GPU heterogenous multichip system, the memory access pattern sig-
nificantly varies between CPU and GPU. CPU requires low latency memory access while
high bandwidth memory access is required for efficient GPU computation. Keeping these
different traffic requirements in mind, a heterogeneous WiNiP interconnection architecture
using both directional and omnidirectional dual band antenna with hybrid MAC was pro-
posed in [8]. Figure 6.4 [8] shows the proposed heterogeneous MCMC system. The om-
nidirectional antenna provided low latency communication between CPU/GPU, CPU/MC
using asynchronous TDMA (aTDMA) MAC while the directional antenna provided direct
high-bandwidth communication between GPU/MC using OFDMA MAC.
However, coherence traffic for GPU using directory based cache coherence protocol is
significantly different than that of CPU [152]. As such multicast traffic can significantly
decrease system performance, a detail analysis of coherence traffic needs to be done for such
heterogenous system. Based on the analysis, implementation of one-to-many traffic-aware
MAC developed in Chapter 3 can be tested or a new MAC can be proposed that improves
the system performance. It will be interesting to look at how CPU and GPU utilizes the
Figure 6.4: A WiNiP topology for heterogeneous (CPU-GPU) MCMC system [8].
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MAC to handle their respective coherence traffic. Moreover, using heterogeneous chips in the
system increases the attack surface of the whole system and hence, increase overall security
vulnerability. The additional security vulnerability of the heterogenous system needs to be
studied and a security-aware heterogeneous architecture needs to be developed.
6.2.7 High-speed Transceiver Design and Emerging Wireless In-
terconnects for Future WiNiPs
To satisfy the ever growing demand of the future HPC systems, it is critical to design the
wireless transceivers in advanced technology nodes. However, designing wireless transceivers
in advanced nodes is challenging due higher inductance and capacitance effect with lower
voltage headroom. Appendix A shows a detail design of a OOK wireless transmitter in 45nm
technology node which provides an energy efficiency of 1.2 pj/bit with 16Gbps link speed.
Current work is going on to complete the layout of that transmitter and transceiver design
in more advanced nodes will be explored in future.
Moreover, novel wireless interconnect technologies such as CNT or graphene-based nano-
antennas have emerged as high-speed, energy efficient interconnect solutions for on and off-
chip communication. Although such technologies are yet to overcome many integration and
fabrication challenges, performance modelling with various MAC, topologies, communication
protocols, and the associated vulnerabilities can be studied for future WiNiP interconnection






Transceiver and Link Budget Analysis
Inter-chip wireless links require extremely low energy consumption to be competitive with
high-speed serial I/O and other emerging technologies like photonic interconnects. The
power consumption in data transmission over wireless medium occurs at the transmitters
and receivers. The choice of the transceiver is dependent on the choice of the physical layer
and modulation technique. In the mm-wave wireless physical layer designs, most research
adopt simple modulation techniques like non-coherent OOK as it eliminates power-hungry,
high-frequency carrier recovery circuits such as PLLs resulting in low power design.
The wireless transceiver used for all of the experiments presented in this dissertation was
designed in 65nm node providing a data rate of 16 Gbps with 2.03 pj/bit energy efficiency.
Transceivers designed in advanced nodes can significantly improve data rate as well as en-
ergy efficiency. However, transceiver design in advanced node requires to overcome various
additional challenges such as low voltage headroom, complex impedance matching. Here, as
our continuous effort to improve wireless energy efficiency, design of a transceiver in 45nm
technology node has been discussed. The fundamentals of wireless transceiver and channel
modeling discussed here will also help the reader to understand the research work presented
in this dissertation. In the next section, we present a non-coherent OOK transmitter designed
at 45nm node for inter-chip wireless communication in the 60GHz band.
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A.1 60GHz Transmitter Architecture
Figure A.1(a) [153] shows the block diagram of an OOK transmitter consisting of a VCO,
modulator and Power Amplifier (PA). In this section, the design approaches for these com-
ponents of the 60GHz OOK transmitter using 45nm technology have been briefly discussed.
A.1.1 Voltage Controlled Oscillator
The VCO is responsible for generating the 60GHz RF carrier wave for the OOK modulator.
The maximum single-ended voltage swing with minimum phase noise can be achieved by an
NMOS cross-coupled VCO as it has comparatively less phase noise compared to the other
oscillators such as ring or LC oscillator [154]. In the cross-coupled NMOS oscillator shown
in Figure A.2, the positive feedback is given via the M1, M2 transistors and the LC tank
Figure A.1: Block diagram of the OOK (a) Transmitter, (b) Receiver.
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circuit. The startup time is a critical part of the oscillator design. To avoid the startup time
from limiting the data rate we do not use the VCO as a modulator. Therefore, the output of
the VCO, the Local Oscillator (LO) signal, is coupled to a separate OOK modulator input
via a transformer, X1 with a 1:1 turns ratio to ensure symmetrical swing at the input of
the modulator. Transformer matching technique was adopted as it reduces overall power
consumption by eliminating buffers or coupling capacitors.
A.1.2 OOK Modulator
The proposed modulator is shown in Figure A.2. The NMOS M6 works essentially as a
pass transistor. The Base Band signal (BB) is fed into the gate terminal of M6. The BB
signal when HIGH turns on the pass transistor allowing the carrier to pass to the drain of
M6 from its source. Similar to the transformer X1 coupling the VCO to the modulator,
another 1:1.5 transformer, X2 is designed to obtain single ended output from the modulator
and for impedance matching of the modulator output with the input of the PA. NMOS M5
is used to drain the residual charge on the transformer when BB is LOW. Table A.1 shows
Figure A.2: Schematic of the proposed OOK modulator with NMOS cross-coupled VCO.
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Table A.1: Component values of the proposed OOK modulator and VCO
X1, X2 M1n, M2n M3n M4n M5n, M6n
1:1, 1:1.5 6um/65nm 60um/65nm 1um/65nm 2.25um/45nm
M7p M8n C1,C2 C3,C4 L1
480nm/45nm 450nm/45nm 10fF 20.1fF 350pH
Table A.2: Component values of the proposed PA
M1n, M2n Ld1 Ld2 Lg1
10um/90um 350pH 420pH 600pH
Lg2 C1 C2,C3 k1,k2
350pH 1pF 14fF 0.088, 128
the component values used to design the OOK modulator.
A.1.3 Two Stage Power Amplifier
In the transmitter, power amplifier is one of the power-hungry blocks that affects the overall
efficiency of the transmitter. In the design, a two-stage Common Source (CS) topology is
used as it provides high frequency response and larger voltage swing compared to cascode
designs. The two-stage PA proposed in this work is shown in Figure A.3. It uses a CS
topology with drain-to-gate transformer-feedback neutralization technique, which creates an
additional signal path that neutralizes the current flow through Cgd [125]. The transformers
are formed using inductors at the gate and drain terminals of M1 (Lg1 Ld1) and M2 (Lg2
Ld2) as shown in Figure A.3 with coupling factors, k1 and k2 respectively. The values of the




, Vin = 0 (A.1)
of the two stages of the amplifier. The inductor Ld1 and Ld2 at the drain of the tran-
sistors M1 and M2 resonates with the drain capacitance. This increases the overall gain
and bandwidth at the center frequency. Transistor M1 and M2 are biased using a voltage
divider based biasing circuit. The output of the power amplifier is matched with 50 Ohms
by using L match impedance matching technique. Table A.2 shows the component values of
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the proposed PA.
A.1.4 Characteristics of the 60GHz transmitter
Here, the key characteristics of the transmitter has been discussed. Figure A.4(a) shows
Figure A.3: Schematic of the proposed PA.
Figure A.4: Transmitter characterization (a) VCO oscillation frequency (b) ON-OFF state
gain of the modulator.
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the frequency response of the VCO. From Figure A.4(a), it can be observed that the VCO
is centered at 60GHz. The on-off steady state gain of OOK modulator have been simulated
using Cadence Virtuoso Analog Design Environment (ADE). At 60GHz the modulator has
an “on” and “off” state gain of -3.6dB and -81.6dB respectively as shown in Figure A.4(b).
Therefore, the on-off steady state gain is above 78dB for the frequency ranges from 45GHz
to 75GHz.
Figure A.5 shows the S11, S22, and S21 for the proposed PA. The S11 is the ratio of
reflected power to the incident power at the input port and is known as reflection coefficient
or return loss. For the proposed PA design the value of reflection coefficient, S11 is found
to be -30.15dB at 60GHz. Therefore, we conclude that the input is matched well with the
50 Ohm antenna impedance and hence we find negligible reflections at the input at 60GHz.
Similarly, S22 is the ratio of reflected power to the incident power on the output port and
it is found to be -15.42dB at 60GHz. S21 is the ratio of output power to the input power
and represents the power gain for a well-matched PA. From Figure A.5, S21 is found to be
14.48dB.
The waveform shown in Figure A.6 shows the amplified OOK modulated signal at the
output of PA with a pseudo-random sequence of logic 0s and 1s at baseband signal input.
Figure A.5: S parameter of the PA.
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As demonstrated 9 bits (000111100) are modulated between 1.06ns and 1.59ns indicating a
data rate of nearly 17Gbps. The output waveform indicates a 450mVpp which translates to
-3dBm output power and is achieved with a total DC power consumption of 3.9mW. This
implies a bit energy efficiency of 0.23pJ/bit at 17Gbps on the transmitter side.
A.2 60GHz Receiver Design
Here, a 60GHz receiver proposed in [155] that can demodulate the signal received over
inter-chip wireless interconnect transmitted from the above the transmitter, has been dis-
cussed. The Figure A.1(b) [155] shows the components of the receiver that consists of a high
gain LNA and an OOK demodulator to demodulate the amplified received signal. The LNA
Figure A.6: BB signal (top) and transmitter output (bottom) for a pseudo-random sequence.
136
consists of a two-stage CS configuration as both the Common Gate (CG) and resistive feed-
back based topologies suffer from Noise Figure degradation due to the occurrence of noisy
resistances in the signal path. Moreover, cascode structures, which are used commonly in
low-frequency design for their high gains, are not suitable for the high frequency application.
This is because the parasitic capacitances in the cascode transistors become dominant at
higher frequencies, which reduces the inter stage impedance and hence, overall gain. The
output of the LNA is then matched to the input of the demodulator. Since this information
is modulated with a high frequency carrier signal, the OOK demodulator will exhibit a Low
Pass Filter characteristic, removing the carrier wave and recovering the baseband digital
signal. The proposed OOK demodulator consists of a source degenerated envelope detector
at the input stage and a two-stage BB amplifier at the final output. The received waveform
in Figure A.7 shows that the receiver is capable of achieving a data rate of 17 Gbps with
12mVpp at the input. The total DC power consumption of the OOK receiver is 6.1mW,
which results in a bit energy- efficiency of 0.36pJ/bit [155] at a data rate of 17Gbps. The
LNA of the receiver has a Noise Figure of 2.8dB making the noise floor -68.7dB at 300K for
a bandwidth of 17GHz Therefore, together with the transmitter the transceiver consume a
total of 0.59pJ/bit operating at 17Gbps.
A.3 60 GHz Link Budget Analysis
In this section, the wireless channel has been characterized in terms of BER that can be
sustained by using the TX described here in typical MCMC environments. The BER has
been evaluated for a range of path loss from 25 to 50dB corresponding to typical intra and
inter-chip communication distances [3]. The received signal power is given by:
PR = PT − PL (A.2)
Here, PR and PT are the received and transmitted power respectively and PL is the path
loss. At the receiving side we assume a non-coherent OOK receiver as these are most power
efficient [155]. Considering Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) at the receiver, the
overall Noise Floor, NFloor of such a receiver is given by
NFloor = 10log(kT ) + 10log(BW ) +NF (A.3)
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Where, k is the Boltzmann constant, T is the absolute temperature, BW is the bandwidth
and NF is the Noise Figure of the receiver. We have considered an NF of 2.8dB for the LNA
designed in [155]. Therefore, from (2) the NFloor of the receiver is -67.8dBm at 300K for a
BW of 16GHz. However, in addition to thermal AWGN, ISI can impact the reliability of
the mm-wave link. Multipath channels existing in such environments as well as bandwidth
limitation of the transceiver, the antennas and the channel, cause ISI. In the absence of
thorough multipath channel models at 60GHz in multichip environments bandwidth limited
Figure A.7: LNA input of the receiver (top) and BB receiver output (bottom) for the same
sequence.
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ISI was considered only in our link budget analysis. From Figure A.6, the transmitter output
is 450mVpp and 67mVpp when it is transmitting a ‘1’ and a ‘0’ respectively when measured
at the center of the pulses. Therefore, the on-off ratio of overall OOK transmitter, ROOK
is 16.54dB. Therefore, the value of bandwidth-limited ISI noise, NISI is dependent on path
loss and is given by,
NISI = PT −ROOK − PL (A.4)
The received Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) is given by,
SINR = PR −NFloor −NISI (A.5)














Where, erfc() is the complimentary error function. Figure A.8 shows the BER achieved
with this transmitter for a wide range of path loss values with and without ISI (for compar-
ison).
Figure A.8: BER variation vs path loss: with and without ISI.
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Appendix B
Machine Learning and Neural
Network Fundamentals
In Chapter 4, various ML classifiers were explored to detect the presence of an internal
and external persistent jamming. Similarly, an ANN model was used in Chapter 5 from
attacker’s side to breach system security by accurately predicting the applications running in
the system. As optimization of the ML or ANN models is not the purpose of this dissertation,
here, we briefly discuss the training and testing procedures of the ML and ANN models used
in those chapters with respect to the WiNiP architecture considered for MCMC environment.
B.1 Basics of the Used ML Classifiers
Several ML classifiers were investigated while detecting the presence of a persistent jamming
in Chapter 4. In this section, some basics of those ML models and their training and testing
process will be discussed.
A SVM is a supervised machine learning classifier with associated learning algorithm that
can analyze data for classification. A SVM takes various data points as input and tries to
find out a hyperplane that best separates the data point tags. This hyperplane is known as
support vector. Once this hyperplane is optimized, based on the location, new data points
140
are classified. Figure B.1 (a) shows the basic operation of a SVM classifier.
DT is a supervised learning method used for classification and regression. It continuously
breaks down a data set into smaller data sets based on some if-else like decision rules and
therefore, forms a tree-like structure. The final result is a tree with decision nodes and leaf
nodes. The decision nodes are intermediate points where further splitting happens. The leaf
nodes represent the final classification results. The topmost decision node is called the root
node. Figure B.1 (b) shows the basic operation of a DT classifier.
KNN is a simple supervised ML algorithm used for classification and regression problems.
For object classification, the object is classified based on majority votes out of its K number of
nearest neighbouring samples. Typically the distance between the nearest K training samples
are measured and sorted in ascending order. The object is assigned the label according to the
mode of the K nearest labels. Figure B.1 (c) shows the basic operation of a KNN classifier.
The considered jamming attacks in Chapter 4 primarily result in causing continuous sus-
tained burst errors in the flits (data corruption). This can be detected by observing the
number of flits in error. In the proposed WiNiP, the output of BEU, which is the number
of burst errors within a block, is fed to an ML classifier to detect and differentiate attacks.
In order to train the ML classifier, cycle accurate WiNiP simulator was modeled to operate
in one of the three modes; normal, random burst errors, and attack mode governed by the
Markov Chain process as described in Chapter 4. In the normal mode, the wireless inter-
connects are assumed to work with the reliability level determined by the operation of the
transceiver and their operating thermal noise. The second mode (random burst errors) is
Figure B.1: Overview of (a) SVM (b) DT (c) KNN classifiers.
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modeled with higher BERs as the burst errors are contiguous bits of flits. Lastly, under DoS
attack, a high BER of 0.5 is assumed as for identically and independently distributed (iid)
data bits even a very high power jamming signal can cause errors only half of the time on
an average.
The simulator is modeled to create flit errors based on these BERs, which are then assumed
to be detected by the BEU. The simulator is made to operate in one of the three modes
dynamically by using a Markov Chain driven process with the assigned state transition
probability discussed in Chapter 4. The specific probability values can be altered to model
any particular scenario. This observed data (number of errors, flits transmitted and received)
along with the operating mode as encountered in each WI is used to train the ML classifier
at that WI. As the duration of the individual states are determined by the Markov Chain
randomly, each specific instance of the states have varying duration, resulting in a diverse
training data set. For the inference i.e., attack detection, the ML classifiers are fed runtime
data such as, whether a flit is received or not, and whether a burst error is detected or
not to detect the mode of operation of system. Training and testing of ML classifiers were
performed with a hundred thousand cycles of data. The training and testing process of the
ML classifiers are shown in Figure B.2.
Figure B.2: Training data creating and testing of the ML classifiers.
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B.2 Description of the Used ANN Classifier
ANNs are biological neural network inspired computational system. Like biological neu-
rons, ANN is composed of many connected computing nodes that process an input signal and
can send an output signal to the connected neurons once enabled by the activation function
just like action potential in neurons. Each signal in ANN has an associated weight which is
optimized during learning phase to reduce the prediction error. Typically the neurons are
arranged in multiple layers where each layer may perform different functions. Figure B.3
shows a basic ANN architecture.
Although many kinds of ANN models exist, here we have limited our discussion to the ar-
chitecture, training, and testing process of the Deep Neural Network (DNN) used in Chapter
5. DNN is an ANN with multiple hidden layers between the input and the output layers as
shown in Fig B.3. We initially built a dataset consisting of eighty different features (pay-
loads) obtained from simulating a system with 64 cores and 16 memory controllers, with
combinations of twelve applications with no more than three running simultaneously.
We consider a maximum of three applications running simultaneously in the system sig-
Figure B.3: Basic ANN architecture.
Figure B.4: DNN layers and neuron numbers with activation functions.
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nifying up to three independent users hosted on the system executing three applications
running simultaneously. Although a larger number of users can be easily accommodated by
only creating training data with that assumption. We create this data in the same manner
as an actual attacker who may be able to create using an emulator or a simulator of the
real system. Specifically, we use a cycle-accurate simulator which monitors the movement
of packets broken down into flits in a NoC. Various permutations of the applications from
a common parallel benchmark suites [122] were executed on the simulator to create traffic
traces that were visible to the HTs and those traffic traces consisting of number of packets
traversing HT infected switches were used as the training dataset.
Furthermore, we train our ANN with all the features available. This yields high accuracy
in predicting the application(s) running on the system. However, the caveat here is that
although the ANN could be trained on a large set of features, yet, it is not feasible to expect
a HT to snoop on all switches simultaneously. Doing so would contribute a significant latency,
area and power overhead, eventually leading to HT detection. Thus, to reflect the real-world
scenario, the attacker intends to insert a HT which focuses on the dominant features that still
enable it to predict applications with high accuracy. We translated this approach by using
correlation-based feature selection i.e., determine the routers in which the HTs need to be
embedded (performed offline) that reduces latency without compromising the performance.
We deploy a 5 layer ANN (N -800-500-200-64-12 neurons; N represents number of features
at input) with ReLU as activation functions for hidden layers and softmax as the activation
Figure B.5: Overall training and testing process.
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function for the output layer. The DNN layer configuration is depicted in Figure B.4.
There are twelve final outputs for the ANN, which are the number of individual applica-
tions used to build the dataset. To represent simultaneous execution of multiple applications,
one-hot encoding has been utilized. A 5-fold cross-validation was utilized to analyze per-
formance, determined based on grid-search. As the ANN is deployed off-chip, the area and
other overheads are not of concern, except the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. The
DNN model was trained using the packet count obtained from deterministic routing while
the testing was done for the packet count obtained from the proposed SA-based routing in
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erated learning: Strategies for improving communication efficiency,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1610.05492, 2016.
[152] I. Singh, A. Shriraman, W. W. Fung, M. O’Connor, and T. M. Aamodt, “Cache
coherence for gpu architectures,” in 2013 IEEE 19th International Symposium on High
Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA). IEEE, 2013, pp. 578–590.
[153] T. Shinde, S. Subramaniam, P. Deshmukh, M. M. Ahmed, M. Indovina, and A. Gan-
guly, “A 0.24 pj/bit, 16gbps ook transmitter circuit in 45-nm cmos for inter and intra-
chip wireless interconnects,” in Proceedings of the 2018 on Great Lakes Symposium on
VLSI, 2018, pp. 69–74.
[154] T. Dellsperger, C. Kromer, and G. Sialm, “Design of a 5 ghz vco in cmos,” Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology Zurich: Zurich, Switzerland, 2002.
[155] S. Subramaniam, T. Shinde, P. Deshmukh, M. S. Shamim, M. Indovina, and A. Gan-
guly, “A 0.36 pj/bit, 17gbps ook receiver in 45-nm cmos for inter and intra-chip wireless
interconnects,” in 2017 30th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 132–137.
166
